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Abstract 
The theoretically ideal tax depreciation rule under an 
accretion tax is economic depreciation, a stream of deductions that 
replicates the decline in value of an asset over time. When the 
future value path of an asset is known in advance, the tax 
depreciation schedule should be based on the age-price profile for 
surviving assets. 
When the future value path of an asset is uncertain, this 
approach fails. A taxpayer can accelerate the statutory schedule 
by "strategic loss-taking . "  A series of special disposition rules 
(where each rule is combined with an adjustment in the ex ante 
depreciation schedule) address this problem, but each such rule has 
particular disadvantages. 
Finally, strategic loss...:taking and rules designed to address 
it are particularly important in formulating a policy toward group 
accounting methods of depreciation. 
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Tax Depreciation and Risk 
by Jeff Strnad· 
A major issue under an accretion tax is how to treat 
depreciable assets, assets that tend to decline in value with time 
and use. The classic theoretical ideal is economic depreciation, 
a stream of deductions that exactly replicates the decline in value 
of each asset over time .1  Although some parts of U.S. law aim to 
replicate economic depreciation, tax depreciation is normally 
allowed at a rate that is faster than economic depreciation. The 
goal of the 11accelerated depreciation" portion of the system is to 
provide a general subsidy to investment without distorting the 
choice between assets . Thus, the ideal is to allow acceleration of 
tax depreciation for all assets but to tailor the degree of 
acceleration for each asset so that no asset is favored over 
another strictly due to the tax depreciation rules. 
Risk affects depreciable assets . For example, it is uncertain 
*· John B .  Milliken ProfeSsor of Taxation, University of 
Southern California ,  and Associate Professor of Law and Economics , 
California Institute of Technology .  I have benefitted from 
comments received when an earlier draft was presented to the Los 
Angeles Tax Policy Group, Harvard Tax Policy Workshop and workshops 
at Yale Law School and Stanford Law School. In addition, I am 
grateful for helpful com�ents outside of the workshop context from 
Bill Andrews, Ellen Aprill, Joe Bankman, Dick craswel l ,  Tom 
Griffith, Louis Kaplow, Bill Klein, Michael Knoll ,  Ed Mccaffery, 
Eric Ramseyer, Roberta Romano, Hillel Sommer , Matt Spitzer, and Al 
Warren . Finally, I am grateful for valuable comments and thorough 
research assistance from Bill Scarff. All errors are my own 
responsibility. 
1. see, g.g. , e. Bittker & L. Lokken, Federal Taxation of 
Income, Estates and Gifts 23-10 (2nd ed, 1988); M. Graetz, Federal 
Income Taxation 391 (2nd ed, 1988) . 
In the framework of an annual accounting period, economic 
depreciation of an asset calls for a deduction each year equal to 
the decline in value of the asset during that year. 
2 
how long an asset will function. Some assets wear out and fail 
much earlier than others. This type of risk will be called 
11retirement risk. 11 Retirement risk plays a special role in the 
analysis of depreciation rules. 
There are other types of risk that affect depreciable assets . 
For example, there is "revenue risk." Assuming that an asset 
survives through a particular future year, the revenues from asset 
output and the future costs of operating the asset during that year 
are uncertain. 2 
Risk can have a significant impact on the optimal design of 
depreciation rules. This Article analyzes that impact in two 
steps . Before starting the two step analysis, Part I discusses 
current law and the basic impact of risk on the depreciation 
system. 
Part II contains the first step: an analysis under the 
assumption that the future price path of surviving units is known 
when an asset is put in service. This assumption is restrictive 
because risk normally will make the future price path for surviving 
units uncertain. Nonetheless, this assumption implies that an 
especially simple set of rules results in a tax treatment that 
matches economic depreciation. In particular, the statutory 
schedule should consist of the expected price path for surviving 
assets. When an asset is retired, appropriate treatment is assured 
2 .  No attempt will be made to separate risk rigorously into 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. such a 
categorization is not necessary for the analysis in the Article. 
It is convenient at several points, however, to treat retirement 
risk as a distinct kind of risk. 
3 
by allowing a deduction for the adjusted basis at the time of 
retirement . There is no need to adjust the statutory schedule to 
take retirement risk into account . 
Given this simple rule as a baseline, Part II examines two 
the prominent approaches for replicating economic depreciation: 
leading academic approach originating in a paper by Charles Hulten 
and Frank Wykoff, 3 and the government approach used by the Treasury 
Department to determine class lives. Part II concludes that the 
Hulten and Wykoff approach results in depreciation rates that are 
much faster than economic depreciation. The government approach is 
conceptually sound, but one of the two major ways that the 
government uses to implement that approach results in large errors. 
Although the government position was formed too recently to have 
had much impact on the depreciation rules,4 the Hulten and Wykoff
approach has had a substantial impact on current law. 5 
Part II goes on to point out that even though retirement risk 
need not be taken into account in designing a schedule that results 
in a treatment equivalent to economic depreciation , retirement risk 
must be taken into account in designing an accelerated schedule 
that does not favor some assets over others . If two assets are 
subject to different forms of retirement risk, very different 
3 .  Hul ten and Wykoff, The Measurement o f  Economic 
Depreciation, in Depreciation, Inflation, and the Taxation of 
Income from Capital 81 (C. Hulten ed, 1981) .  For a discussion of 
the high esteem for this approach and its influence on existing 
law, see infra note 4 5 .  
4 .  See infra note 2 3  and text accompanying notes 61-63. 
5 .  See infra note 4 5 .  
4 
degrees of acceleration may be appropriate for the assets even 
though they would have the same depreciation schedule under a 
scheme that replicates economic depreciation. 
Part III considers the complications that arise in the more 
general and realistic case where the asset price path for surviving 
units is not known in advance. Given that it is still necessary to 
establish a single ex ante depreciation schedule for each asset, 
"strategic loss-taking" comes prominently into play: There is an 
incentive to trade depreciable assets to establish price paths that 
fall below the statutory schedule. Part III discusses potential 
responses to this phenomenon. 
The most promising general responses consist of changes in the 
11disposition11 rules for depreciable assets combined with 
adjustments in the ex ante depreciation schedule. Under current 
law, dispositions result in an immediate tax on loss or gain. It 
is this feature that allows taxpayers to take losses strategically. 
Part III considers several alternative disposition rules such as 
not taxing dispositions at all and levying a tax on the gross 
proceeds (without subtracting adjusted basis) • Applying these 
rules requires an accelerated ex ante depreciation schedule since 
the disposition rules no longer allow a deduction for the loss upon 
retirement of an asset. None of the combinations of disposition 
rules and ex ante schedule adjustments emerges as a dominant 
approach . Part III explores the trade-offs inherent in choosing 
one alternative over another. 
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Part IV applies the results from Part III to "group 
accounting" rules for depreciable assets . These rules permit 
groups of assets to be depreciated as if they were a single asset. 
The rules are important because group accounting can significantly 
lower administrative and taxpayer compliance costs for some 
taxpayers . However, strategic loss-taking is a severe problem for 
some types of group accounts . As a result, a study of group 
accounting policy is an important and natural application of the 
theory developed in Part I I I .  Part IV concludes that two of the 
special disposition rules studied in Part III are very promising 
approaches for the most troublesome types of group accounts . 
Part V summarizes the main conclusions reached in the Article. 
These conclusions and results are relevant not only for the task of 
reforming the general depreciation rules in the tax code but also 
for addressing any tax problem that involves assets that tend to 
depreciate in value. 
6 
I .  Basic Depreciation Policy Considerations and Current Law 
Before engaging in substantive analysis of depreciation and 
risk, it is important to set the stage by discussing current law 
and some general properties of tax depreciation in a risky 
environment . Section A discusses the basic choices that must be 
made in designing a depreciation system composed of depreciation 
schedules set in advance . Attention is devoted to asset retirement 
patterns and strategic loss-taking since these phenomena have a 
heavy impact in such a depreciation system . Section B discusses 
the depreciation methods used under both individual item accounting 
and group accounting, the two major accounting approaches employed 
in current law. 
A. B.asic Depreciation Policy Choices, Asset Retirement Patterns 
and Strategic Trading 
Current tax depreciation rules contain both ex ante and ex 
post elements. Instead of taking the ex post approach of observing 
the actual decline in value suffered by each asset each year, a tax 
depreciation schedule is set in advance at the time the asset is 
placed in service. This schedule is the ex ante element of the tax 
depreciation rules. The two crucial features of the schedule are 
the total time period over which depreciation deductions will be 
allowed and the pattern of deductions during that "recovery 
period. "  A taxpayer facing constant marginal tax rates and a 
positive interest rate over time will prefer to have a short 
recovery period and a front-loaded pattern of deductions that 
shifts deductions into earlier years. 
7 
Although the tax depreciation schedule is set ex ante, ex post 
adjustments occur if the taxpayer sells or disposes of the asset. 
Two sale and disposition events are of particular interest: asset 
retirements and strategic _trades. Asset retirement occurs when the 
asset reaches the end of its economic life and is discarded. 6 
Strategic trading occurs when a taxpayer chooses to sell a 
depreciating asset in order to achieve a favorable tax result. To 
illustrate the nature of these events and their impact on the tax 
depreciation schedule, two examples follow. 
In both examples, we will assume that the tax treatment of 
dispositions will be the one currently applied under " individual 
item accounting . "  That treatment consists of the taxpayer 
realizing a gain or a loss equal to the amount realized, if any, on 
disposition minus the adjusted basis. 7 Since this treatment is 
6 .  I assume that salvage value i s  zero throughout the 
Article. This assumption simplifies the analysis, and the main 
results would not be affected by assuming a nonzero salvage value. 
7 .  Dispositions of depreciable assets may result in capital 
gains and losses or ordinary gains and losses . The rules are 
moderately complex. since most depreciable assets are used in a 
trade or business, these assets normally are subject to the 
provisions in section 1231.  See I . R.C.  § 123l(a)  ( 3 )  ( 1991 ) . That 
section aggregates gains and losses for assets covered by the 
section, and if there is a net gain in aggregate, it is treated as 
a capital gain. See I . R . C .  § 123 1 ( a )  ( 1 )  (1991 ) . If there is a net 
loss in aggregate, the loss is treated as an ordinary loss. See 
I . R . C .  § 1231(a)  ( 2 )  ( 1991) . 
Section 1231 is not the end of the story. The "recapture" 
provisions in sections 1245 and 1250 require that a portion of the 
gain on some depreciable assets be treated as ordinary gain. See 
I .R . C. §§ 1245, 1250 ( 1991) . Under section 1245 any amount of gain 
up to the sum of all past depreciation allowances will be ordinary 
income. See I . R.C.  § 1245 (a) ( 1 )  and ( 2 )  ( 1991) . The rules under 
section 1250 shift gain to ordinary gain to the extent past 
depreciation deductions have exceeded the deductions that would 
have been allowed under the straight-line method . See I . R . C .  § 
8 
linked to individual item accounting, we shall refer to it as the 
" individual item method" when discussing alternative treatments of 
asset dispositions . Individual item accounting itself will be 
defined precisely and contrasted with the alternative , "group 
accounting , "  in section B. 8 
To begin the first example, assume that the statutory tax 
depreciation schedule is the smooth curve shown in Figure 1 .  9 
Thus, in the first year the taxpayer deducts $20 of the initial 
$100 value of the asset. The depreciation period is 10 years. 
Suppose, however, that the asset breaks down right after reaching 
age three and is discarded as worthless at that time. The adjusted 
1250 (a) (1) and (b) ( 1 )  ( 1991) . 
The rest of this Article will ignore the characterization of 
gain or loss upon disposition as ordinary or capita l .  Despite the 
fact that capital gains rates are now the same as ordinary income 
rates, this characterization is still important . Capital gains· are 
valuable because they tend to free taxpayers from the limitation on 
capital losses which allows capital losses to be taken only to the 
extent there are offsetting capital gains. This limitation hinders 
the ability to take losses early and therefore diminishes the 
potential value of strategic loss-taking. That potential value is 
very high, about 10% of value for the typical stock market asset. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the relation between strategic 
loss-taking and the limitation on capital losses, see Strnad , 
Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and Implementation, 99 
Yale L.J. 1817, 1870-12 , 1879, 1882-84 , 1885-1889 ( 1990) . 
Under section 1231,  losses from the disposition of depreciable 
assets will tend to be ordinary losses. The limitation on capital 
losses does not come into play. This fact means that not much is 
lost by ignoring the capital loss versus ordinary loss distinction 
when studying depreciable assets . Ignoring the distinction also 
simplifies the exposition of the major points in the Article. 
8. See � text accompanying notes 16-18.
9. This curve corresponds to MACRS depreciation for a 10-year 
recovery period under the Code . Thus, depreciation is at a 
declining balance rate of 20% per year and then switches to 
straight-line after five years have elapsed. 
9 
basis at the beginning of that year was $51, and the taxpayer can 
take a loss in that amount upon discarding the asset. 10 The ex 
post depreciation schedule is the one indicated in Figure 2 .  This 
schedule tracks the statutory schedule for the first three years 
and then abruptly drops off to zero in the third year. 
Figure 1 Figure 2 
100 100 
80 80 
Value 60 Value 60 
40 40 
20 20 
0 0 0 2 4 6 8 10 0 2 ' 6 8 10 
Time (years) Time (years) 
One variety of strategic trading is "strategic loss-taking . "  
Like asset retirements , strategic loss-taking results in an ex post 
adjustment of the pattern of deductions specified ex ante by the 
statutory depreciation schedule. suppose that the statutory 
schedule is in annual increments representing the same annual 
decrements in value as the statutory schedule in the Figure 1. 
This annualized schedule is represented by the step function in 
Figure 3 .  First year depreciation is $20 and initial cost was $100 
10. To take a loss in the year the asset is abandoned , the 
taxpayer must show abandonment. I assume throughout the Article 
that this showing is not an obstacle. For most depreciable assets, 
this assumption is innocuous since the assets are tangible. The 
real problems in showing abandonment or worthlessness have been 
associated with intangible assets such as securities or legal 
claims. see M. Graetz, supra note 1 ,  at 414-15. 
10 
so that the depreciation schedule is at $80 during the first 
year.11 In the same figure, the market value of the asset appears 
as an irregular curve . 
Figure 3 
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Suppose that the taxpayer can costlessly sell the asset for 
its market value and replace it with a similar used asset of the 
11. The reason for using this particular step function is 
that asset value as a function of time is plotted on the same 
graph. Strategic loss-taking possibilities arise if asset value 
during any given year falls below the adjusted basis after 
depreciation is deducted at the end of the year. It is easier to 
see on a graph whether asset value during a year falls below 
adjusted basis as of the end of the year if the depreciation 
schedule is represented during each year as equal to the adjusted 
basis at the end of the year. 
Figures 3 and 4 take this approach. Thus, for the first year 
in Figure 3 ,  the depreciation schedule is represented by a constant 
$80 value. This $80 value is the adjusted basis at the end of the 
first year after the depreciation deduction of $20 for that year is 
taken into account. 
11 
same value . 12 If the taxpayer faces a constant marginal tax rate 
during the entire ten-year life of the asset, then the taxpayer 
will want to "accelerate" depreciation by selling the asset during 
year three. Depreciation along the statutory schedule would have 
brought the adjusted basis of the asset down to $51 at the end of 
that year. By selling at the low of $28 during the third year, 13 
the taxpayer can take an additional loss of ($51 - $28) = $23 for 
that year. Assuming that the replacement asset is depreciated at 
the same rate as the original one but over the shorter life 
appropriate for a used asset, the effective depreciation schedule 
will be the step function in Figure 4 .  This schedule is the same 
as the one in Figure 3 except that it shifts down to a lower level 
in year three . In effect, the taxpayer has accelerated statutory 
12. The wash sale rules of section 1091 deny a loss deduction 
when sale is accompanied by purchase of a "substantially identical 11 
asset within 30 days preceding or following the sale. See I.R.C. 
§ 109l(a) (1991) . But section 1091 applies only to "shares of 
stock or securities" and thus does not apply to depreciable assets. 
See id. Sale and repurchase of the same asset might be treated as 
a sham transaction so that the loss on sale would be denied. See 
Knetsch v. United States, 364 U . S .  361 (1960) (court can invoke 
sham transaction doctrine to ignore the form of a transaction with 
"no economic substance" and treat it as -something else for tax 
purposes) . However ,  many depreciable assets such as cars and 
computers are quite distinct but functionally fungible, and the 
taxpayer could probably avoid the sham transaction doctrine by 
buying a replacement asset that is similar but not identical to the 
asset that was sold. As a result, it would probably be difficult 
to design effective wash sale rules for depreciable assets. 
1 3 . The ability to trade costlessly means that it is possible
to sell an asset when it reaches its lowest market value during 
some period. The trader need only sell and repurchase whenever the 
asset drops an infinitesimal amount . The last sale and repurchase 
will take place at the lowest market value during the period. This 
strategy involves a large number of trades, but each trade costs 
nothing. 
12 
depreciati.on by strategic loss-taking. 
Two important characteristics of strategic loss-taking are 
worthy of mention. First, profitable strategic loss-taking is only 
possible for a particular asset i f ,  at some point in time, the 
market value of the asset falls below the adjusted basis dictated 
by depreciation schedule. 14 Second, the viability of strategic 
loss-taking depends on transaction costs. If trading is costly 
enough , the benefits of "accelerating" depreciation will be less 
than the after-tax trading costs required to secure those benefits. 
strategic loss-taking is not the only form of strategic 
trading that is important for depreciation policy. 15 But, because 
strategic loss-taking allows the taxpayer to alter the depreciation 
schedule set by the government, it must be considered carefully in 
the design of depreciation policy. As a result, strategic loss-
taking looms large in the discussions that follow, and especially 
so in Part I I I .  
1 4 . I f  statutory depreciation i s  accelerated, the scope for 
strategic loss-taking is lessened. For example, if depreciation 
for the asset depicted in Figures 3 and 4 were accelerated so that 
adjusted basis were at or below $28 by the end of year three, then 
there would be no reason to trade in year three . The extreme 
instance of accelerated depreciation occurs under a cash flow 
income tax where the entire cost of an asset is deducted at the 
time of purchase. In this case, assuming the asset cannot fall 
below zero in value, there is no scope for strategic loss-taking at 
all .  
15. See infra text accompanying notes 161-162 ( discussing 
"churning") . 
B. current Law and Policy 
1 . Individual Item Accounting and Group Accounting 
13 
Under current law, the taxpayer has a choice for each asset or 
group of assets between two general approaches to depreciation 
accounting: individual item accounting and group accounting. The 
approaches differ in two significant ways. First, as the name 
suggests, group accounting typically involves the combination of 
several assets into a single account. At the election of a 
taxpayer, a group of assets is depreciated as if it were a single 
asset. Second , the tax treatment of asset dispositions under group 
accounting typically differs from the treatment under .individual 
item accounting. 
As mentioned above , 16 under individual item accounting, a 
disposition results in a gain or loss equal to the amount realized 
less the adjusted basis. Under group accounting, the rules for 
dispositions are more complicated, and a detailed discussion of 
these rules is deferred until Part IV to accompany the main policy 
discussion of group accounting. It is important to note that 
divergent treatment of dispositions under individual item and group 
accounting is not inevitable. Indeed, later portions of this 
Article consider several group accounting disposition rules as 
policy options for individual item accounting . 17 
The next subsection· of this Part discusses the depreciation 
schedules that are applied under current law. These schedules are 
16. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 115-116.
14 
the same regardless of whether the taxpayer uses individual item 
accounting or group accounting. 18 
2 .  Depreciation Schedules 
There are two separate major schedules for tax depreciation in 
the Internal Revenue Code: the Modified Accelerated Cost Recovery 
system {"MACRS" )  and the Alternative Depreciation System ( "ADS") •19 
These two schedules differ in their relationship to economic 
depreciation, the theoretical ideal of matching the actual pattern 
of decline in asset value exactly by depreciation deductions .20 
18. For example, the proposed regulations for "mass asset 
accounts" simply state that "a taxpayer may elect to account for 
mass assets • • • in the same mass asset account, as though such 
assets were a single mass asset.11 Prop. Reg. § 1.168-2 (h) ( 1 ) .  
11Mass asset accounts11 are the group accounts for the Accelerated 
Cost Recovery System ( 11ACRS11) applicable to tangible property 
placed into Service from 1981-86. No regulations have been 
promulgated for "general asset accounts, 11 the group accounts for 
the Modified Accelerated cost Recovery system ("MACRS" )  applicable 
to tangible property placed into service after 1986. In the.Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 and the associated legislative history, Congress 
evinced no intention to alter the scope of depreciation methods 
available under group accounting. See I . R.C. § 168 ( i )  ( 4 )  (1991 ) ;  
General Explanation o f  the Tax Reform Act o f  1986, prepared by the 
Staff on the Joint committee on Taxation, 108 ( 1987) (hereinafter, 
"Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book" ) ;  Senate Report: S. Rep. No. 
313 , 99th Cong., 2d sess. 104 ( 1986) (hereinafter, 11Tax Reform Act 
. of 1986 senate Report" ) .  See also infra text accompanying notes 
224-227 ( suggesting use of special depreciation schedules for some 
group accounts and expressing doubt that Treasury can create and 
impose those schedules in Regulations without explicit 
Congressional authorization) . 
19. In addition to these two major systems, there is a 
plethora of special rules in the Code. See, g.g. , I.R.C. § 169 
( 1991) ( f ive year amortization of pollution control facilities); 
I.R . C .  § 174 ( b )  ( 1991) ( f ive-year amortization of certain research 
and development expenditures) ;  I.R.C. § 194 ( 1991) ( seven-year 
amortization of certain qualified reforestation expenditures) ;  
I.R.C. § 263 (c)  ( 1991) ( f ive-year amortization for certain 
intangible drilling expenditures) • 
20. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
15 
Generally speaking, the ADS system is meant to mimic economic 
depreciation while the MACRS system is designed to allow 
depreciation at a faster rate than economic depreciation in order 
to stimulate investment. Thus, the Code requires the ADS to be 
used whenever the goal is to measure income21 or to depreciate 
assets under a non-accelerated schedule. zz In addition, the 
Department of the Treasury, operating under Congressional mandate 
2 1 .  For example, when a corporation distributes money to its 
shareholders , it is necessary to decide whether the money 
represents a nontaxable return of capital to the shareholders or is 
taxable as a distribution_ of corporate profits to the shareholders. 
The key question that mu�t be answered to address this question is 
whether the corporation has profits to distribute. If it does, the 
distributions will be considered to be profits since the capital 
contributed by the shareholders is still intact and at work in the 
corporation after the distribution. 
To determine whether a distribution is from profits, the Code 
sets up an 11earnings and profits" account consisting of the net 
undistributed earnings of the corporation. To compute net 
earnings , an accurate measure of depreciation must be subtracted 
from gross earnings . The Code requires that the ADS be used for 
this depreciation computation. See I . R . C .  § 312 (k) ( 3 )  ( 1991) . 
22 . For example, taxpayers must use ADS rather than MACRS to 
depreciate equipment used outside of the United States, equipment 
leased to tax exempt entities and equipment financed by tax exempt 
bonds. lifil> I . R . C .  § 16B(g) ( 1 )  (A) - (C) ( 1991) . 
In each of these three cases, congress did not want 
depreciation to be accelerated at all. Acceleration under MACRS 
was meant to stimulate inVestment in the domestic economy. Section 
168 ensures that MACRS will not be allowed for investments used 
outside of the United States . Tax exempt entities already receive 
a total exemption from taxation . Section 168 ensures that they 
will not be able to receive tax benefits from accelerated 
depreciation through leases. Tax exempt financing results in lower 
interest charges than normal financing . See M .  Graetz, supra note 
1 ,  at 261 . Finally, section 168 prevents the double benefit that 
would arise from combining tax exempt financing with accelerated 
depreciation. 
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to study the class lives to be used as a basis for MACRS and ADS , 23  
explicitly assumes that ADS is meant to serve as a surrogate for 
economic depreciation . 24 
2 3 .  I n  the Tax Reform Act o f  1986, congress directed the 
Treasury Department to study the actual depreciation pattern of 
"all depreciable assets , "  and granted the Department authority both 
to change class lives for assets with existing class lives and to 
prescribe class lives for assets that do not have any. See I . R . C .  
§ 168 (i) ( 1 )  (B) (1986) . In the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue 
Act of 1988 , Treasury's authority to alter the class lives of 
existing assets or to create class lives for assets without any was 
eliminated but the directive to study the depreciation pattern of 
all depreciable assets was maintained. See I . R . C .  § 168(i) ( 1 )  
( 1988) ; Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Public Law 
100-467 , § 625 3 .  The Senate first passed an amendment barring 
Treasury from lengthening class lives. This amendment was extended 
in Conference to cover all Treasury authority to alter class lives, 
including the authority to establish class lives for assets that 
currently have none. See Conference Report, § 6253 . 
The Department of the Treasury recently released the first 
four reports under the Congressional mandate to study the 
depreciation pattern of "all depreciable assets . "  See Department 
of the Treasury, Report to Congress on the Depreciation of Clothing 
Held for Rental ( 1989) (hereinafter cited as "Treasury Rental 
Clothing Study" ) ; Department of the Treasury, Report to the 
Congress on the Depreciation of scientific Instruments ( 1990) 
(hereinafter cited as 11Treasury Scientific Instruments Study" ) ;  
Department of the Treasury, Report to the Congress on the 
Depreciation of Fruit and Nut Trees (1990) (hereinafter cited as 
"Treasury Fruit Tree Study") ; Department of the Treasury, Report to 
the Congress on the Depreciation of Horses ( 1990) (hereinafter 
cited as "Treasury Horse study" ) .  
2 4 .  In the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 
class lives are tied to economic depreciation: 
Class lives • • . would be determined such that the present 
value of straight-line depreciation deductions over the class 
life, discounted at an appropriate real rate of interest , is 
equal to the present value of what the estimated decline in 
value of the asset would be in the absence of inflation. 
Joint comm. on Taxation, General Explanation of the Tax Reform. Act 
of 1986, lOOth Cong . , 1st Sess . 103 ( 1986) (hereinafter cited as 
"Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book" ) .  
In its first opportunity to study class lives under this 
directive, the Treasury Department examined the issue of the proper 
class life for tuxedos. � Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra 
note 2 3 .  The Treasury Department interpreted the Congressional 
intent underlying the directive to be that treatment under the ADS 
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In setting up MACRS in 1986, Congress wanted to allow 
depreciation that is "acceleratedn in comparison to economic 
depreciation but intended that the degree of acceleration for each 
asset class be such that no class of assets would be tax-favored 
over any other class. 25 MACRS operates by assigning assets to one 
of nine classes based oh the "recovery period" to be used to 
depreciate the asset . 26 For some classes of assets, MACRS allows 
front-loaded depreciation, that is, a pattern of depreciation with 
larger deductions in the earlier years of life.27 
should approximate economic depreciation as closely as possible. 
see if! .  at 1-2 , 51. As a result, Treasury resolved ambiguities in 
the phrase "the present .value of straight-line depreciation" by 
calculating present value as if the taxpayer were subject to the 
actual ADS system. Thus, in the case of tuxedos, the mid-year 
convention for the time property is placed in service was assumed 
to apply, see infra note 28, and the tax benefits of the deductions 
were assumed to be realized by the taxpayer on August 9 of each 
year. The August 9 date is the average date the benefits would be 
realized by a taxpayer with positive taxable income through the 
impact of the deductions on estimated tax payments. See Treasury 
Rental Clothing Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 51. 
25. See Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 2 4 ,  at 
98; senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of 1986, s .  Rep. No. 
313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1986}: Bouse Comm. on Ways and Means,
Tax Reform Act of 1985, D.R . No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sesso 146
(1985) .  
26. The recovery periods are 3 ,  5, 7, 10, 15, 20, 27. 5 ,  31.5 
and 50 years. See I . R . C .  § 16B ( c )  (1)  (1991 ) .
27. In particular, the pattern for assets with applicable 
recovery periods of 3 ,  5, 7 or 10 years is the pattern created by 
applying the 200 percent declining balance method and switching to 
the straight-line method at the point in time when that method 
yields larger deductions. The pattern for assets with applicable 
recovery periods of 15 and 20 years is the same except that the 150 
percent declining balance method is used instead of the 200 percent 
declining balance method . Assets with an applicable recovery 
period larger than 20 years do not receive any front loading of tax 
depreciation. These assets are depreciated using the straight-line 
method. See I . R.C. § 168 (b) (1991 ) .
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In contrast, for most assets, ADS consists of straight-line 
depreciation over the 11class life11 of the asset.28 The government 
attempts to set the class lives of assets so that the ADS system 
approximates economic depreciation. 29 Generally speaking, the 
class life of an asset is significantly longer than its "recovery 
period" under MACRS .30 
The class life concept plays a important role in MACRS in 
addition to its central role under ADS. MACRS has nine asset 
categories and three depreciation patterns . 31 The Code explicitly 
assigns some asset types to MACRS categories.32 If an asset has 
28. See I . R. C .  § 168 (g) (1991 ) .  The recovery period under 
ADS generally is the class life of the asset. See I . R . C .  § 
168(g) ( 2 )  (C) (1991 ) .  There are only three exceptions. First, 
personal property with no class life is assigned a recovery period 
of 12 years . Second, nonresidential real property and residential 
rental property are assigned a recovery period of 40 years. 
Finally, railroad grading and tunnel bores are assigned a recovery 
period of 50 years. See id. 
Under the ADS approach, the conventions in section 168 (d) 
about when the property has been placed in service must be 
followed. I . R.C. § 168 (g) ( 2 )  (B) (1991 ) .  With some exceptions this 
means that the "half-year convention" must be followed. All 
property placed in service during the year will be treated as 
placed in service at the mid-point of that year. The most 
significant exceptions are nonresidential real property and 
residential rental property. These assets are subject to a "mid­
month convention. "  See I . R.C. § 168(d} (1991 ) .
29. This i s  clear from both the legislative history of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 and from administrative practice . See supra 
note 24.
3 0 .  See infra note 3 3 .  
3 1 .  see supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. 
320 This includes automobiles, light trucks , railroad grading 
and tunnel bores, residential rental property, nonresidential real 
property, railroad track, and a few other asset types. See I . R . C .  
§ 168 ( e )  ( 3 )  (1991) and I . R . C .  § 168 (c) (1)  (1991 ) . 
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a class life but is not explicitly assigned by the Code to a MACRS 
category, it is assigned to one of six MACRS categories depending 
on its class life.33 If an asset has no class life and is not 
explicitly assigned by the Code to a MACRS category, then the Code 
classifies it as 7-year property for MACRS purposes . �  
33. I . R . C . § 168(e) ( 1 )  (1991}. The classification scheme is 
as follows: 
class life (in years} 
4 or less 
more than 4 but less than 10 
10 or more but less than 16 
16 or more but less than 20 
20 or more but less than 25 
25 or more 
MACRS category 
3-year property 
5-year property 
7-year property 
10-year property 
15-year property 
20-year property 
The MACRS categories indicate the period over which tax 
depreciation is taken under that system while the class lives are 
the period under ADS . It is clear from the table set out above 
that the MACRS period for depreciation of an asset is generally 
much shorter than the class life of the asset. 
34. See I . R . C .  § 168(e) ( 3 )  (C) {iii) {1991) .
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I I .  Optimal Depreciation when the Age-Price Profile i s  Known in 
Advance 
Part I detailed some basic features of depreciation systems 
and set out some features of current law. With this background in 
hand, this Part examines the theory and practice of setting 
depreciation schedules and assigning recovery periods in a 
depreciation system. Sections A, B, and c study the situation 
where the goal is to match tax depreciation with economic 
depreciation. Section D examines the case of accelerated 
depreciation. 
More specifically, Section A discusses a restrictive 
assumption and an example that are used throughout the rest of this 
Part. section B shows that given the restrictive assumption, there 
is a way to replicate economic depreciation. Section c shows that 
the required approach is quite different from the leading academic 
approach devised by Hulten and Wykoff and that some aspects of the 
current government approach also deviate from the required 
approach. Finally, section D considers the issue of accelerating 
depreciation in a neutral manner starting from the baseline of 
economic depreciation. 
In Part III, the restrictive assumption applied in this Part 
will be relaxed. That assumption is valuable because it leads to 
a particularly simple rule for replicating economic depreciation. 
Given this rule, it is easy to provide a very direct critique of 
the Hul ten and Wykoff approach and of the current government 
approach . 
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This Part will focus only on individual item accounting. A 
coherent discussion of group accounting methods requires the more 
complex setting developed in Part I I I .  
A. An Assumption and an Example 
1. The Assumption 
As depreciable assets age and wear out, they generally decline 
in value. This decline r�flects the fact that the asset ' s  revenue 
earning life is becoming·shorter and shorter. The decline can be 
described by an "age-price profile, 11 a specification of the value 
of the asset at each point in its life. This Part studies optimal 
depreciation under the assumption that the age-price profile for 
surviving units is known in advance. That is, when the asset is 
purchased and put into service, the buyer (and the government) know 
exactly how much surviving units will be worth at each future time. 
This assumption is restrictive. It is equivalent to assuming 
that after the asset is put into service, no new information 
concerning its durability or revenue earning potential will be 
discoverable at low cost. To make this point clear, consider 
racehorses, an example of a depreciable asset that will be used 
extensively later in the Article .  I t  i s  clear that racehorses are 
subject to "revenue risk, 11 that is, the revenues that a particular 
horse will earn are uncertain at the time the horse is born. 35 
Racehorses are also subject to "retirement risk , 11 that is, it is 
uncertain how long a particular horse will be able to race or breed 
35. See, �.g. , Treasury Horse Study , supra note 23, at 15-16 
(unpredictable and dramatic earnings and value differences between 
thoroughbred stallions used in breeding) • 
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effectively . 36  
The resolution of these risks over a horse ' s  life will cause 
the value of the horse to differ from the value expected at birth. 
Thus, a horse ' s  initial races at two years old will reveal a great 
deal about the horse 1 s future revenue potential. Horses that 
appear to be Kentucky Derby material will shoot up in value and 
horses that appear to be losers will plummet in value. Also, after 
a few years of life some horses may be identifiably less durable or 
healthy than others . These horses will be expected to have shorter 
productive lives and will be less valuable than other horses. The 
result of risk resolution will be that the age-price profile of 
individual horses will deviate from the age-price profile 
anticipated when the horse is put into service. 
Although the assumption that the age-price profile is known in 
advance is unrealistic for many assets, the assumption allows the 
analysis in this Part to be clear and simple. Part III then 
explores the implications for depreciation policy of relaxing the 
assumption. 
36. Retirement risk is clearly a major factor to address when 
considering the impact of risk on tax depreciation policy . Both 
government policymakers and leading academics are careful to adjust 
their estimates of economic depreciation to take into account this 
type of risk. See infra text accompanying notes 48-50, 66-67. In 
addition, Treasury Department studies on depreciation patterns find 
that asset life is highly uncertain for many very different kinds 
of assets . See Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 23, at 
19 (tuxedos) ; Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 23,
at 15-16 (eight types of scientific instruments) ;  Treasury Fruit 
Tree study, supra note 23, at 14 (peach trees) ;  Treasury Horse 
Study , supra note 23, at 7-9 ( thoroughbred geldings, thoroughbred 
stallions, thoroughbred mares) . These studies suggest that 
retirement risk not only is theoretically important but also is 
empirically significant. 
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2. The Example 
This Part uses an example set up in this section to 
demonstrate many points. The example employs particular 
assumptions about the net ·revenue stream and retirement risk of the 
asset under study. Nevertheless, the basic conceptual results that 
underlie the entire Part will be shown to be independent of the 
particular example chosen . These conceptual results will hold so 
long as the asset ' s  age-price profile is known in advance. 
The example combines a statistical distribution of asset lives 
and a curve representing net revenues at each point in time to 
yield asset value at each point in time. The net revenues at each 
future time for an asset that is still operating are assumed to be 
fixed and known in advance. we also assume that no new statistical 
information will be discovered about an asset ' s  durability beyond 
the originally given statistical distribution of lives. Thus, the 
asset ' s  prospects for additional life at any given later age can be 
specified at the time the asset is put into service. 
Under these assumptions, it is easy to construct in advance an 
"age-price profile" representing the value of surviving assets at 
any given time. For each asset age, one simply computes the 
present value of future revenues taking into account the likelihood 
that the asset will survive to any particular later year. 
We will assume that the statistical distribution of asset 
lives is "exponential. 11 This means that the rate of death per unit 
time is constant. At any given asset age, the same proportion of 
24 
the assets .. still functioning will fail within the following year. 37 
For the net revenue stream, we will make a similar assumption: net 
revenues decline exponentially. For convenience, in this example, 
as in the rest of the Article, we also will assume that there is no 
inflation and that assets have no salvage value . 38  When an asset 
fails, its value falls to zero. 
With exponentially declining revenues and an exponential 
distribution of asset lives, the age-price profile for surviving 
assets will also be exponential . 39  That is, the value of the asset 
will decline at a constant rate with age. With a real interest 
rate of 4%,  an expected asset life of 10 years, and revenues that 
decline at a rate of 20% per year, the age-price profile is as 
3 7 .  Consider a cohort of assets purchased at the same time. 
With an exponential life distribution, the proportion of assets in 
the cohort surviving to any particular age will decline in the same 
way that adjusted basis declines under a declining balance method 
of depreciation. See infra note 52. Each year the same proportion 
of the surviving assets fail, j ust as adjusted basis falls by the 
same proportion each year under the declining balance method. 
An exponential distribution is a special case of a more 
general distribution called the Weibull distribution. See P.
Tobias & D. Trindale, Applied Reliability 66 (1986). The 
exponential distribution has the property that the expected 
additional life of an asset is independent of its age. For many 
. assets this property does not seem intuitive, but, instead, one 
would expect that older assets would have a shorter expected 
additional life. For example, the expected additional lifespan for 
a very old racehorse will be less than the life expectancy of a 
racehorse at birth. This property can be modelled by choosing a 
different case of the Weibull distribution. For a discussion of 
the use of different lifespan distributions and their impact on 
depreciation policy, see infra Appendix C. 
38. See supra note 6 ( salvage value ) ;  infra note 62 
( inflation) . Adding salvage value into the example or discussing 
adjustments for inflation would not affect any of the results but 
would make the example more complicated. 
39. This is demonstrated mathematically in Appendix A in.f!:sl.
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shown in Figure 5. 40 If the asset fails at some point during its 
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life, the age-price curve will follow the curve in Figure 5 up 
until the time of failure and then will drop off instantaneously to 
zero. 
For convenience, we leave the example in terms of "continuous 
time . "  That is, we follow asset value changes as they occur from 
moment to moment. An alternative approach would be to annualize 
the changes in value. The curve in Figure 5 would then look like 
the 11step function" in Figures 3 and 4. 41 This approach would not 
change the results but would make the analysis and the graphs 
awkward. 
40. Note that the real interest rate is taken to be constant 
over the life of the asset and to be known in advance. If interest 
rates fluctuated, it would not be possible to set out a single age­
price profile for the asset in advance. The path of asset value 
over time would depend on interest rates. Higher interest rates 
would depress value because future revenues would be discounted 
more heavily. Part III studies the tax policy ramifications of not 
knowing in advance the eXact age-price profile that an asset will 
experience. See supra text accompanying notes 115-185. 
The 4% discount rate used in the example here is the same rate 
used by the Treasury Department in its depreciation studies. For 
citations and a discussion of the appropriateness of this rate, see 
infra note 67. 
4). 
41. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11 (Figures 3 and 
26 
B .  Replicating Economic Depreciation 
When the age-price profile for surviving assets is known in 
advance, there is a simple rule that replicates economic 
depreciation. This rule calls for using a depreciation schedule 
based on that age-price profile combined with allowing a loss 
deduction when an asset fails. 
For our example, the age-price profile for surviving assets is 
the curve shown in Figure 5. Basing the depreciation schedule on 
this curve means that the taxpayer should receive a dollar of 
depreciation deductions whenever the curve declines by a dollar. 42 
Under this rule, the curve represents the adjusted basis of 
surviving assets as well as their market value. So long as the 
asset survives, a tax depreciation schedule based on the curve will
exactly match the decline in market value of the asset.
When an asset fails, the asset ' s  value falls from the market 
value for surviving assets indicated by the curve to zero 
instantaneously. Economic depreciation requires an instantaneous 
deduction reflecting exactly that decline in value . But the rule 
42. The continuous time nature of this example means that the 
taxpayer continuously receives depreciation deductions and the 
ensuing tax benefits. The accounting period is effectively zero 
since any decrease in market value results in an instantaneous 
deduction. A strong case can be made that this accounting period 
of zero is the appropriate one to use for an accretion tax. See 
Strnad, supra note 7, at 1821-22, 1832-47, 1853-63. 
In a context such as the text example where interest rates and 
the decline in asset value are known with certainty, it is possible 
to collect taxes periodically ( e . g . , annually) but replicate the 
result that would occur under continuous taxation. Tax l iabilities 
and benefits that arise before the end of the year can be paid or 
credited with interest at the end of the year. The result will be 
financially equivalent to continuous taxation. � id. at 1828-29. 
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we have specified calls for exactly this treatment. The taxpayer 
is allowed to deduct the remaining adjusted basis of the asset at 
the time of failure. This remaining adjusted basis is equal to 
market value right before failure. 
In summary, basing the statutory depreciation schedule on the 
age-price profile for surviving assets and allowing a loss 
deduction when an asset fails results in a system that replicates 
economic depreciation per·fectly. So long as an asset survives, tax 
depreciation is equal tO economic depreciation because the tax 
depreciation schedule is exactly the schedule of the decline in 
market value of the asset. If the asset fails and is discarded, 
the statutory schedule no longer represents economic depreciation. 
However, deduction of the loss at the time of failure exactly 
corrects the schedule to correspond to economic depreciation. 
Note that under this set of rules, there is no scope for 
profitable strategic loss-taking. Strategic loss-taking is 
potentially profitable only if market value falls below adjusted 
basis under the statutory depreciation schedule. 43 In the tax 
scheme just presented , that situation occurs only when the asset 
fails and is discarded. But upon failure and disposition of the 
asset, the taxpayer receives a deduction equal to the loss 
suffered . There is no need to trade the asset to receive the 
loss. 44 Furthermore, far from being improper, this deduction is 
43. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14 .
44. The taxpayer need only show that the asset has been 
discarded or abandoned. For depreciable assets that are discarded, 
it normally should be easy to show abandonment . See supra note 10. 
required in order to replicate economic depreciation. 
c .  Government and Academic Approaches 
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The rule set forth in the previous section is a rule that 
results in a tax system based exactly on economic depreciation. 
Furthermore, this rule is impervious to strategic loss-taking. 
Using this rule as a benchmark, this section studies the Hulten and 
Wykoff approach and the government approach designed to achieve 
that same result. Because of improper treatment of retirement 
risk, the Hulten and wykoff approach generally results in 
depreciation that is greatly accelerated compared to economic 
depreciation. The government ' s  approach is conceptually sound but 
one of the two major variants it uses to implement its approach 
results in significant errors. In addition, even if the correct 
variant is employed, the government ' s  approach will fail if 
strategic loss-taking is viable. Subsection 1 discusses the Hulten 
and Wykoff approach while subsections 2 ,  3 ,  4 and 5 examine the 
government approach. 
1 .  The Hulten and Wykoff Approach 
The leading academic work on the measurement of economic 
depreciation is a 1981 article by Charles Hulten and Frank 
Wykoff . 45 Hul ten and Wykoff' s central claim is that economic 
45. Hulten and Wykoff, supra note 3 .
This work is held in very high esteem by the academic 
community. See, g.g. , Shaven, Commentary on Investment Incentives 
in Theory and Practice, in Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a Hybrid 
Income-consumption Tax 340,  345 (1988 ) . The Treasury depreciation 
studies also cite Hulten and Wykoff favorably and rely on Hulten 
and Wykoff for guidance. See, �.g. , Treasury Rental Clothing 
Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 0 ;  Treasury Scientific Instruments 
Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 19. 
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depreciation can be measured precisely enough so that a tax system 
based on economic depreciation is a practical option. 46 They 
intend their depreciation rate calculations to serve as an 
illustration of how rates might actually be derived for use in an 
actual tax system based on economic depreciation. 47 
To compute a curve representing economic depreciation, Hulten 
and Wykoff begin with market price data. This data gives them an 
age-price profile, that is, a curve that specifies the market value 
of surviving assets at each age. Hulten and Wykoff note that this 
profile 11misses the essential point" because it represents 11only 
the value of assets which have survived long enough to be eligible 
for sampling. 1148 
Hulten and Wykoff ' s  work has had significant impact on the 
actual depreciation rules in the Internal Revenue Code. A 1984 
Treasury tax reform study , generally referred to as "Treasury I , 11 
proposed the Real Cost Recovery System (11RCRS" ) ,  a set of 
depreciation rules meant to replicate economic depreciation. These 
rules were based directly on Hulten and Wykoff ' s  results . A later 
administration proposal ( "Treasury II")  used the recovery periods 
and depreciation patterJ:J.s set out in RCRS as the baseline for 
proposing a system of acCelerated depreciation. With some slight 
modifications these periods and patterns became MACRS , the 
accelerated depreciation system currently in effect. See U.S.
Treasury Dep 1 t ,  Tax Reform for Fairness ,  Simplicity, and Economic 
Growth, volume 2 ,  at 160 (1984 ) ;  Brazell , Dworin and Walsh, A 
History of Federal Tax Depreciation Policy, OTA Paper 64, at 22-23
(1989). 
46. See Hulten & Wykoff ,  supra note 3 ,  at 82-83 , 112.
47. See id. at 82-82, 94-96. 
48. see Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3 ,  at 91. Hulten and 
Wykoff note that this type of problem is called "censored sample 
bias" in econometrics. Id. The sample of prices at each age has 
been 11censored" by removal of the assets that have not survived to 
be that old. 
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In response, they adjust the price at each age by multiplying 
by the probability of survival to that age. The resulting product 
is an average price where the average is over both surviving assets 
and assets that have failed earlier and are now worthless. 49 In 
their own words, this average price "takes into account both 
survivors and nonsurvivors . 1150 
Hulten and Wykoff also find that, on average, age-price 
profiles are nearly exponential in form. 51 That is, assets tend 
to decline in value at a constant rate per time interval . 52 Hulten 
49. Suppose, for example, that at age 10 , surviving units are 
worth $100 but that only one half of all units survive to this age. 
Under the Hulten and Wykoff approach, the price at age 10 of $100 
is multiplied by the probability of survival which is . 50. The 
result is $50. But this is the average value of all units (both 
surviving and retired) at age 10. Half of the units are retired 
and have value $0 and half are functioning and have value $100.
50. Id. at 91. 
51. Id. at 93. 
Hulten and Wykoff use the term "geometric" instead of 
"exponential • 11 See id. The terms have the same meaning : curves 
that change at a constant instantaneous rate. 
52. The correlate of constant exponential decline among 
depreciation methods in the Code is the declining balance method . 
Under this method, a constant proportion of adjusted basis is 
deducted each year. For example, if the declining balance rate is 
20% and the asset is initially worth $100, then the pattern of 
deductions for the first four years will be as follows : 
year 
1 
2 
3 
4 
adjusted basis 
at beginning of year 
$100 
$80 
$64 
$51. 20 
deduction 
$20 = . 2 0  x $100 
$16 = . 20 x $80 
$12.80 = . 20 x $64 
$10. 24 = . 20 x $51.20 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I f  the asset actually declines at a constant 20% rate per 
year, then this declining balance method will correspond to 
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and Wykoff term this result 11the most significant finding" of their 
research .53 However ,  they also note that the exponential form for 
the age-price profiles only holds approximately as an average over 
many types of assets. In a rigorous statistical test for the shape 
of these profiles, the exponential form, along with its chief 
rivals, failed to be statistically acceptable.54 
Hulten and Wykoff propose approximating economic depreciation 
by assuming a exponential decline in value and by' using age-price 
profiles corrected to include nonsurviving assets in computing the 
depreciation rate for each asset. 55 
The adjustment for retirement risk under the Hulten & Wykoff 
approach results in a new age-price profile that is lower than the 
old profile that applies only to surviving assets . At each age, 
the price in the new profile is the probability of survival up to 
that age multiplied by the price for that age in the old profile. 
The effect of the HUlten and Wykoff approach can be 
illustrated using the example developed in the earlier sections. 
Consider Figure 6. The upper exponential curve is the age-price 
profile for surviving assets. The lower exponential curve is the 
age-price profile adjusted in the way that Hulten and Wykoff 
advocate . 
economic depreciation. 
53. Id. at 93.
54. This means that there must have been many 
profiles in their study that deviate significantly 
exponential form. 
55. See id. at 94-96.
age-price 
from the 
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V11lue Figure 6 
Tille (yaH'll ) 
Using the lower exponential curve instead of the upper curve 
will result in depreciation that is much faster than economic 
depreciation. A surviving asset moves along the upper curve but is 
depreciated as if the price falls off more sharply along the lower 
curve . When an asset fails , there is a loss deduction equal to the 
height of the lower curve . This amount is less than the actual 
loss which is the height of the upper curve . The difference in 
heights between the curves represents an amount of loss at failure 
that the taxpayer has been permitted to deduct prematurely, that 
is, before failure actually occurred . 
It is possible to express the acceleration effect under the 
Hulten and Wykoff approach in terms of class lives using a Treasury 
Department method described in subsection 2 . 56 Figure 6 includes 
the straight-line schedules that are equivalent in present value to 
56. See infra text accompanying notes 59-81. Treasury ' s
approach involves adjusting both the age-price profile and the 
approximating straight-line schedule for retirement loss 
deductions. It turns out that the proper adjustment for the age­
price profile for surviving assets transforms it into the Hulten 
and Wykoff age-price profile. See infra text accompanying notes 
85-87. I f  one starts out with the Hulten and Wykoff schedule, 
correcting it for retirement losses (as called for in the 
government approach) is redundant since that correction is built 
into the schedule to begin with. This "double correction" results 
in class lives being much too short. 
33 
the age-price profiles in the figure. These schedules translate 
the upper and lower age-price profiles into class l ives of 8.40  and 
5 . 87 respectively. Using the Hul ten and Wykoff approach has 
reduced class life by abo,ut 30%. 57 
Hulten and Wykoff ' s  estimates and methods have strongly 
influenced statutory and administrative recovery periods .58 These 
recovery periods may be niuch too short . 
2 .  Oescript:Lon o f  the Government Approach 
The current tax depreciation treatment of assets depends 
heavily on their class lives. These class lives determine ADS 
treatment in almost all cases59 and determine MACRS treatment for 
all assets except for the assets specifically assigned to a MACRS 
57 . To the extent that this particular example is atypical , 
it may underestimate the acceleration effect of using the Hulten 
and Wykoff approach . In the example, net revenues per unit of time 
for surviving assets fall off at the sharp rate of 20% per year 
while the asset survival rate is 90% per year. The steep rate of 
decline in revenues causes the value of surviving assets to fall 
sharply with age. Combined with the high asset survival rate, this 
sharp decline means that losses at retirement will not figure as 
prominently as they would normally. Put another way, the revenue 
drop causes the curve to drop so sharply that the additional drop 
due to multiplying by the probability of survival is relatively 
small .  This additional drop i s  the adjustment required by the 
Hulten and Wykoff approaCh . 
To illustrate these points with a concrete example, suppose 
that we change the example so that net revenues per unit of time 
fall off at only a 10% rate and the asset survival rate is only 80% 
per year. Then the class life corresponding to the age-price 
profile for surviving assets is 13 . 64 years. using the Hulten and 
Wykoff approach lowers the class life to 5 . 50 ,  a reduction of 
almost 60%. This reduction is about twice as large in percentage 
terms as the reduction in the text example. 
58.  See supra note 4 5 .  
59 . See supra text accompanying note 28 and note 2 8 .  
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category hy the Code . �  
Not surprisingly, the Treasury Department ' s  ultimate goal in 
studying depreciation for each asset is to determine an appropriate 
class life for the asset. In particular, congress has mandated 
that the Treasury Department study the actual depreciation history 
of assets so that Treasury might propose revisions to existing 
class lives and might propose class lives for assets that currently 
have none. 61 The legislative history concerning this mandate 
includes the following directive to Treasury about how class lives 
are to be calculated: 
Class lives • • •  [ should] be determined such that the present 
value of straight-line depreciation deductions over the class 
life, discounted at an appropriate real rate of interest, is 
equal to the present value of what the estimated decline in 
value of the asset would be in the absence of inflation. �  
Treasury has termed the class life that emerges from this type of 
calculation the "equivalent economic life" of the asset. 63  
60. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33. 
61. See supra note 2 3 .  
6 2 .  Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 2 4 ,  at 103 . 
Throughout this Article, the effects of inflation on the tax 
depreciation system are ignored. . Adding inflation into the 
examples and analysis would complicate them and no real conceptual 
gain would result. 
It seems clear that indexing adjusted basis for inflation 
would be a good solution to the problems presented by inflation for 
the depreciation system. Other solutions, such as providing 
accelerated depreciation to offset the taxation of inflationary 
gains, have the weakness that they are a precise cure only when 
inflation is at a particular rate. If the actual inflation rate 
differs from that rate, these solutions simply distort investment 
incentives. see M. Graetz ,  supra note 1,  at 398-400. 
63 . �, �.g. , Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 2 3 ,  
at 1 ;  Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 1. 
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In four reports issued to date under its study mandate, 64 
Treasury reveals its approach to establishing depreciation 
schedules that replicate economic depreciation. Some of the 
reports are a bit vague on the details of the approach, but one of 
them, the study of the depreciation of scientific instruments ,  is 
very explicit. 65 That study uses two slightly different 
approaches, and the approaches taken in the other three studies 
appear to be similar to these two approaches. 
The goal of the government approach is to produce a straight­
line schedule that will result in the same present value of 
depreciation as economic depreciation. The derived straight-line 
schedule then indicates the class life that should be assigned to 
the asset for the ADS , the depreciation system in the tax code that 
is meant to approximate economic depreciation .66 
The government approach includes two major steps. First, a 
retirement adjusted age-price profile is generated. Second, the 
straight-line schedule that would result in the same present value 
of depreciation taking into account retirements is computed.67 The 
6 4 .  See supra note 2 3 .  
65. A mathematical appendix in that study sets out one 
variant of Treasury • s approach. See Treasury Scientific 
Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 , at 49-52 (Appendix C) . 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 21-2 4 .
67 . The Treasury Department uses a 4 %  discount rate to 
compute present values in its depreciation studies. See Treasury 
Rental Clothing Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 4 ;  Treasury Scientific 
Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 2 ;  Treasury Fruit Tree Study, 
supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 3 ;  Treasury Horse Study, � note 2 3 ,  at 1 3 .  
The results are quite sensitive to the choice o f  the discount 
rate. It is unclear how solid the 4% assumption is. over the past 
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total life spanned by the straight-line schedule is the class life 
for the asset. 
The first step begins with the observation or estimation of 
the decline in value over time of the assets . This step results in 
an age-price profile relating the market value of each asset to its 
60 years, U . S .  Treasury bills (short-term notes) have averaged only 
a 0 . 4% real return . For a discussion of the tax policy 
implications of this low historical average rate, see Bankman & 
Griffith, The Debate Between an Income Tax and a Consumption Tax: 
A Debate About Risk (unpublished working paper, 1990) . 
There is a great deal of variance in the ex post real rate of 
return. During the 1940s and 1970s, Treasury bills had a 
significant negative ex post real rate of return . During the 1926-
1934 period and during the 1980s, bills had a large positive ex 
post real rate of return. The 4% figure is not a bad estimate of 
the ex post real rate over the last decade . See R .  Brealey & s.
Myers, Principles of corporate Finance at 126 (table) , 546 (chart) 
(3rd ed. 1988 ) . 
· 
However, it is not the ex post real rate that is critical but 
the real rate that is expected ex ante. Investors will base their 
economic decisions on that rate. Ex post rates may end up being 
particularly high if investors overestimate inflation. 
The most recent evidence suggests that the ex ante real 
riskless rate is not stable. It displays a unit root which implies 
that the time series of ex ante real riskless rate is 
nonstationary. This behavior seems robust to the time period and 
to many other variables used in the statistical analysis. See 
Rose, Is the Real Interest Rate Stable?, 43 J. Finance 1095 ( 1988 ) . 
This result means that the ex ante real interest rate does not 
tend to return to any particular average value but wanders around 
more or less at random. Thus, long runs of negative or positive 
real rates are to be expected if past is prologue . Qualitatively, 
these runs seem to characterize real ex post returns on U . S .  
Treasury bills. Furthermore, there i s  no reason for the average 
real rate over a long time period to be any particular value. 
Picking an appropriate real -riskless rate to use in tax policy 
studies is no easy matter! 
Finally, the 4% figure is not adjusted for taxes. However, 
the failure to make such an adjustment may be acceptable if 
estimating economic depreciation for system-wide application is the 
goal. See ..i.n.fi;:g note 2 3 5 .  
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age . 68  
After deriving an age-price profile, the government approach 
adjusts this profile to take retirements into account and computes 
the present value of depreciation under the adjusted schedule. It 
is here that two variants appear, and both are present and clearly 
described in the scientific instruments study. One variant is 
equivalent to the Hulte.n and Wykoff approach . The age-price 
profile for surviving assets is adjusted by multiplying the value 
of surviving units at each age by the probability of survival . 69  
Since this adjusted profile gives average value a s  a function of 
age, it is possible to derive from the profile an "age-depreciation 
profile" describing the rate of decline in value for the average 
asset at each age. ro  The discounted present value of the decline 
in average value suffered at each age is the present value of 
economic depreciation that will be used to compute an equivalent 
68 . Treasury has employed two different methods to construct 
age-price profiles : the market data method and the productivity 
method. � Treasury Rental Clothing Study, � note 2 3 ,  at 20-
22 (productivity method) ; Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, 
supra note 2 3 ,  at 19 , 2 1  (mixture of market data method and 
productivity method) ; Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 
22-23, 40-41 (productivity method) ; Treasury Horse Study, supra 
note 2 3 ,  at 1 1 ,  1 4 ,  19-21 (market data method) . 
The market data method consists of using data on market price 
versus age to estimate the age-price profile. The productivity 
method is used when market data does not suffice for providing an 
accurate estimate. � infra text accompanying notes 231-235 
(verbal and mathematical description of productivity method in 
Appendix A) • 
69 . � Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, §!!lll1l note 2 3 ,  
at 21-22. In this case, the age-price profile i s  based on market 
data averaged over many types of instruments. See if! .  
7 0 .  See, g_.g. , Treasury Rental Clothing study, supra note 2 3 ,  
at 2 4 ;  Treasury Fruit Tree study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 23-2 5 .  
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straight-line depreciation schedule. 
The other variant is more complex and consists of four 
steps . 71 The first step is to compute age-price profiles for units 
with different known lives . n  As a second step, the prices in each 
age-price profile for a unit of known life are divided by the 
initial price of a unit with that life. This normalization results 
in a normalized initial price of one for all units, regardless of 
life.73 The third step is to compute the present value of 
depreciation as a function of the known asset life . 74 For each 
particular life, this present value of depreciation is simply the 
present value of the declines in value described by the normalized 
age-price profile for an asset with that life. Finally, since 
asset l ives ar� unknown, a weighted average of the present values 
of depreciation for each asset life is constructed where the 
weights are the probabilities that the asset will have any given 
7 1 .  These steps are clearly described in Appendix C of the 
scientific instruments study . See Treasury scientific Instruments 
Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 49-52 (Appendix C) . 
72 . See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study , supra note 2 3 ,  
at 4 9  (equations 1 and 6) ; Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 
2 3 ,  at 29 (Figure 5 and accompanying text) ; Treasury Horse Study, 
supra note 2 3 ,  at 12 (Figure 4 and accompanying text) . 
7 3 .  See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 ,  
at 4 9  (equations 2 and 7) ; Treasury Fruit Tree Study, supra note 
2 3 ,  at 29 ( Figure 5 and accompanying text) . See also Treasury 
Horse study , supra note 2 3 ,  at 12 (Figure 4 and accompanying text ; 
horse prices for different lives normalized to be same at start) . 
74 . See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 ,  
at 50-51 (equations 3 ,  4 ,  8 and 9 ) . 
39 
life.� This second variant takes retirement risk into account by 
averaging together the present value of depreciation for assets 
with different lives. 
The result emerging from the first major step in the 
government approach is a present value for economic depreciation 
that is adjusted to include retirement deductions. As a second 
step, the government computes an adjusted straight-line 
depreciation schedule that results in the same present value of 
depreciation as the present value of depreciation computed in step 
one . 76 This straight-line schedule is 11adjusted11 in the sense that 
loss deductions due to asset retirements are included in the 
present value computation. The adjustment process takes the 
retirement loss at each time, multiplies by the probability that 
retirement will occur at that time, and discounts the product back 
to "time 0 , 11 the time the asset is placed in service. 
Thus, the government approach adds the present value of 
retirement losses to the present value of decline in value along 
each straight-line schedule before picking one with the same 
present value as the retirement adjusted age-price profile. 
Retirement losses accelerate depreciation relative to the schedule, 
and, as a result, adjusting straight-line depreciation for 
retirement risk in this way increases the present value of 
75. See Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra note 2 3 ,
at 50-51 (equation 5 and text following equation 9 ) .  
76. See, g.g. , Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, supra 
note 2 3 ,  at 19-20, 2 2 ;  Treasury Horse Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 13-
14. 
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deductions for each straight-line schedule.n Thus , a straight-
l ine schedule with a longer life will be required to match any 
given present value derived from the retirement-adjusted age-price 
profile. 78 
As an illustration of the government ' s  approach, consider 
Figure 7 which is based on the example developed previously.79 The 
exponentially declining line is the retirement adjusted age-price 
7 7 .  When retirement occurs, the remaining adjusted basis is 
deducted immediately instead of gradually as indicated by the rest 
of the schedule. Considering retirement risk therefore increases 
the present value over the level that would follow from the 
schedule alone.
7 8 .  When the present value of depreciation as a percentage of 
initial value is lower, the straight-line schedule that produces 
the same present value of depreciation must be less steeply sloped. 
Since the class life corresponds to the point where the straight­
line schedule 'Crosses $0 value, the class life will be longer. 
Adjusting a straight-line schedule for retirement risk 
requires knowing the distribution of lives for the asset under 
study . In general, the present value of retirement loss deductions 
will be higher when depreciation is slower. The reason for this 
result is that when an asset fails and becomes worthless, the 
ensuing retirement loss is equal to adjusted basis. Adjusted basis 
is higher at any given time during the recovery period when 
depreciation is slower. 
Thus, for example, allowing for retirement risk would tend to 
reduce the gap in present value between five-year and ten-year 
straight-line depreciation. Even though the present value of 
depreciation under the five-year schedule is higher, the present 
value of retirement loss deductions is higher for the ten-year 
schedule. 
This reduction cannot entirely eliminate the gap. Suppose 
that an asset fails and is retired at time t and that the 
retirement loss under the ten-year schedule at this time is $X(t) 
higher than under the five-year schedule. Under the five-year 
schedule this amount $X(t) has been deducted earlier than under the 
ten-year schedule. For this asset, the present value of 
depreciation plus retirement losses must be greater under the five­
year schedule. But this argument does not depend on the particular 
retirement time that was chosen. As a result, the argument holds 
for all assets, independent of retirement time. 
79. � supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
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profile for the asset based on the Hulten and Wykoff approach. The 
present value of depreciation for this schedule is 8 8 .  44% of 
initial value. The lower straight-line schedule results in the 
same present value of depreciation i f  deductions for retirements 
are not included in the computation. Since this l ine cuts the 
horizontal axis at 6 . 4 0 ,  6 . 4 0  years is the "appropriate" class life 
for the asset. so The higher straight line results in the same 
present value of depreciation as the exponential curve if 
retirement deductions are taken into account. Since taking into 
Valu• Figure 7 
_, 
"o " 
Ti11e (yeors) 
account retirement deductions increases the present value of 
deductions, this straight line is more gradual and represents 
slower depreciation for Surviving assets than the first straight 
line. The second, more gradual straight line cuts the horizontal 
axis at 8 .  40, and thus requires that class life be set at 8 .  40 
80. Strictly speaking this class life should be adjusted to 
reflect the peculiar features of ADS depreciation. Thus, the 
appropriate convention for the starting time of service, typically 
the mid-year convention, should be used to compute the equivalent 
straight-line schedule, and the exact timing of the receipt of the 
tax benefits from depreciation deductions should be taken into 
account. See supra note 2 4 .  I ignore these ADS adjustments here 
for simplicity of exposition. 
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years, a .considerably longer class life than the 6 . 4 0  years 
dictated by the first straight line. The impact of the adjustment 
for retirement is quite dramatic: Class life increases by about 
2 4 % .  
3. Critique of the Government Approach 
At first glance the government approach looks quite different 
from the approach that we identified as optima l ,  that is, basing 
the depreciation schedule on the age-price profile unadiusted for 
retirements .  The government approach adjusts the age-price profile 
for retirements but then makes an offsetting adjustment for 
retirements in computing an equivalent straight-line schedule.81 
These adjustments raise three questions. First, is the 
government ' s  approach appropriate even though it appears to differ 
from the approach that we argued was optimal above? Second, are 
the offsetting adjustments for retirements in the government 
approach necessary? Given that the government has to derive a 
straight-line schedule that is equivalent to economic 
depreciation,82 an alternative and apparently simpler approach 
would be to convert the "optimal" depreciation schedule derived 
from the age-price profile for surviving units directly into a 
straight-line schedule. Third, if the adjustments are appropriate, 
8 1 .  The two adjustments are offsetting because the age-price 
profile is 11accelerated11 while the surrogate straight-line schedule 
is "decelerated" by taking retirement deductions into account. 
Compare supra text accompanying notes 69-75 (acceleration due to 
adjusting age-price profile for retirement deductions) with � 
text accompanying note 78 (deceleration of equivalent straight-line 
schedule to allow for benefits from retirement deductions) . 
82 . See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 61-62 . 
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are both of the government ' s  variants for adjusting the age-price 
profile correct? 
To address these questions, this subsection argues that if we 
assume away the possibility of strategic loss-taking, the 
government ' s  approach us
,
ing the Hul ten and Wykoff variant for 
adjusting the age-price profile is correct. The other variant, 
however, results in depreciation that is too fast. The next 
subsection shows that the offsetting retirement adjustments are 
necessary . Simply converting the age-price profile for surviving 
assets to a straight-line schedule with equal present value will 
not work. A final subsection shows that the government ' s  approach 
fails when strategic loss-taking is possible. 
If we ignore strategic loss-taking, the argument for the 
government approach is that the present value of depreciation 
adjusted to include the loss deductions that arise from retirements 
is the total present value of all the tax benefits that come from 
economic depreciation of the asset. A retirement loss is simply 
part of the asset ' s  price path and it should be accounted for as a 
tax loss at the time of retirement by the tax system. 83 The 
present value of the tax adjustments for economic depreciation 
should include the present value that arises from retirements .M 
If the goal is to give the taxpayer a straight-line schedule 
8 3 .  see supra text accompanying notes 42-44 . 
8 4 .  The Treasury Department makes exactly this argument in 
several of its depreciation studies. See, �.g. , Treasury Horse 
study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 14 ; Treasury Scientific Instruments Study, 
supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 3 .  
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that is equivalent to depreciation using the age-price profile for 
surviving assets as a schedule, it is necessary to ensure that the 
present value of the §Ym of depreciation deductions and retirement 
loss deductions is the same under the two schedules . Only then 
will a taxpayer face the same expected present value of total 
tax benefits for cost recovery under both schedules. 
In the remainder of this subsection, we explore the two 
variants that the government has used to adjust for retirements . 
The first variant simply uses the same adjustment that appears in 
the Hulten and Wykoff approach: the age-price profile for 
surviving assets is adjusted downward by multiplying the price at 
each age by the probability of survival to that age.85 The 
resulting curv� consists of the average value of both surviving and 
retired assets . 86  The present value of depreciation based on this 
curve is the retirement-adjusted present value that emerges from 
the first variant. 
Using this first variant results in the correct outcome. The 
decline along the derived curve will be precisely the average 
decline in value experienced by assets with different lives. The 
present value of depreciation that follows from the curve will be 
the present value that is expected on average when the asset is 
purchased . 87 This present value is exactly the goal of the 
8 5 .  See supra text accompanying notes 48-50. 
8 6 .  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
8 7 .  To make this point in a more mathematical way, note that 
there are three steps in the computation under the Hul ten and 
Wykoff approach : 
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calculations . 
The second variant does not perform as well .  I n  the example 
we have been using in this Part ,88 the present value of 
depreciation calculated by using the first variant is 8 8 .  44% of 
initial value compared to 9 0 . 51% of initial value when calculated 
using the second variant .89 These present values translate into 
class lives of 8 .  40 and 6 .  3 6  years respectively for the two 
variants.90 The second variant results in a class life that is 
about 24% too short. 
The divergence becomes even more extreme if we alter the 
example to allow a slower rate of decline in revenues. The rate in 
the example was 20% per year. If we use a rate of 10% per year, 
the present values of depreciation for the first and second 
variants are 8 3 . 60% and 8 7 . 66% of initial value respectively� The 
corresponding class lives are 15.  08 under the first variant and 
(1)  A curve representing the average value of all units 
(retired and surviving) is derived; 
(2)  The derivative of this curve gives the instantaneous rate 
of decline in value at each point ; 
(3)  The instantaneous decline in value at each point is 
integrated after being discounted to present value. 
Taking the average and taking the derivative commute .  That i s ,  the 
derivative of the average value curve is equal to the average 
derivative of the individual value curves. Thus, the overall 
result will be the expected present value of depreciation 
independent of the order of steps ( 1 )  and ( 2 ) . 
8 8 .  See supra text accompanying notes 37-4 1 .  
8 9 .  The mathematical derivation o f  these results i s  set out 
in Appendix A. See infra Appendix A .  
9 0 .  The class lives are calculated 
Department 1 s method for translating the 
depreciation for an asset into a class life 
supra text accompanying notes 75-80. 
using the Treasury 
present value of 
for the asset. See 
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9 . 26 years· under the second variant. The second variant results in 
a class life that is almost 40% too short. This discrepancy is 
much larger than the discrepancy when revenue declined more 
quickly . 
The intuitive reason for the deviation between the two 
variants and the increase in that deviation for a lower rate of 
decline in revenues is that the second variant gives too low a 
weight to assets with long lives . The second variant begins by 
computing the age-price path and the present value of depreciation 
for individual cases where the life of the asset is known. Assets 
with a longer life will be more valuable initially because the 
owner knows that these assets will continue producing revenues 
after assets with a shorter life have been retired. since they 
start at a higher initial value, longer-lived assets will 
contribute more total depreciation than shorter-lived assets. · In 
addition, the depreciation for longer-lived assets will be 
concentrated in the later years compared to shorter-lived assets . 
The shorter-lived assets will reach zero value and stop 
depreciating at some point. At this point the longer-lived assets 
still have value and are still depreciating. 
If assets of different l ives are averaged together (as in the 
age-price profiles we have been considering) , the longer-lived 
assets will be a larger component of value, will contribute more 
total depreciation, and will cause average depreciation to be 
shifted toward later years. However, the second variant normalizes 
the initial price of assets of different lives to be one. This 
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normalization artificially diminishes the contribution o f  longer-
lived assets to the average . These assets � more valuable 
initially and they contribute more to average depreciation than 
shorter-lived assets. The main impact of artificially downplaying 
the significance of longer-lived assets is that average 
depreciation will appear to be faster than it really is. 
shorter-lived assets are in effect weighted too much. 91 
The 
It is not surprising, then , that the second variant results in 
much shorter class lives than the first variant. It is also not 
surprising that the discrepancy is more severe when revenues 
decline more slowly. A slower decline in revenues means that the 
later years of an asset ' s  life are relatively more important . The 
second variant artificially downplays these later years. 
It is now possible to come to some conclusions about the 
government approach. First, in the absence of strategic loss-
taking , the government approach is conceptually correct . In 
particular, adjusting both the initial age-price profile and the 
surrogate straight-line schedule for retirements is theoretically 
sound . Second , implementing the government approach by the first, 
"Hulten and Wykoff" variant for adjusting the age-price profile for 
retirements results in - the correct values for class lives. 
However, using the second variant results in class lives that are 
much too short. Use of this variant should be abandoned in favor 
of the first variant. 
91. This 11weighting" effect emerges very clearly in the 
equations that describe the second variant. � infra Appendix A. 
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Unfortunately, these positive conclusions will not hold up 
when strategic loss-taking is viable. The impact of strategic 
loss-taking on the government ' s  approach is discussed in subsection 
5 below. The next subsection shows that the government approach 
cannot be simplified to eliminate the retirement adjustments. such 
simplifications introduce substantial errors. 
4 .  The Need to Adjust for Retirements 
The government ' s  approach rests on the Treasury Department ' s  
interpretation of language in the legislative history of the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 concerning how class l ives should be 
calculated . 92 This language could be interpreted differently to 
mean that class lives should be determined without making any 
adjustments for retirement risk. 93 Thus, the government could 
simply translate the age-price profile for surviving assets into 
the straight-line schedule that results in equal presen� value of 
depreciation. This approach would eliminate the laborious 
92. See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
93. This interpretation would not strain the language in the 
legislative history. On the contrary, perhaps the most natural 
interpretation of the language is that the age-price profile should 
be translated into the straight-line method that is equivalent in 
present value without adjusting for retirement risk. The relevant 
language in context is as follows : 
If resale price data is used to prescribe class l ives, such 
resale price data should be adjusted downward to remove the 
effects of historical inflation. This adjustment provides a 
larger measure of depreciation than in the absence of such an 
adjustment . Class l ives using this data would be determined 
such that the present value of straight-line depreciation 
deductions over the class life, discounted at an appropriate 
real rate of interest , is equal to the present value of what 
the estimated decline in value of the asset would be in the 
absence of inflation. 
Tax Reform Act of 1986 Blue Book, supra note 2 4 ,  at 103. 
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corrections for retirement risk both for the age-price profile for 
surviving assets and for the straight-line schedule. 
Unfortunately, this simplified approach can result in 
significant errors. These errors arise because a depreciation 
schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving assets will 
be equivalent to the corresponding straight-line schedule only for 
the assets that survive for the duration of both schedules. For 
assets that perish before both schedules reach zero, retirement 
deductions generally will differ under the two schedules. As a 
result, when retirement risk is taken into account, the expected 
present value of deductions is not the same for the approximating 
schedule and the schedule based on the age-price profile for 
surviving assets. The direction of the errors depends on whether 
the approximations allow faster or slower depreciation than the 
actual decline in value of surviving assets in the early years of 
asset life. 
Consider the case where the approximation results in slower 
depreciation in the early years compared to actual depreciation. 
For the example that we have been considering in this Part, Figure 
8 sets out the age-price profile for surviving assets and the 
• 
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straight-l·ine schedule that results in the same present value of 
depreciation deductions . It is apparent from the figure that in 
the early years of the asset ' s  life the straight-line schedule 
results in depreciation that is slower than the actual decline in 
value of the asset. In later years the straight-line schedule 
results in depreciation at a faster rate than the actual rate of 
decline in asset value. 
The straight-line schedule in the figure extends over 9. 42 
years. If the taxpayer holds the asset for the full 9 . 42 years, 
then the taxpayer will experience depreciation that is too slow in 
the early years but will "catch up" in the later years when 
depreciation under the straight-line schedule is too fast. 
There is � problem, however, that has been identified by Roger 
Pies and David Fischer:� Many assets will fail and be discarded 
before the taxpayer can catch up under the straight-line schedUle. 
In the example that generates the diagram, �  over 50% of assets 
will fail before the two curves cross in the diagram at 
approximately 7 . 1  years. These assets are depreciated at too slow 
a rate during their entire life. They never have a chance to catch 
up in the later years when depreciation is faster along the 
straight-line schedule than the actual rate of decline in value • 
This phenomenon results in the Pies-Fischer effect: When 
retirements are taken into account , the straight-line schedule 
9 4 .  See Pies & Fischer, How Dispositions Affect Determination 
of Depreciation Class Life, 47 Tax Notes 8 5 ,  85-86 (1990) . 
9 5 .  See supra text accompanying notes 37-41. 
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results in a lower present value of deductions than the schedule 
based on actual depreciation. In the example represented by Figure 
B ,  the present value of all deductions will fall from 8 8 . 44% of 
initial value for depreciation based on the actual age-price 
profile to 87 . 52% of initial value for depreciation using the 
straight-line approximation to that profile.96 
our example represents only one of two possible cases. 
Straight-line approximations may involve depreciation that is 
faster than actual decline in value in the early years followed by 
depreciation in the later years that is slower than actual decline 
in value. In this second case, retirement risk can cause an 
" inverse" Pies-Fischer effect to occur. A larger proportion of 
assets experience the early part of the approximate schedule than 
the later part. Since the early part is accelerated relative to 
the actual decline in value while the later part is decelerated, 
the expected present value of all deductions will be higher under 
96. As Pies and Fis-cher point out, present value effects that 
appear small ,  such as the one percentage point effect here, may 
actually represent significant distortions in terms of the degree 
of adjustment in the law required to correct them. See Pies & 
Fischer, supra note 9 4 ,  at 89 (class life for use in straight-line 
depreciation must be shifted from 5 . 039 years to 3 . 619 years to 
overcome 1 . 64 percentage point gap in present value) . 
The exact class lives that Pies and Fischer advocate may be 
much too short . To const_ruct a depreciation schedule for surviving 
assets, they use the depreciation rates derived by Hul ten and 
Wykoff. See Pies & Fischer, supra note 94 , at 9 0 .  But these rates 
already have been accelerated to take into account retirement 
losses. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58. Nonetheless, 
Pies and Fischer proceed to adjust the schedule based on these 
rates for retirement losses. In effect, this approach results in 
a double adjustment for retirement losses. The resulting class 
lives will be much too short. See supra note 56 and text 
accompanying notes 56-58 . 
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the approximated schedule than under the schedule that reflects 
actual decline in value . 
In conclusion, it is not possible to eliminate the adjustments 
for retirements in the government approach without creating 
significant errors. 
necessary. 97 
However painful , those adjustments are 
5 .  The Impact o f  Strategic Loss-taking 
In subsection 3 we argued that the government approach was 
conceptually correct so long as the proper variant is used to 
adjust the age-price profile for retirement risk. Unfortunately, 
this conclusion does not hold up if strategic loss-taking is 
feasible. 
9 7 .  The use of a straight-line approximation does raise some 
problems even under the government ' s  approach. Although . the 
present value of deductions is the same under the straight-line 
approximation as under the retirement adjusted age-price profile, 
there is a residual "ex post" equity problem that arises from using 
an approximation. 
Suppose that the approximating straight-line schedule 
initially is slower than economic depreciation represented by the 
age-price profile for surviving assets but that an asset will be 
fully depreciated under the straight-l ine schedule before the age­
price profile reaches zero. Then, taxpayer one who holds an asset 
that fails early will receive depreciation that is too slow 
compared to economic depreciation. In contrast, taxpayer two who 
holds an asset that fails right after the approximating straight­
line schedule reaches zero will receive depreciation that is too 
fast compared to economic depreciation. 
This ex post problem cannot be fixed short of abandoning 
approximation techniques altogether and using the actual age-price 
profile of surviving assets as the basis for the depreciation 
deductions allowed. As long as the approximate schedule deviates 
in different directions from economic depreciation during different 
asset age periods, differential treatment based on the holding 
period for the asset will occur. See also infra text accompanying 
notes 165-168 (discussing impact of diversified holdings of 
depreciable assets on equity problem) . 
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To see the basic intuition behind this conclusion, let us 
return to the theoretically ideal treatment consisting of using a 
depreciation schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving 
assets. As we have noted ,98 under this schedule there can be no 
strategic loss-taking. At any point in time, the asset has been 
depreciated for tax purposes down to exactly its market value. 
Adjusted basis is equal to market value. The taxpayer cannot 
obtain a tax loss by selling the asset. 
This result disappears, however ,  if the age-price profile that 
represents the depreciation schedule is ever above the age-price 
profile for surviving assets . At such a point in time, .the market 
value of the asset is less than the adjusted basis of the asset and 
the taxpayer can trade to obtain a tax loss. 
This phenomenon is independent of whether there is any 
retirement risk. Consider an asset that will produce constant 
revenues of $1000 per year and will last exactly 10 years. 99 
98. See supra text- accompanying notes 43-4 4 .
9 9 .  Since the exact life i s  known in advance, there i s  no 
retirement risk. 
This example is almost identical to the example used by 
Professor Chirelstein to 'illustrate what he calls the " sinking-fund 
depreciation method . 11 See M .  Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation 
6 . 08 ,  at 137-39 (5th ed. 1988) . The sinking-fund method is 
equivalent to the productivity method described above: The age­
price profile that serves as a basis for economic depreciation is 
equal at each moment in time to the present value of future 
revenues .  See supra note 2 3 1 .  
Unfortunately, Professor Chirelstein l inks the sinking-fund 
method to the outcome that economic depreciation will be 
decelerated compared to straight-line depreciation. See id. at 
139.  But that deceleration result is not the necessary or natural 
outcome of the sinking-fund method. Instead the result is an 
artifact of the particular example Professor Chirelstein examines. 
The asset in the example has constant revenues, no revenue risk and 
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Figure 9 plots the ensuing age-price profile and the straight-line 
schedule with the same present value of deductions as the schedule 
based on that profile. 
The two schedules cross when the asset is 6 . 77 years old. Up 
to this point the taxpayer is better off under the straight-line 
schedule, but afterwards , the taxpayer should trade frequently so 
as to secure deductions that track the actual decline in value of 
no retirement risk. 
All of the age-price profiles depicted in figures in this 
paper have been derived by the same method, the productivity 
method , that Professor Chirelstein uses. The profiles in these 
figures are based on different assumptions about revenue risk and 
retirement risk. Yet most of them are accelerated rather than 
decelerated relative to the straight-line method. See, ,g.g. , .slJ.l2U 
text accompanying notes 39-41 (Figure 5 ,  exponential life 
distribution and exponentially declining revenues) and infra text 
accompanying notes 121-122 (Weibull life distribution with shape 
parameter 2 . 12 5 ,  constant revenues) .  
Whether deceleration or acceleration relative to the 
corresponding straight-line curve is "typical 11 is an empirical 
question. The evidence unearthed by Hul ten and Wykoff suggests 
that acceleration is typical . They term the case studied by 
Chirelstein where revenues are constant and the asset simply 
collapses at some known future time, the "one-horse-shay" case. 
See Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3 ,  at 8 9 .  This case results in an 
age-price profile that declines more swiftly at older ages , as in 
Figure 9 and the Chirelstein example. But this case is not typical 
as is indicated by two of Hulten and Wykoff ' s  empirical findings . 
First, Hulten and Wykoff found that the one-horse-shay pattern is 
not statistically acceptable as a model for the large set of 
depreciable assets that they studied. Second, the average age­
price profile for these assets is convex, that i s ,  the rate of 
decline is more rapid in the early years of the asset ' s  life. See 
supra text accompanying notes 53-54 . 
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Figure 9 
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the asset. too The total present value of deductions under this 
strategy are 61. 23% of initial value compared to 59 . 80% of initial 
value for the stream of deductions under either the straight-line 
100. At about three years of age, the rate of the actual 
decline in value becomes greater than the rate of depreciation 
along the straight-line schedule. At this point in time, the slope 
of the age-price profile ·in the figure is equal to the slope of the 
straight line. But it is not optimal for the taxpayer to switch to 
the actual schedule at this "equal rates" time even though the 
actual decline in value ·will be at a faster rate for all future 
times. Switching by trad.ing at the equal rates time entails paying 
taxes on the gain equal to the vertical gap between the schedules 
at that time. This gain will be offset by accelerated deductions 
along the age-price profile representing actual decline in value. 
When the point at which the curves cross is reached , the entire 
amount of this gain will be offset by additional deductions. 
However, these offsetting deductions are later in time than the 
gain experienced from selling at the equal rates time. In present 
value terms , the taxpayer is worse off. 
This same argument applies to potential trades at all points 
in time before the time at which the curves cross. After that 
time, there is no penalty in the form of taxable gain for shifting 
to the faster schedule based on the actual decline in asset value. 
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schedule or the schedule based on actual decline in value. 101 
Congress has required the government to convert schedules 
representing economic depreciation into straight-line schedules 
with the same present value of depreciation. 10Z This requirement 
is not senseless since it allows ADS , the part of the Code that 
approximates economic depreciation, to be very simple: Each asset 
is depreciated under the straight-line method over its class life. 
But the existence of the requirement makes strategic loss-taking 
problems inevitable. 
This inevitability results from the fact that a schedule that 
approximates economic depreciation must result in adjusted basis 
sometimes being higher and sometimes lower than actual market 
value. If ad�usted basis were always higher than market value,
depreciation under the approximating schedule would be too 
slow. 10l If adjusted basis were always lower than market value, 
101.  The taxpayer will be even better off if used assets are 
depreciated using the same type of straight-line approximation 
employed for new assets . Then, after selling at the point where 
the curves cross, the taxpayer will receive a new straight-line 
schedule that will decline faster than the actual decline in value 
for some period of time. The taxpayer should stick to that 
schedule until it crosses the age-price profile. Then the taxpayer 
should trade again, receiving a third straight-line schedule. 
Pursuing this strategy dominates simply trading to deduct along the 
age-price profile after the first straight-line schedule crosses 
the curve representing that profile. 
102 . See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 61-62 . 
103 . This assertion is true even if we take retirements into 
account . Under the slower_ schedule with consistently higher 
adjusted basis, retirement loss deductions are more valuable since 
loss is equal to adjusted basis at the time of retirement . 
However, the increased losses exactly correspond to earlier 
depreciation deductions given up by the taxpayer on the slow 
schedule. Thus, the slower schedule will result in a lower present 
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the approximating schedule would be too fast. Since adjusted basis 
must sometimes be above market value under any approximation, 
strategic loss-taking is a potential problem. 104 
Since Congress requires the government to use approximations, 
it is important to consider policy responses to the strategic loss-
taking problem. It turns ·out, however, that strategic loss-taking 
is a much more pervasive problem. The true scope of the problem 
has been hidden by our assumption that the age-price profile for 
surviving assets is known in advance. A schedule based on this 
profile precludes stratetj"ic loss-taking since adjusted basis is 
value of depreciation even after adjustment for retirement losses. 
For a more extensive explanation of this point, see supra note 7 8 .  
104 . In the context o f  our example, consider the following 
figure. The curved line is the age-price profile for surviving 
assets. This curve represents the market value of surviving assets 
at any given time. The straight-line is the approximating schedule 
under the correct, Hulten. and Wykoff, variant of the government ' s  
approach. See supra text. accompanying notes 59-82, 9 2 .  
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It is clear from the. figure that the approximating straight­
line schedule results in an adjusted basis above market value for 
the first six years and an adjusted basis below market value 
thereafter. Thus, adjusted basis under the approximating schedule 
is sometimes below and sometimes above market value. During the 
first six years, the period when adjusted basis is above market 
value, strategic loss-taking is possible .  The taxpayer will want 
to 11trade down" to the market value and thus effectively accelerate 
depreciation deductions .• 
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always equal to market value. 
But, in general, the age-price profile for surviving assets is 
� known in advance . 105 As a result, there is the danger that 
ma�ket prices will end up being higher than adjusted basis under 
whatever schedule is specified ex ante. Part III takes up the 
potential policy responses to strategic loss-taking in this more 
general setting. 106 The solutions discussed there apply equally 
to the strategic loss-taking problems raised by the need for the 
government to use approximations. 
D .  Retirement Risk Considerations i n  the Neutral Design of 
Accelerated Depreciation Systems 
section B establishes that retirement risk can be ignored in 
computing a ?epreciation schedule that results in economic 
depreciation. However ,  if the goal is to accelerate depreciation 
in a neutral way across assets from a benchmark of economic 
depreciation, then retirement risk must be taken into account. 
The basic reasoning behind this assertion is straightforward. 
Two assets with the same age-price profile for surviving units will 
have the same statutory schedule if economic depreciation is the 
goa l .  101 Suppose, however ,  that asset number one has a much 
higher survival rate than asset number two. The statutory schedule 
covers only surviving units. Asset number one is more likely to 
survive and therefore is more likely to be depreciated along any 
105. See supra text accompanying notes 35-3 6 .  
106 . See infra text accompanying notes 115-185. 
107 . see supra text accompanying notes 41-4 4 .  
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given portion of the statutory schedule. Accelerating the 
statutory schedule will benefit asset one more than asset two . 
This result can be illustrated using the example developed in 
earlier sections. 108  Consider Figure 10. The upper curve is the 
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same age-price profile that we have seen i n  the example all along. 
Since this curve is the age-price profile for surviving 'assets, it 
is the statutory schedule that should be used if economic 
depreciation is the goa l .  The lower curve i s  a n  accelerated 
depreciation schedule. The rate of depreciation on the lower 
schedule is exactly twice the rate on the upper schedule. The 
difference in the heights of the two curves represents the 
cumulative amount of "early" tax depreciation that an asset 
depreciated on the lower curve will receive compared to economic 
depreciation. 
Now consider two as_sets. Asset one has a survival rate of 
9/10 annually while asset two survives only at a rate of 2/3 
annually. The following table indicates the probability of 
survival to various ages for the two assets : 
108. See supra text accompanying notes 37-4 1 .  
Table I 
age 
(years) 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
percentage of units surviving to age for 
asset one asset two 
100 . 0% 
9 0 . 0 %  
8 1 .  0% 
7 2 . 9% 
65 . 6% 
59 . 0% 
53 . 1% 
4 7 . 8% 
4 3 . 0% 
3 8 . 7 %  
3 4 . 9% 
100 . 0% 
6 6 . 7 %  
4 4 . 4% 
2 9 . 6% 
1 9 .  6% 
1 3 . 2 %  
8 . 8 %  
5 . 9 %  
3 . 9% 
2 . 6% 
1 .  7% 
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From the table it is clear that at any given age past a few months, 
it is much more l ikely that asset one will be subject to the 
statutory depreciation schedule. Asset two is much more l ikely to 
fail early. As a result ,  accelerating statutory depreciation 
should be much' more of a benefit for asset one than for asset two. 
This intuition turns out to be true and can be quantif�ed. 
The total set of tax benefits consists of statutory depreciation 
deductions and retirement loss deductions. For the two assets, the 
present value of these deductions per dollar of asset cost before 
and after acceleration of depreciation are as follows: 
Table II 
asset 
one 
two 
present value of tax benefits under : 
economic depreciation accelerated depreciation 
0. 677254
0. 819708
0 . 7 58898 
0 . 848388 
For asset one, the increase in the present value of deductions is 
0 . 081644 per dollar of investment while the increase for asset 
two per dollar of investment is only 0 .  02868 , about a third as 
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much . The acceleration of depreciation has clearly favored asset 
one over asset two . In order for accelerated depreciation to be 
neutral, the statutory schedule for asset one must be accelerated 
much less than the one fdr asset two. 109 If the depreciation rate 
109 . There is much work by economists on the issue of how to 
accelerate depreciation in a neutral manner. See Auerbach , .'r.ruf 
Neutrality and the Social1Discount Rate, in Tbe Taxation of Capital 
xncome 33 (A. Auerbach ed, 1983 ) (citing sources) .  There is more 
than one test for neutrality. The two major tests are the present 
value approach and the internal rate of return approach . See id. 
at 33-34.
The present value approach works by computing the present 
value of gross returns required per dollar of investment. If tax 
benefits are high enough ,. this present value will be less than one 
dollar. This means that less than a dollar in present value of 
gross returns will justify a one dollar investment . A "neutral" 
acceleration of depreciation will decrease the required present 
value of gross returns for all assets the same amount. 
The internal rate of return approach works by computing the 
gross internal rate of return required to justify a one dollar 
investment . Higher tax benefits mean that this internal rate of 
return will be lower. The investment does not need to earn as much 
return if tax benefits are more generous . A 11neutral11 acceleration 
of depreciation will decrease internal rates of return for all 
assets the same amount . 
The argument in the text is equivalent to the present value 
approach . An increase in the present value of deductions 
translates to a proportional decrease in the required present value 
of gross returns. Appendix B infra demonstrates that the 
proportionality factor is T/ ( l  - T) where T is the tax rate. 
There are strong arg_uments in favor of using the internal rate 
of return approach instead of the present value approach. See 
Auerbach, supra this note. But using the internal rate of return 
approach would not affect the qualitative argument in the text . 
Accelerating depreciation would lower the required internal rate of 
return by • 02411 times T/ (1 - T) for asset one and by O. 015161
times T/ ( l  - T) for asset two. Thus, under the internal rate of 
return method, this acceleration of depreciation fails to be 
neutral in exactly the same way: The acceleration strongly favors 
asset one. 
The fact that the internal rate of return approach comports 
qualitatively with the present value approach in this example is 
not surprising. The intuition that accelerating the statutory 
schedule should have more impact on asset one because of its higher 
survival rate is independent of which approach toward testing 
neutrality is taken. 
For a mathematical discussion of the application of the 
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is doubled for asset two as in the example, neutrality will be 
achieved if the depreciation rate for asset one is increased by a 
factor of 1 . 2 9 .  110
It is clear that different amounts of acceleration may be 
required for two assets that have the same statutory depreciation 
schedule under an economic depreciation scheme if the assets differ 
in retirement risk characteristics. This result has important 
implications for current law. Under current law, ADS is meant to 
simulate economic depreciation, and MACRS is meant to accelerate 
depreciation in a neutral manner from the baseline of economic 
depreciation. 111 But the Code simply translates the class lives 
under ADS to recovery periods under MACRS . 112 This approach may 
result in some serious misclassification if assets vary greatly in 
retirement risk characteristics. 113 In fact, it appears that there 
present value and internal rate of return approaches to the text 
example, see infra Appendix B. 
110. There is no single, accepted definition of neutrality. 
See supra note 109.  The two leading approaches to neutrality are 
the present value approach and the internal rate of return 
approach . See id. Under these two approaches the required 
acceleration factors for asset one are 1 . 2 9  and 1 . 56 respectively. 
The text uses the 1 . 29 figure because the example has been cast in 
present value terms . 
111. See supra text accompanying notes 19-25. 
1 1 2 .  � supra note 3 3  and accompanying text. 
113 . The misclassification arises because ADS is meant to 
replicate economic depreciation while MACRS is meant to allow 
accelerated depreciation that is neutral between assets. The point 
in the text is that neutral acceleration can result in two assets 
with the same economic depreciation schedule having very different 
accelerated schedules. Thus, the fact that two assets are in the 
same ADS category does not mean that they should be in the same 
MACRS category. Setting up MACRS categories strictly on the basis 
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is a great deal of variation, even for assets that seem 
similar. 114 
of class lives as in the current Code, see supra note 3 3 ,  is a 
mistake. 
Earlier parts of the Article point out that ADS depreciation 
may not accurately replicate economic depreciation. See supra text 
accompanying notes 57-58 (use of Hulten & Wykoff approach makes 
class lives too short under current law) • But even if ADS did 
accurately replicate economic depreciation, the claim that a scheme 
where ADS and MACRS categories are the same involves some 
misclassification would still stand. Given that assets have 
different retirement risk characteristics, either the ADS 
categories or the MACRS pategories or both must be flawed if the 
two sets of categories are the same . 
Finally, note that since the MACRS categories cover broad sets 
of class lives, the current MACRS classification system may not be 
very accurate anyway. For example, assets with class lives of 
between 4 and 10 years all are treated as 5-year recovery property 
under MACRS . See supra note 3 3 .  The failure to take into account 
retirement risk in going from ADS to MACRS is theoretically 
significant, but the existing degree of misclassification may be so 
large that it dwarfs effects stemming from that failure. 
Nonetheless, it does appear plausible that some of the 
misclassification in the current MACRS categories stems from 
ignoring retirement risk. 
114 . see infra Appendix c. This Appendix discusses life 
distributions and shows that apparently similar assets (in 
particular, different sexes of horses) may have very different life 
distributions . 
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III . Optimal Depreciation When the Age-Price Profile is Not Known 
in Advance 
Part II studies tax depreciation policy in a context where the 
age-price profile is known in advance. For many depreciable 
assets, however, information about revenues or the durability of 
the asset affect the value of the asset as its life unfolds. 115 
For these assets, the age-price profile for the asset is not known 
in advance. This condition qualifies some of the conclusions of 
Part II and raises some new issues. 
The most fundamental result in Part II is that the age-price 
profile for surviving assets provides the unique statutory 
depreciation schedule that leads to an exact replication of 
economic depr�ciation. Since a depreciation schedule is set in 
advance, this result depends on knowing the age-price profile for 
surviving assets in advance. If that profile is not knowri in 
advance, the government must use other approaches for setting the 
depreciation schedule. 
Section A explores the new considerations that arise from not 
being certain about the future prices of surviving assets. 
Sections B and C discuss potential tax policy responses to that 
uncertainty . Section B focuses on changes in the ex ante part of 
depreciation policy, that is, changes in the statutory depreciation 
schedule which is fixed in advance. Section c considers changes in 
the ex post features of depreciation law. Under individual item 
accounting, those features currently consist primarily of "settling 
115.  See supra text accompanying notes 35-36. 
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up11 by assessing a loss or a gain when an asset is sold or 
discarded. The loss or gain is equal to the amount realized minus 
the adjusted basis. Section C considers more elaborate ex post 
adjustments . Some of these are alternative rules for the tax 
treatment of dispositions that are actually used in group 
accounting methods . The discussion, however, continues to presume 
individual item accounting. Part IV discusses group accounting. 
Section D states some conclusions. No clear policy winner 
emerges from the discussion. The stronger alternatives have 
strengths and weaknesses and only more research can determine which 
of them is actually the best policy. 
A .  The Basic Implications o f  Uncertain Future Asset Prices for Tax 
Depreciation Policy 
To illustrate the dilemma created by not knowing the age-price 
profile of surviving assets in advance , consider an example that 
roughly approximates the situation for racehorses. At birth it is 
unclear how successful a racehorse will be. The horses end up in 
three general categories. 116 About 40% never become "starters , "  
that is, horses that race regularly. 117 A minority of the 60% 
that become starters enjoy spectacular success. Suppose that this 
116. Finer gradations are undoubtedly possible. But these 
three categories do emerge from the Treasury Department ' s  study on 
the depreciation of horses if both racing and later breeding uses 
are considered . See Treasury Horse Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 5 ,  14-
1 8 .  
117 . The data indicate that between 30% and 4 0 %  never start. 
See Treasury Horse study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 5 .  
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class comprises one-sixth of the starters or 10% of all 
racehorses . 118 These spectacularly successful horses undoubtedly 
are the ones in the big national and international races such as 
the Kentucky Derby . The other starters race consistently but 
probably only in local events .  These other starters comprise 50% 
of all racehorses. They are clearly 11successful11 but never earn 
the huge revenues that spectacularly successful horses earn. 
suppose that there is no information about which type a 
racehorse is until the horse actually begins to race at age two, 
but that shortly after the horse is two, the horse ' s  type is 
discovered with certainty. 119 The result will be that all
racehorses will have a common age-price profile up until age two: 
During the first two years of life the owner must assume a 40% 
chance that the horse will not be a starter, a 10% chance that the 
horse will be a spectacularly successful starter, and a 50% chance 
that the horse will start but will not enjoy spectacular success. 
When racing begins at age two, the common age-price profile splits 
into three parts . The price of spectacularly successful horses 
118. Unlike the 40% figure, this figure is simply used to 
generate the example. It is not clear exactly what proportion of 
racehorses are, in fact, "spectacularly successful. 11 Some evidence 
indicates that the figure may be much less than 10% of all 
racehorses, including nonstarters. See Treasury Horse Study, � 
note 2 3 , at 18 (about 7% of all starting colts become spectacularly 
successful breeding stallions) .  
119 . Information undoubtedly arrives at a more gradual rate 
than this. In addition, some horses may be more likely to be 
successful based on their genetic heritage. These horses 
presumably would have a higher value at birth. The goal here is 
not to model racehorses precisely, but merely to construct a simple 
but striking example. 
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shoots up at that time while the price of nonstarters falls. 
Assume that spectacularly successful horses earn $5000 per 
year, nonstarters earn $500 per year, and starters that are not 
spectacularly successful earn $2000 per year. In addition, suppose 
that all three types of horses have the same distribution of useful 
lives once they are put into service at two years old. 120 
Finally, suppose that before being tested in their first races, 2-
year olds are sold to the owners who will race them. 121 Since 
each horse ' s  type is unknown until after the first few races, all 
of these sales will occur at the same price. 
Figure 11 illustrates the age-price profiles for the three 
types of horses that follow from these assumptions. Until two 
years of age all three types have the same age-price profile, then, 
at two years old, the age-price profiles for the three types 
diverge . The spectacularly successful starters are identified and 
their price shoots up. 122 Their age-price profile is the top one 
120. Instead of choosing an exponential distribution of 
lives, we use a Weibull distribution with shape parameter 2 . 125 and 
life parameter 0 . 153 . This distribution is estimated from data on 
the useful lives of thoroughbred geldings. For a discussion of the 
Weibull distribution, see infra Appendix c .
121. This assumptipn permits use of the common market value 
just before two years old as the original basis of the horses. The 
Treasury Department in its study of horses in effect makes a 
similar assumption since they take the value of horses before two 
years old to be constant and use this value as the original basis. 
� Treasury Horse study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 ,  1 1 .  Taking the 
value at birth as the basis instead would complicate the analysis 
but would not affect any of the major conclusions. 
122. The treatment of appreciation during portions of the 
lives of depreciable assets raises interesting tax policy issues. 
For a discussion of these issues, see infra text accompanying notes 
138-141. 
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in the figure . The second highest curve is the age price profile 
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for horses that become starters but that do not enjoy spectacular 
success. The lowest curve is the age-price profile for horses that 
are nonstarters. These horses experience a large drop in price 
when they are identified as nonstarters at two years old. Finally, 
the third highest curve is a weighted average of the other three 
curves. The weights are the proportions of horses that fall into 
each of the three categories. This "average curve" therefore 
represents the an average age-price profile for all horses. 1� 
It is clear from Figure 11 that it is no longer possible to 
replicate economic depreciation perfectly by using a single 
123 . If an individual owned 
performance for the aggregate group of 
close to this average curve. 
many racehorses, price 
horses would tend to be 
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statutory schedule. 124 Even if the schedule is based on the 
average curve in the figure, many horses will experience actual 
depreciation that deviates sharply from the schedule. In 
particular, if the schedule is based on the average curve , 
depreciation will be much· too fast for the spectacularly successful 
starters and much too slbw for nonstarters. 125 
In addition, unless the statutory schedule is generated from 
a curve that lies entirely below the lowest age-price profile, 
profitable strategic loss-taking will be possible if trading costs 
are low enough. For example, suppose in Figure 11 that the 
statutory schedule is the average curve . When a· horse is 
124 .  One might wonder why the authorities would not delay 
until right after the beginning of year three to set the schedule 
for that year and future years. Then the tax authorities would 
know which outcome occurs and could set the depreciation schedule 
on the basis of the 11correct0 age-price profile. 
This approach would work in the example. However, a peculiar 
feature of the example is that all risk is resolved at one point in 
time. In the real world, risk tends to be resolved gradually. The 
tax authorities would have to wait until a machine was retired to 
know the exact age-price profile that occurred . Then , the 
depreciation system would be entirely ex post in nature . 
The device of having all risk resolved at one time in the 
example is used to make the analysis simple. Analyzing the value 
of strategic loss-taking in an environment where risk is resolved 
continuously is mathematically very difficult. See, �.g. , 
constantinides, Capital Market Equilibrium with Personal Tax, 51
Econometrica 611, 611 (1983 ) ; Magill & Constantinides, Portfolio 
Selection with Transactions Costs, 13 J .  Econ. Theory 245 (1976) . 
For a cogent study of -the value of strategic loss-taking for 
depreciable assets in that kind of environment, see Williams, 
Trading and Valuing Depreciable Assets , 14 J. Financial Econ. 283
(1985) . 
125 . A schedule based on the average curve will give each 
taxpayer at each point in time a deduction equal to the average 
decline in value across the assets in the category (here 
racehorses) . There are mathematical reasons for choosing the 
average decline in value as an estimate of the true decline in 
value. See infra text accompanying notes 142-143 and note 142 . 
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identified as a nonstarter just after two years of age, the owner 
will want to sell the horse to speed up tax depreciation. By 
selling, the owner takes the large loss of $6062 . 8 5  that occurs at 
two years but that is not reflected in the average curve . 126 The 
owner can then replace the horse sold with another nonstarter and 
depreciate this horse roughly along its age-price profile for the 
remainder of its life. 127 
This strategy increases the present value of deductions by 
$1765 . 3 0  as of year two, since that is the difference in present 
value between depreciating along the average curve and taking the 
$6062 . 85 loss right after the beginning of year two combined with 
depreciating along the age-price profile for nonstarters for the 
rest of the asset ' s  life. 128 The strategy will be attractive if 
126. The $6062 . 8 5  loss is the difference between $8589 . 04 ,
the value right before year two , and $252 6 . 19 ,  the value of a hOrse 
that is identified as a nonstarter right after the beginning of 
year two . The example assumes that the owner first purchased the 
horse at $8589 . 04 ,  right before the beginning of year two. 
127.  Presumably, the average curve which generates the 
statutory schedule would dictate the shape of the schedule. This 
shape can be described by the percentage of original cost allowable 
as a deduction for each time period. But the age-price profile for 
nonstarters has the same shape as the average curve. That age­
price profile simply starts at a lower point. Thus , the 
replacement horse would be depreciated along its actual age-price 
profile for the remainder of its life. 
1 2 8 .  The present value of depreciation along the average 
curve adjusted for retirements is $6088 . 19 .  The present value of 
depreciation along the nonstarters ' curve adjusted for retirements 
is $17 9 0 .  64 . The $6062 . 85 loss deduction has present value of 
$6062 . 8 5  since the loss occurs immediately. 
By taking the loss and shifting to the lower nonstarters' 
curve, total present value for all deductions increases by 
$6062 . 8 5  + $179 0 . 64 - $6088 . 19 � $1765 . 30 .  
The adjustment for retirements used to compute the $6088 . 19 and 
$1790 . 64 figures consists of weighting depreciation along the curve 
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this increase in present value exceeds the present value of the 
trading costs of engaging in the strategy . 129 
If strategic loss-taking is viable, the taxpayer can subvert 
a depreciation schedule based on the average age-price profile. 
The taxpayer will depreciate along that schedule if the actual age-
price profile ends up being above the average one. But if the 
actual age-price profile turns out to be below the average curve, 
the taxpayer will jump down to the schedule based on that lower 
age-price profile. So the overall result will be that at worst the 
taxpayer will be subject to the schedule based on the average 
curve. Under some outcomes, the taxpayer will be able to 
depreciate based on a more favorable schedule. The actual average 
schedule experienced by the taxpayer will result in faster 
by the probability of survival and adding the present value of 
retirement loss deductions where retirement at each particular time 
is weighted by its probability. These figures therefore represent 
the total present value of all deductions that will result from 
depreciating according to the schedule as long as the asset lives 
and then taking a loss deduction at retirement. 
129 . This statement is strictly true only under certain 
patterns of tax rates over time. In particular, the statement is 
true if the taxpayer is subject to the same marginal tax rates 
during the investment ' s  entire life. In that case, all of the 
depreciation deductions _and the deduction for trading costs will 
translate into after tax benefits at that common marginal rate. 
The taxpayer need only compare the increase in present value for 
the depreciation deductions to the present value of the trading 
cost deductions to decide whether to engage in trading. 
Note that trading costs are not necessarily entirely 
deductible at the time trades are made. Trading costs typically 
will be added to the basis of the asset and, in effect, will be 
deducted at the time of sale or disposition of the asset. See 
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U . S .  572 (1972 ) . Although the 
transaction costs of selling the original horse would result in an 
immediate tax benefit, the transaction costs of buying the 
replacement horse might not result in a tax benefit for many years. 
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depreciation than the schedule based on the average age-price 
profile. 
Anticipating this phenomenon in advance can cause assets 
subject to significant future price risk to be favored by the 
depreciation rules over otherwise similar assets . Going back to 
the example, let us compare the asset in the example to an asset 
with an age-price profile that is known in advance and that is the 
same as the average age-price profile in the example. For both 
assets, suppose that the statutory depreciation schedule is based 
on that average age-price profile. Then the individual who buys 
the asset in the example will anticipate the fact that there will 
be a special tax benefit if the horse ends up being a nonstarter: 
The taxpayer in effect will be able to accelerate depreciation if 
this outcome occurs. As mentioned above, this acceleration 
increases the present value of depreciation and loss deductions by 
$1765 . 3 0  in that case. 
Since there is a 40% chance of any given horse being a 
nonstarter, the present value of depreciation deductions at the 
time of purchase right before year two will increase by ( . 4 0  x 
$1765 . 30 )  = $706 . 12 .  As a result, the total present value o f  all 
depreciation and loss deductions at time of purchase will increase 
from $6088 . 19 to $6794 . 31 .  This increase o f  about 12% represents 
the tax advantage of the asset subject to an uncertain future price 
path in the example over an otherwise identical asset that is not 
subject to such uncertainty. It is clear, then, that substantial 
investment distortions may follow if the degree of future price 
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path uncertainty is not taken into account in setting up tax 
depreciation rules. 130 
s. Ex Ante Policy Responses to Price Path Uncertainty 
The previous section indicates that price path uncertainty can 
lead to both inefficiency and inequity. Inequity arises when some 
130 .  The example in this section centered on the fact that 
different assets of the same type may have different future revenue 
streams . Thus , racehorses perform differently and experience 
different degrees of success over their careers. see supra note 
3 5 .  It is worth noting , however, that revenue risk may affect all 
members of a class uniformly. Suppose, counterfactually, that all 
racehorses will earn the same revenues but that the general 
popularity and profitability of horseracing is uncertain. This 
situation still fits easily into the conceptual framework of this 
section. In particular, the three age-price profiles can be 
reinterpreted as the outcome under high, moderate and low 
profitability for horseracing . At the time the horses are two 
years old, the information about which of the three categories 
applies is revealed instantaneously. But the tax authorities have 
set the depreciation schedule in advance not knowing which of the 
three outcomes will occur . 
More generally, revenue risk may be divided into a portion 
that can be diversified away costlessly and a portion that is 
endemic to the entire economic system. This second type of risk 
cannot be diversified away costlessly. Some economists believe 
that the presence of systematic revenue risk, that is, revenue risk 
that cannot be costlessly diversified away, warrants special 
depreciation subsidies. The author disagrees with this claim. For 
a discussion, see infra Appendix D .
One type o f  revenue risk that i s  interesting from a tax policy 
standpoint is on the "cost side" of net revenues. Assets that have 
the same useful life may differ substantially in the amount and 
pattern of repair and maintenance costs. Net revenues will reflect 
these differences since the costs of repair and maintenance are 
subtracted from gross revenues in the netting process. 
Repair and maintenance costs are interesting from a tax policy 
standpoint . There may be a tendency to expense these costs even if 
they extend asset life by many years so that there is a policy 
argument for amortization. Excess expensing of maintenance costs 
may lead to a tax-induced bias in favor of used assets . Extending 
the life of used assets is accompanied by a 100% up front deduction 
for the costs while the extended life of new assets must be paid 
for with dollars that are deducted only over several future years . 
A careful study of the significance and policy implications of 
this issue is left to future research . 
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taxpayers .receive treatment that is either more favorable or less 
favorable than economic depreciation. 131 Inefficiency arises if 
one type of asset is favored over another by the tax system when 
there is no economic reason to do so. In the previous section we 
saw that traditional depreciation rules will favor assets with more 
uncertain age-price profiles. 
One way to respond to the potential distortions and inequities 
that arise from price path uncertainty is to adjust the 
depreciation schedule that is set ex ante. This section explores 
this possibility while the next section examines solutions that 
involve ex post adjustments to the results under the schedule. 
Regardless of whether ex ante or ex post adjustments are the 
focus, it is useful to divide the analysis into three cases : zero 
trading costs, very high trading costs, and all cases in between 
these two extremes. Trading costs are central because they 
determine the viability of strategic loss-taking. If trading costs 
are zero, then strategic trading has its fullest scope. If trading 
costs are very high, no strategic trade will be profitable .  
I f  trading costs are zero, an attractive rule i s  to allow no 
depreciation deductions at all . This rule will induce the taxpayer 
131.  There are two senses in which 11 inequi ty11 occurs as a 
result of deviations from economic depreciation. First, some 
taxpayers may enjoy treatment that is more favorable than economic 
depreciation while others are treated less favorably relative to 
the same standard. Second, even i f  the deviations from economic 
depreciation are all of the same degree and in the same direction, 
the idea that the tax system should take into account weal th 
changes as they occur is a central tenet of accretion tax theory. 
See Strnad, supra note 7 ,  at 1820-22, 1903 . This tenet originates 
from norms that are based on notions of "equity . "  See id. at 1821
n .  7, 1832-48.
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to trade whenever value falls below adjusted basis in order to 
accelerate loss deductions to the earliest possible moment . But 
the rule does not result in perfect replication of economic 
depreciation because it does not tax the owner when depreciable 
assets appreciate. 
To see this point consider the value path for 11spectacularly 
successful" racehorses p�rchased right before age two from Figure 
11 in the previous section. 132 This path along with a horizontal 
line indicating original cost are reproduced in Figure 12 below. 
Given that trading is costless and that there are no depreciation 
deductions, the taxpayer will hold the asset until it is about six 
and one-half years old. Then the taxpayer will trade down the 
curve by continually Selling and repurchasing an equivalent 
substitute asset. 
In this case, the taxpayer is treated properly during the 
period following the six and one-half year point. As losses 
accumulate during that period, the taxpayer receives a steady 
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stream of deductions equal to the losses. However, right after 
purchase at year two , there is a very large gain followed by four 
132 . See supra text accompanying notes 121-12 2 .
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and one-half years of losses equal to that gain. With a constant 
marginal tax rate, this pattern of appreciation followed by an 
equal amount of depreciation normally would generate taxes with a 
present value greater than zero. 133 Here, however, there is no 
tax effect since the taxpayer does not realize the gain from the 
appreciation and does not deduct the later offsetting depreciation. 
In tota l ,  the taxpayer receives treatment that is more favorable 
than economic depreciation. 
Bouts of appreciation followed by equal depreciation will 
happen frequently during the lives of most risky depreciable 
assets . When a decline in value is followed by good news about 
future revenues, the asset may appreciate in value despite the fact 
that its estimated remaining life is declining. 134 With costless 
trading and no statutory depreciation deductions , the taxpayer will 
have traded the adjusted basis down to the low point before · the 
appreciation started. 135 The asset then will appreciate and 
fluctuate for a while before moving back down to the level of the 
133 . The reason for a positive present value is that the 
gains are earlier than the losses. If the same tax rate applies to 
both, then the tax benefits from the losses will be equal in amount 
to the taxes on the gains since the total gain is equal to the sum 
of the losses. But the tax benefits will be discounted more 
heavily since they are received later. 
1 3 4 .  This phenomenon actually occurs for two of the three 
types of horse and for the average horse across the three types in 
the example just presented. See Figure 1 1 ,  supra text accompanying 
notes 121-122.
135.  With costless trading and no depreciation deductions , 
taxpayers will trade continuously when the asset declines. .§.gg 
supra note 1 3 .  A s  a result, the adjusted basis of the asset a t  any 
point in time will be the minimum value of the asset over the 
period of ownership up until that time. 
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adjusted basis. 136 That period of appreciation and fluctuation 
will involve equal total amounts of gain and loss as in the example 
just presented . During the life of an asset subject to substantial 
price risk, there should be many such periods of appreciation and 
fluctuation. 
There are several ways to deal with the problem that 
depreciable assets may appreciate over part of their lives. Under 
accretion tax theory , the ideal approach would be to tax all gains 
and to allow deductions for all losses as they occur. By the 
standards of this theory , allowing no depreciation deductions at 
all when trading is costless is too lenient a rule. The taxpayer 
should pay a net tax on each of the bouts of appreciation and 
fluctuation but does not under the rule. 
The potential solutions to this problem of unrealized 
appreciation for depreciable assets are similar to the potential 
solutions for the more general class of risky assets that are not 
necessarily depreciable. 137 The most prominent such solution is 
136.  The asset will eventually fail with probability one. 
Thus, with probability one, the asset will decline below the level 
of its adjusted basis sometime in the future. 
137 . The category of "depreciable assets" used here has a 
similar meaning to the Class of assets subject to 11a reasonable 
allowance for . . •  exhaustion, wear and tear ( including a reasonable 
allowance for obsolescence) " under section 167 of the Code. §gg 
I . R . C .  § 167(a) (1991) . These assets have finite useful l ives and 
therefore will wear out and become valueless in a way that is at 
least roughly predictable. Thus , land is not included in the 
section 167 category because it has "no ascertainable useful life. 11 
See Treasury Regulations § 1 . 167 ( a ) -2 (1991) . The same would be 
true of corporate equities and similar assets . Fixed maturity 
bonds have an ascertainable life, but generally do not decline in 
value to zero over that lifetime. Bonds will tend to trade at a 
constant price if interest rates remain constant . Neither bonds 
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11frequent assessment, "  a solution that is ex post in nature: The 
asset • s  actual value path is observed as closely as possible and 
the appropriate tax is levied. 138 
In two of its four recent studies, the Treasury Department 
faced the problem of depreciable assets that appreciate during part 
of their lives. 139 The Treasury Department ' s  solution for the 
appreciation aspect of these depreciable assets is to ignore the 
nor corporate equities are depreciable assets under section 167 . 
1 3 8 .  For a discussion of this solution and its leading 
competitors, see Strnad, supra note 7 ,  at 1891-1903. Perhaps the 
strongest general competitor for frequent assessment is ex post 
approximation in l inear or exponential form. This approach assumes 
that the asset has followed a linear or exponential path between 
any two known values on the actual path . 
However, regardless of whether the exponential or linear 
variant is used, the approach fails completely to address the 
problem presented here. That problem is that in between sales at 
roughly the same price there is a period of appreciation followed 
by equal amounts of depreciation. The linear and exponential 
approximations in this case are both the same: Price remains flat 
during the entire period between sales. As a result, no tax is 
due. But some tax should be paid to reflect the fact that 
appreciation is followed by an equal amount of depreciation. 
139 . One of the studies focussed on racehorses . 
Spectacularly successful racehorses display an age-price profile 
very similar to the profile that we have been studying . See 
Treasury Horse study, � note 2 3 ,  at 16.  The other study 
examined fruit and nut trees. See Treasury Fruit Tree Study, � 
note 2 3 .  Fruit and nut trees are ••put into service" for purposes 
of tax depreciation when they start producing fruit and nuts . � 
.iQ.. at 1 ,  1 1 ,  23-24.  But at that point in time they are still 
growing. Fruit and nut output per tree increases at a rapid rate 
and does not reach a peak until several years after the first 
season with significant yield. See id. at 1 ,  2 3 ,  2 7 ,  3 3 ,  3 6 ,  3 9 ,  
4 2 .  This effect i s  pronounced enough that the trees increase in 
value during the early years in life. In these early years, the 
fact that remaining life is shorter as time goes on is more than 
offset by the fact that peak revenues associated with peak 
production are closer in time and therefore discounted less 
heavily. The Treasury Department used a 4%: real after-tax discount 
rate in its fruit and nut tree study . See id. at 2 3 . 
appreciation and the associated offsetting depreciation. 140 
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In 
terms of the example, this means that the appreciation · and matching 
depreciation from the two year point to the six and one-half year 
point would be ignored. Depreciation would only be allowed 
starting at the six and .one-half year point when the asset first 
declines below its original cost. 
A possible theoretical rationale for this approach is that it 
would be unfair and perhaps also inefficient to tax the unrealized 
gain from the appreciation on these depreciable assets when the 
Code generally allows unrealized gains to go untaxed. 141 Given 
that the appreciation is not taxed, the offsetting depreciation 
should not be deductible either. 
When trading is costless ,  the proposed rule of permitting no 
statutory depreciation will perfectly implement the Treasury 
Department approach. The taxpayer will take loss deductions only 
when and to the extent that value declines below adjusted basis. 
An initial spurt of appreciation above original cost followed by 
offsetting depreciation will be totally ignored. 
Now consider the opposite case from the case of zero trading 
costs. If trading costs are very high, strategic trading will 
never be economically viable. As a result, choosing and imposing 
140. See Treasury Horse study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 18-19;
Treasury Fruit Tree study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 1-2 , 24-27 . 
141.  The Treasury Department did not rely on this rationale. 
It arrived at its position based on its belief that Congressional 
intent with respect to the treatment of depreciable assets requires 
not taking periods of appreciation and matching depreciation into 
account . See Treasury Fruit Tree study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 1 8 ;
Treasury Horse Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 1 8 .
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a deprecia�ion schedule based on the expected decline in value for 
surviving assets is an attractive approach . This approach means 
that at each moment during the asset ' s  life, the taxpayer will 
receive a depreciation deduction that is the average of the actual 
depreciation that would occur over all possible paths. Choosing 
the average minimizes the variance, 142 a measure of how much actual 
depreciation tends to deviate from the amount allowed. 143 
142 . This point is easy to demonstrate using a l ittle 
calculus. Suppose that one wants to know the true value of some 
random variable X .  There are n possible values, each o f  which is 
equally likely. Denote these values x\ where i = 1, 2 , • • •  , n. The variance of X from some estimate b is simply 
1 n V(X) = - � (x1 - b) 2 • n �  
The second derivative of V with respect to b is 1 ,  which is 
positive, and the first derivative is zero when b = (l/n) E x1 , the 
average value of X .  This average value is the minimum variance 
estimate of X .  
1 4 3 .  The average value here i s  based on information available 
at the time the asset is placed into service. Call that moment 
"time O . "  In between time O and the time, 0t, "  at which 
depreciation is being approximated, there may be additional 
information that would change the estimate of average depreciation. 
The estimate of the average based on time O information will not 
necessarily be a minimum variance estimate of time t depreciation 
given information available at time t .  
However, we are considering a scheme where the depreciation 
schedule is set ex ante, at time O .  Thus, if this schedule is 
meant to minimize the variance of actual depreciation from schedule 
depreciation, the average depreciation at time t based on time 0 
information is the best estimate. 
It should be noted that the normative goals of tax policy may 
dictate estimation objectives that are more complicated than simply 
minimizing variance. For example, if most depreciable assets are 
held by weal thy taxpayers, then errors on the side of leniency 
(depreciation that is too fast) may be more serious than errors in 
the other direction. See Strnad, � note 7 ,  at 1850 n .  89
(equity/efficiency tradeoffs may mean that at an optimum, 
additional transfers from high income to low income individuals are 
socially desirable) . As a result, an estimate might be made that 
weights errors on the side of leniency more heavily. Such an 
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Having considered the polar cases of zero trading costs and 
very high trading costs, there remains the case where trading costs 
are "moderate. 11 In this case, strategic trading will only be 
viable when the tax timing benefits outweigh the trading costs. 
This case is considerably more complicated , and the optimal 
solution does not necessary lie "in between" the attractive 
approaches in the other two cases. With very high trading costs, 
setting the depreciation schedule on the basis of the average age-
price profile was appealing. In the case of zero trading costs the 
ultimate in "decelerated" depreciation, namely, no depreciation 
deductions at all , appeared to be a good rule. But it is not 
necessarily true that a schedule somewhere in between the one 
dictated by the average age-price profile and one that allows no 
deductions at all is optimal in the case of moderate trading costs. 
To see this point, consider the three outcomes in Figure 11
where the statutory schedule is the second curve from the bottom, 
the average age-price profile . For convenience, that figure is 
reproduced here as Figure 1 3 .  Taxpayers facing the top two 
estimate will not necessarily be a minimum variance estimate. In 
statistical terminology, odd central moments such as skewedness 
will also be socially relevant. 
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Figure 1 3  
outcomes will welcome this schedule since it gives them faster 
depreciation than economic depreciation. On the other hand, 
taxpayers facing the lowest outcome will want to engage in 
strategic trading. This trading will result in depreciation 
deductions that roughly replicate the actual age-price profile that 
they will experience. 144 on the other hand, the trading costs 
incurred by these taxpayers are a social cost. 
In terms of accretion tax theory , the taxpayers with the· two 
high outcomes are receiving an improper tax benefit while taxpayers 
facing the low outcome are treated exactly right. If the 
depreciation schedule is decelerated by moving it up from the 
average-age price profile, the improper benefits to the high and 
middle outcome taxpayers will be reduced . 
The central issue is how much deceleration is optimal .  I f  the 
schedule is based on a curve that is far enough above the middle 
outcome age-price profile, then strategic trading will be viable 
144 . Thus, giving the figure its original racehorse 
interpretation, these taxpayers take the loss that occurs right 
after the horse is two years old and then depreciate along the age­
price profile for nonstarters . See supra text accompanying notes 
125-129. 
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for middle outcome taxpayers. 145 At this point, the middle 
outcome taxpayer will experience tax benefits that are roughly 
correct and the additional deceleration in depreciation will reduce 
the improper benefits experienced by high outcome taxpayers . 
However, these tax policy benefits are not free. The middle 
outcome taxpayer now pays for trading, and these trading costs are 
a social cost of the tax policy. 146 
It is possible that the induced trading costs from 
decelerating the schedule exceed any gains in efficiency or equity 
from that deceleration . 147 And here is the rub: The same 
145. If trading costs were zero, these taxpayers would engage 
in trading if any part of the schedule-setting curve was even an 
infinitesimal amount above the actual age-price profile. If 
trading costs are moderate, the schedule-setting curve must be high 
enough above the actual age-price profile so that the increase in 
tax benefits from trading outweighs the trading costs. 
146 .  In our example, there is a upper limit to how much 
deceleration is desirable. Once the schedule-setting curve reaches 
the highest age-price profile, there is no reason to go higher. 
All taxpayers will receive approximately the correct tax treatment. 
Further deceleration will only induce strategic trading by the high 
outcome taxpayer. This trading will result in social costs and 
there is no corresponding social benefit since the high outcome 
taxpayer is already being treated correctly. 
147 . This possibility is enhanced because the efficiency and 
equity gains will tend to be 11second order, 11 that i s ,  small 
compared to the increased present value of the taxes collected by 
the government . For example, it is well known that the efficiency 
costs of taxation tend to be proportional to the tax rate squared 
and thus are of lower order than the taxes themselves which are 
proportional to the tax rate. see, �.g. , Fullerton, Shaven and 
Whalley, Replacing the U . S .  Income Tax with a Progressive 
Consumption Tax: A Sequenced General Equilibrium Approach, 20 J .
Public Econ. 3 ,  1 7  (1983 ) . However ,  the trading that i s  induced by 
a slight deceleration in the schedule is l ikely to involve trading 
costs approximately equal to the tax savings caused by the trades. 
In other words, at the margin trading costs may be "first order" in 
magnitude . 
It is unclear whether this point would hold up for large 
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reasoning applies to the taxpayer facing the low age-price profile 
who trades strategically to take losses as measured against the 
"normal "  depreciation schedule based on the average age-price 
profile. In particular, it may be true that the trading costs 
induced for that taxpayer are larger than the efficiency and equity 
costs that would result from accelerating the schedule to eliminate 
that trading. Thus, the optimal policy may be to provide 
accelerated depreciation to el iminate the costs of trading induced 
by a schedule that simulates economic depreciation on average . 
Indeed, one of the virtues of an accelerated depreciation system 
such as MACRS is that it reduces strategic loss-taking. Under an 
accelerated schedule adjusted basis is lower at any given point in 
time. It is less likely that adjusted basis will ever exceed 
market value by enough to make strategic loss-taking profitable net 
of trading costs. 148 
The overall picture under moderate trading costs now emerges. 
As depreciation is decelerated, the improper benefits that flow to 
high outcome taxpayers are reduced. In addition, more low and 
decelerations of the schedule. In. that case, for some taxpayers 
trading costs will be small compared to the potential gains in tax 
savings while others will be at the margin as we have described. 
Unfortunately, it is difficult to develop models that specify 
optimal trading strategies and the ensuing total trading costs for 
Various taxpayers. � infra text accompanying notes 270-27 1 .
1 4 8 .  It i s  also the case that failing to index adjusted basis 
for inflation reduces the scope for strategic loss-taking. Market 
value is in nominal dollars and increases with general price 
inflation. Opportunities for strategic loss-taking depend on 
adjusted basis exceeding market value. Given that the rate of 
inflation has generally been positive, this condition will be less 
likely to occur if adjusted basis is not indexed for inflation. 
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moderate outcome taxpayers trade strategically. This trading makes 
their tax treatment roughly correct , but the sum of their costs of 
trading is a social cost. Tax equity , as defined by tracking 
wealth changes as closely as possible, 149 is enhanced at the price 
of additional trading costs. 150 However, the same reasoning 
applies to the low outcome taxpayer. It may be optimal to 
accelerate the depreciation schedule because the reduction in 
trading costs for the low outcome taxpayer exceed the social costs 
in the form of reduced equity. 
In conclusion, clear guidelines for setting ex ante 
depreciation schedules in the face of uncertain future price paths 
emerge only when trading costs are very high or very low. With 
high trading costs, a good approach is to base the depreciation 
schedule on the average age-price profile. With zero trading costs 
providing no depreciation deductions at all is an attractive 
strategy . In the case of moderate trading costs, not much can be 
said in general about optimal ex ante depreciation schedules. 
C. Ex Post Policy Responses to Price Path Uncertainty 
An alternative or additional way to respond to the 
complications that arise from revenue risk is to alter the ex post 
149 . see supra note 131.
150.  Efficiency may also be enhanced . Using a statutory 
schedule based on the average age-price profile tends to improperly 
favor depreciable assets with high future price risk. See supra 
text accompanying notes 129-130. There will be an amount of 
deceleration that will exactly cancel out these improper benefits. 
The trade-off between the efficiency gains of deceleration and the 
added induced trading costs is similar to the trade-off between 
equity gains and the added trading costs. 
86 
adjustment aspects of the depreciation rules. Under individual 
item accounting, these aspects consist primarily of "settling up" 
at the time of disposition of an asset by taxing the difference 
between amount realized and adjusted basis. 
Unfortunately, unless the government actually observes the 
price path of depreciable assets, it is difficult to design purely 
ex post adjustments that improve on an optimally designed ex ante 
system. The only additional information that is available ex post 
is the actual life or holding period of the asset. Subsection 1 
shows that this information cannot be exploited in a way that is 
free from effective taxpayer manipulation. 
This pessimistic conclusion is not the end of the story. It 
may be possibl� to combine ex post and ex ante rules in a way that 
effectively addresses the situation of uncertain price paths and 
the associated problem of strategic loss-taking. One set of 
methods of this sort combines disposition rules that discourage 
strategic loss-taking with changes in the ex ante depreciation 
schedule that adjust for the disposition rules. 
Subsections 2 ,  3 and 4 consider three such combinations of 
disposition rule and ex ante schedule: the depreciation bond 
approach, the proceeds tax rule and the account adjustment rule. 
The proceeds tax rule and the account adjustment rule are actually 
used for certain types of group accounts. 151 Subsection 5 
concludes with a summary of the strengths and weaknesses of 
policies that combine alternative disposition rules with ex ante 
151. See infra text accompanying notes 191-19 3 .
schedule adjustments. 
1 .  Ex Post Adjustment I n  General 
87 
one potential ex post approach is periodic valuation and 
assessment of taxes. If the period used in this approach is very 
short , the approach will come close to taxing all gains and losses 
as they occur. 
theory. 152 
This result is ideal under accretion tax 
The potential disadvantage of this approach is that frequent 
valuation may be very expensive . Public markets may not exist for 
many depreciable assets, and market price series that do exist may 
not reflect the value of assets retained by owners. 153 One 
important advantage of taking an ex ante approach to depreciation 
by setting a schedule in advance is that this approach avoids the 
152. See Strnad , supra note 7 ,  at 1821-2 2 ,  1832-47, 1853-63.
153. Assets that are sold may have different characteristics 
than those that are retained. A well-known theoretical example of 
this phenomenon is the so-called "market for lemons. 11 See 
Ackerlof, The Market for Lemons, 8 5  Q. J .  Econ. 488 (1970) . If 
quality is not observable at low cost, the only equilibrium price 
in a market may be a price that would be paid for a low quality 
asset, a "lemon. 11 If the market price were higher, owners of 
lemons would unload them. Buyers would assume that they will 
receive a lemon and will refuse to pay the higher market price. 
Thus, assets that are held rather than sold will be of higher 
quality. 
If market prices reflect only the value of lemons, 
depreciation schedules based on those prices will tend to be 
accelerated relative to the age-value profile of the average asset. 
Academic commentators and the Treasury Department are very aware of 
this phenomenon and have tried to adjust for it in their analyses. 
�. g.g. , Hulten & Wykoff, supra note 3 ,  at 96-99; Treasury Horse 
Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 7 .
I n  the context o f  this Article, a market subject to the lemons 
phenomenon is a 11high trading cost11 market . To sell an asset that 
is not a lemon requires expending significant costs to convince 
buyers of that fact . If these costs were small, there would be no 
111emons11 problem. 
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need to va·lue depreciable assets frequently. 
If observing actual price series is ruled out , it is hard to 
come up with ex post adjustments that improve a well-designed ex 
ante system. Consider first the case of very high trading costs. 
In this case, sales are prohibitively costly so that the only 
dispositions are retirements . It is hard to see how to improve on 
the approach suggested in the previous section of using the average 
expected age-price profile to design a statutory schedule and then 
allowing losses to be taken upon retirement. Unless more 
information is observed about actual asset paths, the average 
expected path as of asset purchase will still be a good estimate of 
the path that the asset took up until failure and retirement. 154 
The only �dditional information that is available costlessly 
in this case is the time of retirement. If the time of retirement 
correlates with the path up to retirement, then additional ex post 
adjustment might be fruitful. Consider the racehorse example once 
again. If high revenue horses also tend to have longer lives, then 
a tax surcharge might be levied on horses that are retired after 
long years of service. Unfortunately, there are problems with this 
type of ex post rule. As a horse nears the end of its life, value 
154 .  11Good estimate" here means minimum variance estimate. 
See supra text accompanying notes 142-143 and note 1 4 2 .  The 
conclusion that enriching the ex post adjustment rules is not very 
fruitful would not change if 11good estimate" meant an estimate that 
aimed at goals other than minimizing variance. See supra note 143 . 
All that might change is that the best ex ante estimate would not 
be the average age-value profile. 
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drops off sharply. 155 If the surtax were high enough to capture 
the huge excess tax benefit inherent in the high outcome case, 156 
owners would simply send horses to the glue factory early. 157 
suppose, on the other hand, that highly successful horses tend 
to have shorter useful l ives and that a surtax is imposed on early 
retirements. Owners might then respond by keeping horses around 
after their racing days are over and claiming that they are still 
in service. This strategy would be even easier for non-living 
assets such as machines. owners of such assets do not have to 
contend with physical death as a fact that rebuts the claim of 
continued service. 
If trading costs are zero, then the goal is simply a rule that 
induces the owner to trade frequently. Frequent trades establish 
a flow of taxes appropriate to the actual value path of the asset. 
By trading, the taxpayer does the government ' s  work for it. The 
previous section discussed ex ante rules designed to induce 
155. This drop off occurs for horses in all revenue-earning 
categories. See Figure 11 supra text accompanying notes 121-122. 
156. In the high outcome case, the present value of 
depreciation deductions _ adjusted for retirements based on the 
decline in value of the average horse is $6088 . 19 .  But the present 
value of depreciation adjusted for retirements for the high outcome 
horse using its actual age price profile is only $1233 . 5 9 .  This 
$1233 . 59 figure is much lower than the $6088 . 19 because the high 
outcome horses experience a huge spurt of appreciation at age two. 
See supra text accompanying notes 132-133 . The excess tax benefit 
for these horses is ($608 8 . 19 - $123 3 . 59 )  = $4854 . 60 multiplied by 
the marginal tax rate. 
157. For the same reasons, early retirement would be the rule 
for less talented horses. These horses have a lower revenue base 
so that the surtax would loom even larger. The salvage value of a 
horse is about $450 . See Treasury Horse Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 
1 1 .  
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trading . . To the extent these rules are unsatisfactory, it seems 
that actual observation of the asset path is the best 
palliative. 158 
In the case of "moderate" trading costs, the favored ex ante 
approach results in the tax treatment of some assets being 
established by trading as in the zero trading cost case and the tax 
treatment of the remaining assets being in accord with an ex ante 
schedule as in the case of very high trading costs. The same 
reasons for being skeptical of improving matters by embellishing 
the ex post rules in the case of zero and very high trading costs 
apply equally to the moderate trading cost case. The tax treatment 
of the traded assets is probably already close to being correct . 
For the non-traded assets not much improvement is possible short of 
gathering information on the actual value path over time. 
2 .  The Depreciation Bond Approach 
I f  we allow for coordinated changes in the ex post and ex ante 
portions of the tax depreciation rules, a whole additional set of 
alternative policies are available. In particular, the disposition 
rules can be altered to penalize strategic loss-taking and the ex 
ante schedule can be adjusted to take into account the new 
disposition rules . 
One simple policy of this type is the depreciation bond 
approach. This approach consists of three basic elements. First, 
the original owner of an asset receives all the depreciation 
158 . In particular, both of the most prominent practical ex 
post approximation techniques fail to improve on the proposed ex 
ante rule at all.  See � note 138.
9 1  
benefits from the asset regardless o f  how long the original owner 
retains the asset. Depreciation is therefore similar to a 
nontransferable bond. Original ownership of the asset entitles the 
owner to a fixed stream of deductions, j ust as a bond entitles the 
owner to a fixed stream of payments. 159 Second, dispositions of 
all kinds are not taxable events . There is no loss deduction upon 
retirement, and sale does not result in taxable gain or in a 
deduction for loss. Third, the depreciation schedule would be set 
using the Hulten and Wyko�f approach. Instead of simply basing the 
schedule on the age-price profile for surviving assets, that 
profile would be first adjusted by multiplying the price at each 
age by the probability of survival to that age. 160 
The depreciation bond approach cleanly eliminates the 
possibility of strategic loss-taking. Since dispositions are not 
159. Given that future deductions are set in advance , a 
variant of this step would be to give the taxpayer a single 
deduction equal to the present value of depreciation at the time 
the asset is purchased. such an approach would be identical to the 
" first-year capital recovery system" proposed by Professors Alan 
Auerbach and Dale Jorgenson in 1980. See Auerbach & Jorgenson, 
Inflation-proof Depreciation of Assets, 58 Harv. Bus. Rev. 113
(1980) . This approach - has the advantage that the effect of 
inflation is removed from the depreciation rules. The present 
value of depreciation and the ensuing tax savings is in current 
dollars. Thus, there is no need to correct for inflation by 
indexing adjusted basis or by using other similar adjustments . 
Auerbach and Jorgenson ' s  approach , however ,  has a different 
disposition rule than the, depreciation bond approach . They propose 
that the seller take the present value of depreciation for the used 
asset being sold into income at the time of sale. See id. at 114.
This disposition rule is similar to the "account adjustment rule" 
discussed infra in subsection 4 .  See infra note 178 and 
accompanying text. 
160. For a discussion of the Hulten and Wykoff approach, see 
supra text accompanying notes 45-55.
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taxable events, trading has no tax effect. Whatever ex ante 
depreciation schedule is set will "stick" since taxpayers cannot 
alter the pattern of deductions under the schedule by realizing 
losses. 
Use of this disposition rule requires that a different 
depreciation schedule be set ex ante . Given that dispositions are 
not taxed, a depreciation schedule based on the age-price profile 
for surviving assets would be inappropriate. The argument for 
using that schedule in the face of retirement risk is that loss 
. deductions granted upon disposition automatically adjust for asset 
retirements. 161 To replicate economic depreciation under the 
depreciation bond approach, retirement losses must be built into 
the schedule as in the Hulten and Wykoff approach. 
Although the depreciation bond approach eliminates strategic 
loss-taking, it makes another kind of strategic trading viable: 
the "churning" of depreciable assets . If each new owner were 
entitled to a depreciation bond based on the purchase price, a new 
asset could be traded back and forth to generate deductions many 
times the original cost the asset. This churning cannot happen 
under current law, because excess depreciation is recaptured as 
gain upon disposition. The original cost of each new asset can 
only be deducted once. 
A potential response to this problem would be to make used 
assets nondepreciable. Under that rule, used assets would trade at 
a discount reflecting the absence of depreciation deductions . For 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 42-4 3 .
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example, if a brand new asset were traded right after i t  was first 
purchased and if every taxpayer faced the same marginal tax rate, 
the discount would equal the present value of the depreciation bond 
multiplied by that tax rate. This result would ensue because the 
purchaser could buy a new asset instead and obtain a depreciation 
bond at the same time. 
This price environment would ensure that no individual ' s  
investment decisions would be biased for or against used assets 
versus new assets. Sale of used assets would be at a price reduced 
by the present value of the tax benefits that would result from 
buying a new asset with the same expected life and productivity. 
Ignoring trading costs, an owner would be indifferent between 
holding the old asset and replacing it with the new asset. 
similarly, a purchaser would be indifferent between purchasing a 
new asset accompanied by a depreciation bond or a similar used 
asset without a depreciation bond but at a discount reflecting the 
absence of the bond. The purchase and sale of the depreciable 
assets would turn strictly on business considerations and not on 
tax benefits or detriments . 
Making used assets nondepreciable is not a perfect solution. 
This rule puts tremendous pressure on the distinction between new 
and used assets . An asset would sell for a higher price if it was 
a "new" asset. The taxpayer therefore would have an incentive to 
"rebuild" or otherwise alter the old asset and claim that it is a 
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new asset ... 162 A substantial and complex set of rules might be 
required to maintain the distinction between old and new 
assets. 163 
There are two other problems with the depreciation bond 
approach. First, the approach fails to track wealth changes that 
happen as the value of the asset fluctuates. 164 Thus , for 
example, if the asset fails early in its life, deductions are not 
accelerated to reflect the early loss. Eliminating the ex post 
corrections triggered by dispositions in the current system weakens 
the accuracy of the system in tracking wealth changes. 
There is a 11diversification" argument that suggests this 
p�oblem is not pressing. Most of the depreciable assets in the 
United States are held by large corporate taxpayers. 165 A typical 
large corporation undoubtedly holds a large number of depreciable 
assets. In addition, individuals who hold ownership position$ in 
162 . A kind of tax arbitrage is possible by taking the 
following steps: buy a new asset, alter it, and resell it as "new" 
for a price equal to the purchase price plus the cost of 
alterations . This maneuver is tax arbitrage in the sense that the 
taxpayer receives depreciation tax benefits without having any 
ongoing investment. 
163 . For example, Value added accounts might be set up for 
depreciable assets . When an asset is purchased, only the "new 
value" added by refurbishing of altering the asset would be 
depreciable. The potentially large administrative and taxpayer 
compliance costs for operating this system are obvious . 
164 . Under accretion tax theory, tracking wealth changes as 
they occur is normatively desirable. See supra note 131.  
165 . See Bankman, The Case Against Passive Investments : A 
Critical Appraisal of the Passive Loss Restrictions, 4 2  Stan. L. 
Rev. 15 , 29 n .  79 (1989 ) .
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the corporations often will invest in many different 
corporations . 166 In effect, these individuals hold a small 
ownership interest in a very large number of very different 
depreciable assets. Early retirement of some assets is likely to 
be offset by unexpectedly long useful lives for other assets. 
Assets used in one industry that go up in value because industry 
revenues will be higher than expected are l ikely to be offset by 
assets used in another industry that are falling in value because 
industry revenues will be lower than expected. If depreciation 
schedules are set in advance to mimic average expected economic 
depreciation, diversification may bring most investo.rs 1 actual 
experience close to this average . 
The problem with this argument is that revenue risk is 
correlated across the aggregate of all depreciable assets. A 
significant portion of this risk cannot be eliminated costlessly by 
holding a diversified portfolio. 167 Thus , there is a substantial 
probability that actual asset values in aggregate will deviate 
significantly from the performance that is expected on average . 
The problem that eliminating ex post adjustments reduces the 
ability of the tax system to track actual changes in wealth remains 
despite the ability to hold a diversified portfolio. 168 
166. Portfolio diversification, dividing one ' s  wealth into 
many different investments , is a superior strategy for most 
investors • .§gg R. Brealey & s. Myers, supra note 6 7 ,  at 131-3 4 .
167. See id. at 1 3 2 .
1 6 8 .  There i s  also an efficiency problem when dispositions 
are not taxable events: riskier assets are favored by the 
depreciation rules. The causes of this phenomenon are complicated. 
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An additional potential problem with the depreciation bond 
approach arises if not all taxpayers are subject to the same 
marginal tax rate. In that case, the approach permits depreciation 
tax benefits to be sold by low bracket taxpayers to high bracket 
taxpayers. Instead of purchasing new depreciable assets directly, 
the low bracket taxpayer can arrange for a high bracket taxpayer to 
buy the assets and immediately resell them to the low bracket 
taxpayer. The high bracket taxpayer retains the depreciation 
benefits in the form of the depreciation bond and can pass most of 
the after-tax value of the benefits on to the low bracket taxpayer 
in the form of a reduced price. 
This maneuver is reminiscent of safe harbor leasing where a 
high bracket taxpayer leases an asset to a low bracket taxpayer. 
In this case, the high bracket taxpayer formally retains ownership 
of the asset and therefore is entitled to the stream of 
depreciation deductions generated by the asset. The depreciation 
bond, however, is much simpler since the high bracket taxpayer does 
not have to retain ownership of the asset to enjoy the tax benefits 
that flow from depreciating the asset. 169 
The potential problem with this result is that it may be 
For a discussion, see infra Appendix D .  
169 . Soon after the addition of safe harbor leasing to the 
tax code in 1981 ,  Professors Warren and Auerbach in fact suggested 
direct transferability of tax benefits as an alternative method for 
achieving the same goal s .  Direct transferability eliminates tax 
and other legal problems associated with the requirement that the 
high bracket taxpayer retain ownership while the low bracket 
taxpayer uses the asset. See Warren & Auerbach, Transferability of 
Tax Incentives and the Fiction of Safe Harbor Leasing, 9 5  Harv. L .
Rev. 1752 , 1774-78 (1982 ) . 
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undesirable to allow low bracket taxpayers to benefit from 
depreciation deductions to the same degree as high bracket 
taxpayers . In a scheme that attempts to simulate economic 
depreciation, these larger benefits compensate for a higher tax 
rate on revenues so that all taxpayers, independent of marginal 
rate, perceive the same market value for all investments . 170 This 
neutral outcome will be violated if low bracket taxpayers pay tax 
on revenues at their low rate but then receive benefits from 
depreciation deductions based on a higher rate. In that case, low 
bracket taxpayers will be willing to pay more in pre-tax dollars 
for investment assets than high bracket taxpayers who are equally 
efficient users of the assets. 171 
3 .  The Proceeds Tax Rule 
The proceeds tax rule is an approach used for some group 
170. See infra note 235.
171.  If the tax code does not adhere to economic 
depreciation, then the transferability of tax benefits may be 
desirable from a neutrality perspective . In fact, the existence of 
accelerated depreciation_ provided a series of rationales for the 
transfer of tax benefits inherent in safe harbor leasing. For a 
good discussion, see Warren & Auerbach, � note 169, at 1753-62 , 
1768-72 ;  Warren & Auerbach , Tax Policy and Equipment Leasing after 
TEFRA, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1579, 1583-85 (1983) . 
We have assumed in the text example that most of the benefits 
of purchase of depreciable assets by high bracket taxpayers for 
resale to low bracket taxpayers are passed on to the low bracket 
taxpayers. Thus, high bracket taxpayers will not reap very much of 
a reduction in taxes from the deals . If the incidence is 
different, the story will be different but it will still be a story 
about distortions that carry an efficiency cost. Thus, if high 
bracket taxpayers reap most of the benefits, they will be able to 
reduce their taxes on revenues . But their deductions for costs 
will still yield the same high tax benefits as before. They will 
be artificially favored over low bracket taxpayers instead of vice 
versa. 
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accounts . 1� The rule addresses two of the weaknesses of the 
depreciation bond approach: the proceeds tax rule stops churning 
dead in its tracks and makes tax deals between taxpayers in 
different brackets unprofitable. Using the proceeds tax rule does 
have a disadvantage . The rule interferes with trading of 
depreciable assets that is motivated by business rather than tax 
goals. 
The proceeds tax rule is so named because it requires the 
entire proceeds of an asset sale to be taken immediately into 
income. There is no deduction for the adjusted basis of the asset. 
The remaining adjusted basis is deducted as if the asset had been 
retained. 173 Thus, the proceeds tax approach is similar to the 
depreciation bond approach in that depreciation, once set at the 
start, continues unadjusted until exhaustion even if the taxpayer 
sells or retires the asset before it is fully depreciated. · The 
difference between the two approaches is that the depreciation bond 
approach ignores dispositions while the proceeds tax rule taxes the 
gross proceeds from the disposition. 
The proceeds tax rule clearly blocks strategic loss-taking. 
There is no tax benefit from selling an asset that has a 11loss11 on 
it. Recovery of the cost of the asset will proceed on the original 
schedule even in the face of a sale or other disposition. In fact, 
sale results in additional tax in a present value sense for the 
172 . See supra text accompanying notes 191-193.
173 . For a more complete description of the proceeds tax rule 
in the context of group accounts , see infra text accompanying 
note 2 9 8 .  
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"loss" asset. In effect, the remaining value is taxed (even though 
it is below adjusted basis for a "loss" asset) and then recovered 
as future deductions along the original depreciation deduction 
schedule. For both 11gain11 and "loss" assets, there is therefore a 
penaltv for trading because adjusted basis is ignored at the time 
of disposition. 
The proceeds tax rule also makes churning a losing strategy. 
Purchase of the asset followed by immediate resale results in 
income equal to the value of the asset plus a series of future 
depreciation deductions that sum to that value . In effect, the 
taxpayer receives income and an equal deduction, but the deduction 
is delayed. For a taxpayer facing constant marginal tax rates and 
positive interest rates, this combination has negative net present 
value. Because of the time value of money , the reduction in future 
taxes from the delayed deductions is worth less than the immediate 
tax on the income . 
The fact that the proceeds tax rule punishes asset sales by 
ignoring adjusted basis means that it is effective in controlling 
both strategic loss-taking and churning. However, this feature of 
the rule also leads to its major disadvantage . The rule will 
penalize sales that are motivated by business rather than tax 
considerations . For instance, the taxpayer who wants to sell his 
depreciable assets in order to finance a new production technology 
will have to pay a tax penalty to do so. 
Another problem with the proceeds tax rule is that it may be 
difficult to compute the appropriate ex ante depreciation schedule. 
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Moving from a schedule based on the age-price profile for surviving 
assets to a Hulten and Wykoff schedule is appropriate when asset 
dispositions are untaxed as in the depreciation bond approach . But 
this degree of adjustment is inadequate when dispositions are 
subj ect to a punitive tax. It is difficult to specify how much 
additional adjustment is warranted . The appropriate amount depends 
on the frequency of "legitimate" business sales of assets that are 
not fully depreciated. 174 That frequency would be difficult to 
forecast with any accuracy. 
Finally, the inherent penalty on asset sales generated by 
ignoring adjusted basis results in the same equity problem as under 
the depreciation bond approach. In particular, the system fails to 
track and tax wealth changes as they occur. 
4 .  The Account Adjustment Rule 
The account adjustment rule is used for some types of group 
accounts , and the strict definition of the rule is embedded in a 
group accounting framework. 175 Group accounts treat a group of 
assets as if they were a single asset for purposes of depreciation. 
174 . We have not had to take this special category of sales 
into account under the previous depreciation methods that we have 
studied. I f  the depreciation schedule is based on the age-price 
profile for surviving assets and that profile is correct, the 
market value of an asset will be equal to its adjusted basis. 
There are no tax consequences of sale. See supra text accompanying 
notes 42-4 4 .  The depreciation bond approach exhibits this trait 
even more strongly. Under sny depreciation schedule that is set in 
advance, sale has no tax consequences. That is,  the failure of 
sale to have tax consequences does not depend on the depreciation 
schedule being "correct . "  
175.  For a more complete description of the rule in the 
context of group accounting, see .in.fl:9. text accompanying note 2 9 7 .
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The account adjustment rule halts the tax depreciation of assets 
that are sold or retired from group accounts and requires that the 
gain or loss on the disposition be computed. In contrast to 
individual item accounting, this gain or loss is not recognized 
immediately. Instead, gain is subtracted from the "adjusted basis" 
of the group account while loss is added to that "adjusted 
basis . 11176 In effect, the tax on the gain or the reduction in tax 
on the loss is delayed since gain reduces and loss increases future 
depreciation deductions. 
Translating this rule to the framework of individual item 
accounting , it is as if gain or loss is taxed or credited under the 
schedule used to depreciate the asset before it was sold. 177 
Suppose for example, that the asset was being depreciated under a 
ten year, straight-line schedule. If the asset is sold for a $100 
gain at the end of five years, the account adjustment rule calls 
for $20 of income for each of years six through ten inclusive. 1� 
176 . Adjusted basis is placed in quotation marks because 
group accounting does not formally assign an adjusted basis to the 
group account . However, the results of the account adjustment rule 
are accurately described using the concept of the group account 
having an "adjusted basis . "  See infra text accompanying note 293 . 
177 . This translation to individual item accounting will be 
exact if the group account consists entirely of assets placed into 
the service at the same time and depreciated under the same 
schedule. But group accounts currently are not restricted to 
aggregations of such a uniform set of assets . Such a restriction 
did exist for group accounts consisting of ACRS assets put into 
service from 1981-86. See infra note 283 and text accompanying 
notes 282-285. 
178.  An alternative method would be to take the present value 
of the entire stream of gains into income at the time of sale. If 
it is true that the purchaser of the used asset would depreciate 
under a five year, straight-line schedule, then this present value 
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The account adjustment rule blocks churning as an effective 
strateqy but allows strategic loss-taking. Churning will not work 
because the taxpayer who buys an asset and then immediately resells 
it for the same price will not be allowed to depreciate the asset. 
The account adjustment rule cuts off future depreciation deductions 
at the time of sale or disposition. On the other hand, strategic 
loss-taking is still a viable strategy. Loss is recognized, 
although somewhat delayed compared to the individual item method. 
This allows the taxpayer to accelerate depreciation when it turns 
out to be too slow ex post. Concurrently, the taxpayer can retain 
depreciable assets with gains on them and thus need not decelerate 
depreciation at all when it turns out to be too fast ex post. 
It is true that strategic loss-taking is not as profitable a 
strategy under the account adjustment rule as under the individual 
item method. Losses have delayed effect under the account 
adjustment rule, while they reduce taxes "immediately, 11 that is,  in 
the year of disposition, under the individual item method . 
The impact of the account adjustment rule on "normal 11 business 
sales is similar to the impact of the individual item method. If 
the depreciation schedule is based on the age-price profile for 
surviving assets and that profile is correct, the market value of 
an asset will be equal to its adjusted basis. There are no tax 
consequences of sale, and the taxpayer decides whether or not to 
sell based strictly on business considerations. This happy outcome 
treatment would be identical to the disposition rule proposed by 
Professors Auerbach and Jorgenson under their " first-year capital 
cost recovery system . "  See supra note 159. 
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is consistently attainable only if the correct age-price profile is 
known in advance . In the more general context adopted in this 
Part, there is price path uncertainty. An ex ante depreciation 
schedule based on the expected price path may prove to be too fast 
for some assets . In this case, assets will have gains on them and 
there will be a lock-in effect: The taxpayer may forgo sales that 
make business sense in order to avoid recognizing the gains . 179 
The account adjustment rule does require an accompanying 
adjustment to the ex ante depreciation schedule. The schedule 
based on the age-price profile for surviving assets is appropriate 
for individual item accounting because that schedule presumes that 
retirement loss deductions will have immediate effect. When assets 
are retired, treatment in accord with "economic depreciation" is 
assured because the loss deduction is exactly equal to the loss in 
value when the asset is retired . 180 Where the loss deduction is 
delayed, the associated reduction in taxes is delayed and the 
taxpayer receives too small a benefit under the standard of 
economic depreciation. Thus, if the account adjustment rule 
applies to dispositions, the ex ante depreciation schedule will 
179. The depreciation bond approach avoids this lock-in 
effect. See supra note 174 .  The proceeds tax rule exacerbates it. 
.§.gg supra text accompany
.ing 
notes 173-174 . 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 42-44 . This argument 
is strictly true only in the case where the age-price profile for 
surviving assets is known in advance . If that is not the case, the 
adjusted basis of the asset may differ from market value at the 
time of retirement . Deducting the adjusted basis will not be 
equivalent to deducting the amount of economic loss since the 
economic loss is equal to the market value right before the asset 
"dies" and becomes worthless. See §!!PU. text accompanying notes 
116-125. 
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have to be accelerated compared to the schedule appropriate for 
individual item accounting. 
5 .  A Comparison of the Alternative Disposition Rules 
We are now in a position to summarize the strengths and 
weaknesses of various disposition rules. 
weaknesses lie along five dimensions: 
( 1 )  the strategic loss-taking problem: 
( 2 )  the churning problem: 
These strengths and 
( 3 )  the impact on 11normal11 business sales o f  depreciable 
assets ; 
( 4 )  the need to know adjusted basis i n  order to compute tax 
treatment on sale; 
( 5 )  the difficulty in adjusting the ex ante depreciation 
schedule adjustment . 
The following' table summarizes the performance of the various 
disposition rules along these dimensions. 181 In the table, the 
1 8 1 .  Another potential dimension involves the sharing of 
11systematic11 risk with the government through the tax system. When 
asset dispositions are taxed, the government shares in the upside 
and downside by taxing gains and allowing deductions of losses. To 
the extent that this risk is "systematic, 11 that is, cannot be 
costlessly diversified away, this risk sharing has value to the 
taxpayer. 
Some of the asset disposition rules eliminate or reduce this 
risk-sharing feature . Under the depreciation bond approach , there 
are no tax consequences of disposition and therefore no risk 
sharing. The proceeds tax rule discourages dispositions and 
thereby reduces the scope for risk sharing. When assets are sold 
under that rule, however, there is risk sharing since the tax on 
the proceeds will be higher for the better outcome of a higher 
sales price. Finally, the account adjustment rule reduces the 
impact of taxes on disposition by delaying the accompanying gains 
and losses . This delay should reduce the degree of risk sharing 
inherent in the rules. 
Some economists believe that when risk sharing is reduced, the 
depreciation schedule should be accelerated in compensation. This 
reduction may well occur for some of the disposition rules 
discussed here. For a more complete discussion, see infi;:A Appendix 
105 
" individual item method" refers to the policy of taxing gains and 
losses on dispositions immediately. 182 
Table III 
disposition remaining remaining impact on need to know ease of 
treatment strategic churning "normal" adjusted adjustment 
trading problem sales basis? for 
problem depreciation 
schedule 
individual 
item severe none moderate yes easy 
accounting 
depreciation 
bond none severe none no moderate 
approach 
proceeds 
tax none none severe no hard 
rule 
account 
adjustment moderate none moderate yes moderate 
rule 
Clearly none of the four treatments is dominant. Choosing 
between them involves trading off one problem against another. 
Perhaps the most appealing treatment in the group is the 
depreciation bond approach . But the depreciation bond approach 
will only be viable if the churning problem can be addressed in a 
way that does not involve administrative or taxpayer compliance 
D .  
182 . The name is derived from the fact that this method is 
used for individual item accounting under current law. See supra 
text accompanying notes 7-8 . 
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costs that are too large. It is unclear whether the approach 
suggested earlier of making used assets nondepreciable will meet 
this goal . 183 
D .  Some Conclusions 
Assuming that basing depreciation on annual changes in asset 
value is infeasible, two general alternatives have emerged for 
dealing with strategic loss-taking and the fact that the future 
price path for most depreciable assets is uncertain. One is ex 
ante adjustment in the depreciation schedule. The problem with 
this approach is that the desired degree of adjustment depends 
heavily on the traits of individual assets . In particular, one 
would need to know whether trading is costly for each asset and 
also the degree of uncertainty in future prices . The need to 
classify assets by durability has proven to be difficult 
enough . 1� Factoring in trading costs and price uncertainty would 
greatly complicate an already arduous task. 185 
1 8 3 .  See supra text accompanying notes 162-163. 
184 . One need only read any of the four recent Treasury 
studies of particular assets to be convinced of this fact. See 
supra note 2 3  (citing the four studies) .  
185.  Analytic complexity is not the only problem that would 
come about from a more extensive methodology. Depreciation policy 
is subj ect to considerable political pressure from concerned 
groups. For example, in 1988, Congress withdrew the power to set 
useful lives that it had delegated to Treasury in the Tax Reform 
Act of 1986. See supra note 2 3 .  The original proposal restricting 
Treasury ' s  power merely barred Treasury from lengthening l ives. 
This fact suggests that the withdrawal of power was prompted by 
industries who feared that Treasury studies of their depreciable 
assets would result in decelerated depreciation. 
As is the case with durability, there is a significant degree 
of uncertainty about both trading costs and future price volatility 
for various assets. But the more uncertain the determination of 
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An alternative approach is to change the disposition rules. 
These changes would require an accompanying adjustment of ex ante 
depreciation schedules, but the required adjustments are 
analytically clear for many of the disposition rules. 
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a clear winner among the 
disposition rules since each rule has some drawbacks . Nonetheless, 
some of these rules ( for example, the depreciation bond approach) 
have potential and are worthy of further study. 
depreciation treatment becomes, the more scope there is for 
politics. When the political process is factored in, adding more 
uncertain factors to be considered may make depreciation policy 
less effective. 
Along these lines, it is worth noting the motivation for 
Hulten and Wykoff ' s  seminal study of economic depreciation. Their 
aim was to counter the claim that depreciation policy must be 
"politically determined" since a theoretically correct depreciation 
policy cannot be implemented. They intended to accomplish this aim 
by showing that there is a clear way to estimate economic 
depreciation. Thus, a theoretically correct depreciation policy is 
attainable. See Hulten and Wykoff, supra note 3 ,  at 8 2 .  
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IV. Group Accounting 
Group accounting methods allow a group of assets to be 
depreciated in a unified account as if they were a single asset. 
This approach makes tax accounting much easier and less expensive 
in situations where a taxpayer holds large numbers of identical , 
low-value assets and where keeping track of these assets on an item 
by item basis is difficult. This administrative cost saving is 
undoubtedly the major reason for permitting group accounting. 186 
This Part shows that tax policy toward group accounts turns 
heavily on the fact that strategic loss-taking is a particularly 
serious problem for certain types of group accounts . As a result, 
a powerful analysis of group accounting policy is possible based on 
the theory developed in the previous Part. 
This policy analysis is not merely of theoretical interest. 
In the face of potentially large administrative cost savings, group 
accounting is an important aspect of depreciation policy. 
Controlling strategic loss-taking should not be accomplished at the 
cost of heavily penalizing taxpayers who choose group accounting. 
Section A describes current law governing group accounting. 
Section B discusses the form that rules addressing group accounting 
should take. Finally, Section C considers the problem of designing 
186 .  For tangible assets put into service during 1981-1986, 
group accounting was permitted only for assets where such a 
rationale was likely to apply. This limitation was motivated by a 
technical concern about the recapture of the investment tax credit 
from assets sold out of group accounts . As a result, an attempt 
was made to narrow the category of assets for which group 
accounting was allowed as much as possible. See infill text 
accompanying notes 282-286. 
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optimal rules under certain constraints set by congress. 
A. Current Law 
Group accounting is quite complex. Four major group 
accounting systems have Qeen in force since 1971. Two remain in 
force today, and one of these will not be clearly delineated until 
the Treasury Department issues regulations. 
This section provides a qualitative overview of group 
accounting . Particular attention is devoted to the group 
accounting rules for the tax treatment of asset dispositions since 
this aspect of group accounting is the most important aspect for 
purposes of this paper. Appendix E provides a more extensive 
discussion of group accounting rules for the interested reader and 
provides primary and secondary references for the assertions about 
current law made in this subsection. 187 
The two group accounting systems that apply to assets put into 
service currently, that is, in 1991, are a system of "multiple 
asset accounts11 established under the regulations for section 167 , 
and a system of "general asset accounts" established by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986. The general asset account rules apply to 
"recovery property, 11 property subject to depreciation under MACRS . 
Recovery property includes most real and personal tangible 
property. Most of the rules for "general asset accounts" will be 
provided in Regulations . No Proposed Regulations have been issued 
187 . That appendix details the scope of the four major group 
accounting systems that have been used during the last twenty 
years. This information enables the reader who is unfamiliar with 
group accounts to understand the significance of various references 
to group accounts made in the text and the footnotes to the text. 
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yet so the exact contours of some of the rules for general asset 
accounts are uncertain. 1M The multiple asset account rules apply 
to property that is depreciable but that is not recovery property. 
This category includes intangible assets such as patents and 
copyrights . 
Both general asset accounts and multiple asset accounts are 
elective and quite flexible .  A taxpayer can set up any number of 
these accounts and can place any number of assets ( including one) 
in any of the accounts . 189 Use of group accounts for any given 
asset does not preclude treating other similar assets put into 
service in the same year or a later year under individual 
accounting. 
The central feature of group accounting is that each group 
account will be treated as if it is a single asset for accounting 
purposes. But different types of group accounts are subject to 
1 8 8 .  I . R . C .  § 168 ( i) ( 4 )  (1991) provides that Treasury shall 
issue Regulations governing general asset accounts . As of the 
present time, there are neither permanent Regulations nor Proposed 
Regulations for general asset accounts . But Congress did establish 
some guidelines for the Regulations , and there are a set of 
Proposed Regulations for 11mass asset accounts , 11 the group accounts 
for ACRS property put into service from 1981-86. The Congressional 
guidelines to some extent respond to features in the mass asset 
account Proposed Regulations . Thus, there is some indication about 
the what rules will govern general asset accounts , but a great deal 
of detail is missing. For a more extended discussion and citation 
of sources, see infra text accompanying notes 287 and JOO.
189.  Placing one asset in a group account is essentially an 
election to apply the group accounting disposition rules to the 
asset instead of the disposition rule that applies under individual 
accounting. This fact emphasizes the point that group accounting 
methods are distinguishable from individual item accounting because 
of different substantive tax treatments (upon disposition of 
assets) and not simply because group accounts treat several assets 
as a single asset. 
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different tax rules upon disposition of assets . In addition, there 
is a traditional distinction between two types of dispositions : 
"normal 11 retirements and "abnormal" retirements . The difference 
between these two types is somewhat fuzzy, 1� but some particular 
cases are clear. For instance, if a few assets are sold from a 
group account long before they are obsolete, the sales will be 
treated as abnormal retirements. On the other hand, discarding an 
asset that wears out in an ordinary way from use will be treated as 
a normal retirement . 
There are three general methods for treating dispositions 
under multiple asset accounts and general asset accounts: the 
individual item method , the account adjustment method, and the 
proceeds tax method. Part III defines and discusses two of these 
methods, 191 and Appendix E contains a more detailed description of 
all three methods for the interested reader. 192 For multiple 
asset accounts, the account adjustment method applies to normal 
190. For multiple asset accounts, the definitions of normal 
and abnormal retirements are set out in Reg. § l . 167 (a} ( 8 ) . An 
abnormal retirement is one "due to a cause not contemplated in 
setting the applicable depreciation rate. 11 Reg. § l . 167 (a}  ( 8 ) . As 
an example, the Regulation cites an asset destroyed by a casualty 
or one that "has lost its usefulness suddenly as the result of 
extraordinary obsolescence . '' .IQ. Generally speaking all the 
" facts and circumstances" must be considered to determine whether 
a retirement is normal or abnormal. Id. 
Since the Regulations governing general asset accounts have 
not yet been issued, it is unclear whether there will even be a 
distinction between normal and abnormal retirements ,  much less 
whether the distinction will be the same as the one for multiple 
asset accounts. See infra text accompanying note 300.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 172-180. 
192. See infra text accompanying notes 292-300.
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retirements while the individual item method is used for abnormal 
retirements . For general asset accounts, it seems clear that the 
proceeds tax method applies to abnormal retirements. The treatment 
of normal retirements from general asset accounts is not clear. It 
appears that either the proceeds tax rule or the account adjustment 
rule will apply.1� 
B. Optimal Group Accounting Rules 
In discussing the rules that should be used for group 
accounting, an important threshold question is why group accounting 
. requires rules that are different from the rules for individual 
asset accounting. Given that the goal of group accounting is to 
allow aggregate treatment of assets that are costly to account for 
individually, 194 we need to focus on whether aggregation of 
several assets into one "group account" asset raises any special 
problems . 1� In fact, special problems related to strategic loss-
193 . See infra text accompanying note 300.
194 . See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
195 . Group accounting rules raise issues that result from 
aggregation of depreciable assets . There is also a body of rules 
that deal with issues that arise from the "disaggregation" of 
depreciable assets . These are the "repair" rules. Certain 
components of a depreciable asset may wear out and require 
replacement before other components . An important issue is how 
repairs or replacement of components should be treated. See � 
note 130 . 
There is some fascinating history associated with this issue. 
For example, prior to 1981, the Code allowed taxpayers to 
"disaggregate" buildings and depreciate the components based on 
their separate and distinct useful lives. This method was called 
"component depreciation. 11 It was abolished in 1981.
Despite the fact that the "repair" rules are intellectually 
interesting and practically significant, we leave an examination of 
the rules for another day. 
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taking exist, but only for certain types of aggregation. In 
particular, problems exist when assets subject to different 
depreciation schedules or assets put into service at different 
times are aggregated in the same account. we demonstrate this 
point in subsection 1 and then discuss possible solutions in 
subsection 2 .  
1 .  Problems Posed By Group Accounting 
some terminology is useful . 196 Accounts that include assets 
put into service in different years are called 11open11 accounts 
while accounts limited to assets put into service in a single year 
are "closed" accounts . The term 11open11 captures the idea that the 
taxpayer may continue to add assets to the account after it has 
been started in some particular year. Furthermore, accounts that 
contain assets subject to different depreciation schedules are 
called "heterogeneous" accounts while accounts that contain only 
assets subj ect to a single schedule are "homogeneous" accounts . 
Consider first the case of homogeneous , closed accounts , that 
is , group accounts containing only assets placed into service in 
the same year and subject to the same depreciation schedule. In 
this case, there is no real need for separate rules for group 
accounting. Each asset can be treated as if it were an individual 
asset. 
196. This terminoloqy is derived from Oooher, Lyon, Barlett, 
and Tiederman, 412 T . M . , Depreciation Methods -- Item and Group 
Accounts (Bureau of National Affairs, 1989) , at A-2 and A-33 to A-
39.  
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There are two reasons for this conclusion. First, since all 
assets in the group would be subject to the same depreciation 
schedule if accounted for individually, the group can be assigned 
that same schedule. There is no scope for changing the 
depreciation schedule for any given asset by aggregating it with 
other assets in a group account . Second, the adjusted basis of any 
particular asset in the group is readily determinable even though 
it might be impossible to distinguish one asset in the group from 
another. This adjusted basis is simply the adjusted basis for the 
group multiplied by the proportion of initial group value 
represented by the asset in question. 197 Thus, the disposition of 
an asset from the group account can be treated in exactly the same 
manner as disposition of that asset would have been under 
individual asset accounting. since neither depreciation of 
surviving assets nor disposition of assets need be treated 
differently, the same depreciation policy considerations apply as 
under individual asset accounting. 
This happy result falls apart if the law allows heterogeneous 
or open accounts. consider first the case of heterogeneous 
accounts , that is, accounts containing assets subject to different 
depreciation schedules. When such assets are placed into the same 
197 . All assets are placed into service at the same time and 
are subject to the same depreciation schedule as they would be if 
accounted for individually. If the adjusted basis for the group is 
X% of initial value, it will be true that the adjusted basis of an 
individual asset would have been X% of initial value if this asset 
had been accounted for individually. Thus, we can easily convert 
the adjusted basis of the group into adjusted basis for an asset in 
the group if we know the aggregate initial value of the group and 
the initial value of the asset. 
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group account, the group account is depreciated under a composite 
schedule that is a weighted average of the schedules that would 
have applied to the individual assets placed into the account. 198 
Use of the weighted average schedule allows the taxpayer to 
create some lucrative strategic loss-taking opportunities . Recall 
that strategic loss-taking is a potentially serious problem when 
the future price path for surviving assets is not known in advance. 
In that case, market price may range above adjusted basis under 
whatever depreciation schedule is set, and the taxpayer can 
"accelerate" the schedule by strategic loss-taking. When group 
accounts use a weighted average schedule rule, the ta:>'Payer can 
deliberately mix assets with very different depreciation schedules 
in a group account to create profitable strategic loss-taking 
198 .  To compute the weighted average , one computes the rate 
of depreciation represented by the aggregate first year allowance 
for the assets in the group under individual item accounting and 
then divides by the total value of the assets placed into the 
account . Consider an example used later in the text. suppose a 
group account contains $2000 worth of assets . Of this $2000, $1200 
is in assets subject to straight-line depreciation over six years 
and the remaining $800 is in assets subject to straight-line 
depreciation over one year. The aggregate first year allowance 
would be one-sixth of $1200 plus $800 , or $1000. This amounts to 
50% of the initial $2000 in value. Thus, straight-line 
depreciation over two years is used for the group account. 
The rules are most clearly set out for "open heterogeneous 
accounts. 11 These are group accounts with assets placed into 
service at different times as well as assets subject to different 
depreciation schedules. This mixture is the most general case, and 
it is not surprising that the rules are the most well-developed for 
this case. For a good description of these rules for multiple 
asset accounts , see Dooher, Lyon, Barlett, and Tiederman, supra 
note 196, at A-34 to A-37 . Accounts consisting of assets placed 
into service at the same time but subject to different depreciation 
schedules are called 0heterogeneous accounts closed at the end of 
the first year . " The rules for these accounts are not as clear or 
well developed. See id. at A-37 to A-38 . 
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opportunities. 
To see how this manipulation works , consider two groups of 
assets with known lives of one year and six years respectively. 
suppose that the value of both asset types declines in a straight-
l ine fashion over their lives. If the Code provides the correct 
theoretical depreciation schedule for these assets , that is, 
straight-line depreciation over their lives , there will be no 
strategic loss-taking opportunities for the assets under individual 
item accounting. Each asset ' s  adjusted basis will at all times be 
equal to its market value. 
This result disappears if the taxpayer can aggregate the two 
different asset types into a group account using a weighted average 
schedule. Suppose, for example, that the taxpayer constructs a 
group account composed of forty percent (by value) of the one year 
asset and sixty percent of the six year asset. This account would 
be depreciated as if it were one asset on a two year straight-line 
schedule. 199 But the taxpayer can retire the one year assets at 
the end of one year and claim a loss equal to the remaining 
adjusted basis. Assuming that the loss can be taken immediately as 
is the case under the individual item method, these assets will be 
depreciated correctly (following economic depreciation) since they 
have a one-year life. However ,  the remaining assets with six year 
lives will be depreciated for two years on a straight-line basis, 
thus receiving accelerated treatment. Thus, by mixing long-lived 
and short-lived assets in the same group account , the taxpayer can 
199. See supra note 198 .  
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accelerate the depreciation of the long-lived assets compared to 
their individual item treatment. zoo 
In the multiple asset account regulations, the government 
addresses this problem by specifying in the Regulations that "the 
average useful life and rate shall be redetermined whenever 
additions, retirements, or replacements substantially alter the 
relative proportion of types of assets in the accounts . 11201 
However, it appears that this Regulation is not enforced very 
effectively. Enforcement is especially difficult in the case of 
the most general type of account, that i s ,  open heterogeneous 
accounts, since the "substantial alteration" of asset types in such 
200. we have previously defined strategic loss-taking to mean 
the sale of an asset for a tax loss combined with repurchase of a 
similar asset. see supra text accompanying notes 12-14 . In the 
text example, the taxpayer combines assets in a group account 
anticipating that some will be retired before they are fully 
depreciated. The one-year asset is retired for a loss but no asset 
is sold for a tax loss and replaced with another asset. 
We will nonetheless refer to the strategy of accelerating 
depreciation for long-lived assets by mixing them in a group 
account with short-lived assets as "strategic loss-taking. "  The 
taxpayer is intentionally mixing the assets together in such a way 
that long-lived assets will receive favorable treatment , 
accelerated depreciation, while short-lived assets suffer no 
detriment due to the ability of the taxpayer to form a new 
"schedule" for those assets by loss-taking trades or retirements . 
In fact, the absenc::e of 11pure" strategic loss-taking in the 
text example is largely an artifact of that particular example. I f  
we had mixed two-year assets with six year assets , the resulting 
schedule would be straight-line depreciation with a recovery period 
three and one-third years. The taxpayer would deduct 30% of 
initial value in the first three years and 10% of initial value in 
the fourth year. In this case, pure strategic loss-taking is 
called for. After the first year, the two-year assets have fallen 
50% in value but adjusted basis has only been reduced by 3 0 % .  The 
taxpayer can trade these for a loss and then replace them with 
equivalent assets with one-year of life remaining. 
201. Reg. § l . 167 (a) -7 ,  paragraph (d) . 
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an account need be only temporary. 202 The taxpayer may add new 
assets to the account in the near future, thereby shifting the 
types of asset in the account back toward the original mix. 
In fact, even if this Regulation were strictly enforced, the 
taxpayer can play by the rules and get away with murder. For 
instance , in the example of the one year asset and the six year 
asset, the taxpayer could annually add smaller and smaller amounts 
of one year assets to the account and yet maintain the rate of 
depreciation -on the six year assets at 50% per year or greater. 203 
2 0 2 .  See Dooher, Lyon, Barlett, and Tiederman, supra note 
196, at A-36. 
203 . Consider the example with account balances as in note 
198 supra. That is, in the first year, there are $1200 worth of 
six-year straight-line assets and $800 worth of one-year assets. 
The group account is depreciated on a two year straight-line 
schedule so that only $1000 in "adjusted basis" is left after one 
year. In addition, the one year assets are retired from the 
account at a $400 loss, thereby reducing the account "adjuSted 
basis" to $600. Thus, only five-year assets are in the account and 
these have an aggregate adjusted basis of $600. 
Suppose the Regulations are applied strictly so that the 
taxpayer must recompute the depreciation rate for the account . By 
adding one year assets with total value of $360 to the account, the 
taxpayer would maintain two year straight-line treatment : The 
first year allowance would be one-fifth of $600 plus $360 which is 
$480 or one-hal f  of $960, the total value of assets in the account. 
The following table details the value in one-year assets that 
would need to be added each year to maintain a group treatment on 
a two-year straight-line basis: 
year remaining adjusted basis new value of one-year 
of long-lived assets that must be added 
1 $1200 $800 
2 $600 $360 
3 $300 $225 
4 $150 $100 
5 $75 $0 
6 $37 . 5  $0 
In year six, the taxpayer can simply deduct the entire $37 . 50 of 
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In effect, the taxpayer will have replaced six year straight-line 
depreciation with 250% declining balance depreciation. 204 
Finally, even if the account in question is closed and the 
Regulation is strictly enforced , the taxpayer will still succeed in 
getting accelerated depreciation. In our example, the taxpayer 
still deducts one-hal f  of the basis of the six-year assets in the 
first year. If the regulation is enforced, the taxpayer will have 
to deduct the remaining half of the basis of these assets under a 
straight-line schedule over five years. 205 But the overall result 
is more favorable to the taxpayer than 200% declining balance 
depreciation. 206 
We now turn to the case of open, homogeneous accounts. That 
is, we focus on the consequences of allowing similar assets placed 
in service in different years to be in the same account . Special 
problems arise in these accounts when it is costly to distinguish 
adjusted basis since the _asset now has only one year of useful life 
left. The net result is that the taxpayer switches the 
depreciation of the six-year asset from six-year straight-line 
depreciation to six-year 250% declining balance depreciation. 
204.  The resulting degree of acceleration is more than the 
Code allows for accelerated depreciation. MACRS permits at most 
200% declining balance depreciation compared to the straight-line 
treatment under ADS . See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
205. All of the one-year assets have been retired from the 
account. All that remains is the six-year assets that have five 
years of life remaining. 
206. The present value of depreciation taken 50% at the end 
of year one followed by 10% in each of the following five years is 
9 0 . 88% of initial value. The present value of depreciation on a 
200% declining balance schedule over six years ( switching to 
straight-line when it is optimal to do so) is 9 0 . 13 %  of initial 
value. 
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assets. Consider railroad ties, an example that is suggested as a 
prime candidate for these accounts by the Regulations. 207 
The railroad company will constantly be replacing ties that 
have rotted or are damaged with new ones. A group account 
consisting of all of its railroad ties in service will be a 
composite of ties placed in service initially in many different 
years. Labelling each tie in some indelible way and keeping track 
of it separately in the tax accounts would undoubtedly be very 
costly. 
The treatment of retirements from such a group account poses 
problems if the rule for dispositions depends on adjusted 
basis. 208 If ties are not identified, the date a tie was placed 
iri service and thus its adjusted basis at retirement are not known . 
using the average adjusted basis for ties in the account would be 
inaccurate if older ties are more likely to be the ones that- are 
retired. In that case, the average adjusted basis will generally 
be too high. 
2 .  Some Solutions to the Problems 
Subsection 1 shows that the problems specific to group 
accounting arise when group_ accounts are allowed to be open or 
heterogeneous. One obvious potential solution is to require that 
2 0 7 .  See infra note 283 . 
2 08 .  The individual item method and the account adjustment 
method both require knowledge of the adjusted basis of the asset 
being retired (or sold) from a group account . See supra text 
accompanying note 7 and i.nf.D! text accompanying note 297 . 
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such accounts be closed and homogeneous . 209 
Unfortunately, this solution vitiates much of the legitimate 
scope of group accounting . The purpose for allowing group accounts 
is to address situations where assets are numerous, 
indistinguishable or of low unit value. In these situations 
individual item accounting would be extremely expensive compared to 
the value of the assets. This problem is clearest for assets like 
railroad ties where not permitting open accounts would result in 
potentially very high administrative and compliance costs . But the 
same problem can exist i f  heterogeneous accounts are not permitted . 
High cost savings may result if the taxpayer is permitted to treat 
a myriad of small items put into service in the same year in a 
single account, to be treated as a single asset. The taxpayer ' s  
financial accounts may already be structured in this way, perhaps 
lumping all the miscellaneous items for particular projects into 
one category. 
Given the need to allow group accounts that are open or 
heterogeneous ,  it would be valuable to establish separate rules for 
closed, homogeneous accounts . The nice feature of these accounts 
is that nothing is lost in applying the same rules that apply under 
individual item accounting. 210 The Code and the Regulations 
209 . This requirement in fact applied to "vintage accounts11 
under the Asset Depreciation Range system in effect from 1971 to 
1980. See infra text accompanying note 2 8 0 .
210. See supra text accompanying notes 196-197. Ideal 
individual item accounting rules may be different from the ones in 
operation today. In particular, they may adjust tax schedules or 
use a disposition rule other than the individual item method in 
order to combat strategic loss-taking. See supra text accompanying 
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should perm.it taxpayers to operate closed, homogeneous accounts 
under those rules. 
The remaining issue is how to treat open, heterogeneous 
accounts . 211  The availability of these accounts raises the danger 
that they will be used to enhance or create strategic loss-taking 
opportunities. It is important that the rules that apply to open, 
heterogeneous accounts aim at controlling strategic loss-taking. 
At the same time, these rules should not be so severe as to destroy 
the viability of using these accounts since they can result in 
large savings of administrative and compliance resources . 212 
Ex ante schedule adjustments alone are unlikely to be a good 
policy for open, heterogeneous accounts . The big problem with 
controlling strategic loss-taking by ex ante schedule adjustments 
is that the required adjustments depend heavily on trading costs 
and asset volatility. 213 This problem is much worse for open 
heterogenous accounts since these accounts mix different kinds of 
assets and since the asset mix may change over time. Each open, 
heterogeneous account would require its own special schedule, and 
notes 130-183. But the essential point is that there is no need to 
establish different rules for closed, homogeneous accounts . 
2 1 1 .  I choose not to deal with open, homogeneous accounts and 
closed, heterogenous accounts separately. The policy adjustments 
for "openness" and "heterogeneity" are sufficiently similar that it 
is not worth discussing these two types of accounts separately. 
Instead the discussion focuses on the most general case: the open, 
heterogeneous account. 
2 1 2 .  See supra text accompanying notes 209-210 (special role 
for open and heterogeneous accounts) .  
213 . .§gg_ supra text accompanying notes 130-150.
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setting the appropriate schedule might be very difficult. Z14 
Two of the disposition rules discussed in Pai-t III,  the 
depreciation bond approach and the proceeds tax rule, are extremely 
attractive methods for controlling the strategic loss-taking 
problems that accompany Open, heterogeneous group accounts . Two 
features of these rules make them particularly suitable. First, 
under both rules, computing the tax treatment upon disposition of 
assets from the account does not require knowing the adjusted basis 
of the assets sold or retired from the account. zi5 We have seen 
that for open accounts, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, it is 
difficult to determine the adjusted basis for such assets . Such a 
determination is possible for closed, heterogeneous accounts . 
Since these accounts contain assets that are all put in service in 
the same year, adjusted basis can be computed from scratch knowing 
the type asset being sold or retired . Nonetheless, this 
computation is exactly the kind of asset-by-asset delineation that 
group accounts are designed to avoid. The computation would be 
especially burdensome if a group of assets were sold or retired as 
214. One could not simply start with special schedules for 
each asset type and then .have a formula that mechanically combined 
those schedules into a single schedule when the assets are mixed in 
a group account . There may be IlQ danger of strategic loss-taking 
for two asset types considered separately, but combining them may 
create a considerable danger. see supra text accompanying notes 
199-204 (example) . Thus, a special schedule for a group account 
would have to be tailored to the particular mix of assets in that 
account . In addition, if the account is open, that mix may change 
over time so that the schedule would have to be changed along with 
the mix or would have to be set so as to anticipate changes in mix. 
183. 
2 1 5 .  See supra text accompanying notes 159, 171-173, and 181-
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a block. 216 
The second advantage of the depreciation bond approach and the 
proceeds tax rule is that they make strategic loss-taking totally 
ineffective . 217 since strategic loss-taking is a particularly 
serious problem for open, heterogeneous accounts, it makes sense to 
use a policy that strongly addresses that type of manipulation. 
One drawback of using either the depreciation bond approach or 
the proceeds tax rule is that the ex ante depreciation schedule 
will have to be adjusted.zta Unless this schedule is considerably 
accelerated, the taxpayer will pay a substantial price for shifting 
to group accounts under these disposition rules. zt9 Failure to 
adjust would discourage use of open, heterogeneous group accounts,
216. It is interesting to contrast the outcome of this sale 
or retirement of a block of assets with the same transaction for 
closed, homogeneous accounts . For these accounts , the adjusted 
basis of a single asset Qt: a block of assets is simply the 
"adjusted basis" of the account multiplied by the proportion of 
original account value represented by the asset or block. See 
supra text accompanying note 197. Thus, it is fairly easy to 
compute adjusted basis when assets are sold or retired from such an 
account. This ease of computation makes it feasible to use 
disposition rules that hinge on the adjusted basis of the assets 
that are sold or retired from closed, homogeneous accounts . 
217.  The other disposition rules are not 
They leave some scope for strategic loss-taking. 
accompanying notes 178-179. 
complete cures. 
See supra text 
218.  Of course, adjustment would not be necessary if the 
depreciation bond approach or the proceeds tax rule were applied 
generally, that is, to all assets regardless of whether individual 
item accounting or some form of group accounting applies to the 
asset. 
219. See supra note 57 and text accompanying notes 56-58, 161 
and 174 (large degree of acceleration required for ex ante 
depreciation schedule under depreciation bond approach and proceeds 
tax rule) . 
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and we have seen that using these accounts promises substantial 
cost savings . 220 
Establishing a separate set of schedules for assets in group 
accounts that are open or heterogeneous is inelegant and adds to 
the complexity of the depreciation rules. 221 In addition, unless 
the government is prepared to define the situations where 
administrative and compliance costs warrant the use of group 
accounts, group accounting treatment is destined to be elective. 
If the special schedules set up for assets in group accounts that 
are open or heterogeneous overcompensate for the disposition rules 
applied to those accounts, taxpayers will elect group accounting 
simply to obtain a more favorable depreciation schedule. 
Finally, the problem of designing special schedules differs 
for the two disposition rules. In the case of the depreciation 
bond approach, computation of the appropriate accelerated schedule 
220.  See supra text accompanying notes 209-210.
2 2 1 .  However, the schedule adjustment rules could operate 
mechanically. The rules could specify a group of schedules 
paralleling MACRS and ADS . These schedules would specify the 
treatment for each type of asset ( e . g .  , by class life or MACRS 
category) .  The schedule for a group account would be a weighted 
average (weighted by initial value) of the schedules for the assets 
put into the account . If the account were "open, 11 the schedule 
would be readjusted when new assets were added . 
In contrast, no such mechanical approach will work where the 
schedule adjustment itself is used to combat strategic loss-taking. 
See supra note 2 1 4 .  A mechanical method is possible for the 
depreciation bond approach and the proceeds tax rule since under 
these approaches the schedule adjustment merely allows for the 
change in disposition rule. The new disposition rule itself (and 
nQ:t the schedule adjustment) is what stops strategic loss-taking. 
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is easy. 22.2 In contrast , under the proceeds tax rule that 
computation is difficult. 223 As a result, under the proceeds tax 
rule the danger of making a schedule adjustment that 
overcompensates for the severity of the disposition rule is greater 
and, in the face of computational difficulty, so is the danger of 
undercompensating in an effort to avoid overcompensating. 
Although the required schedule adjustment for the depreciation 
bond approach and the proceeds tax rule are a disadvantage, using 
one or the other of these two disposition rules seems l ike the best 
available approach for group accounts that are open or 
heterogeneous . Using other disposition rules or relying solely on 
schedule adjustment for such accounts is not practical. 
C. Some Suggested Reforms of the Group Accounting Rules 
Two reform suggestions emerge from the previous section. 
First, taxpayers should be able to elect group accounting · for 
closed, homogeneous accounts under the same rules that apply to 
individual item accounting. Second, group accounts that are open 
or heterogeneous require special treatment . The best policy for 
these accounts appears to be use of either the depreciation bond 
approach or the proceeds tax rule. 
Unfortunately, there are some legal roadblocks that stand in 
the way of Treasury directly implementing these rules for "general 
asset accounts" by Regulations . First, on its face, section 
2 2 2 .  The Hulten and Wykoff schedule will work. see � 
text accompanying note 161.
223 . See supra text accompanying notes 173-174.
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168 ( i) ( 4 )  seems to require the proceeds tax rule for 
dispositions . 224 This requirement would make it difficult to 
provide "normal" tax treatment by Regulation for closed, 
homogeneous accounts. Treasury could argue , however, that applying 
11normal" tax treatment for these group accounts is simply a 
bookkeeping matter. The basis for this argument is that the assets 
in these accounts will be treated exactly as they would be under 
individual item accounting. Aggregation simply makes recordkeeping 
and tax returns simpler. 
since the proceeds tax rule is a potentially good policy for 
group accounts that are open or heterogeneous, the congressional 
mandate in favor of that rule may not be very onerous . 225 But 
there is a second problem: Congress did not explicitly authorize 
use of an accelerated schedule along with the proceeds tax rule. 
Without such a schedule, much of the potential usefulness of group 
accounts may be vitiated. 226 But Treasury would have to rely on 
a broad reading of Congressional intent to set up accelerated 
schedules on its own in the Regulations. Congress has proven 
acutely sensitive to Treasury-determined depreciation schedules in 
the past, even when Treasury authority to set the ·schedules was 
2 2 4 .  See I . R . C .  § 16B ( i )  ( 4 )  (1991) . 
2 2 5 .  It is clear that Congress envisions that heterogeneous 
general asset accounts will be allowed. Congress made it clear 
that it wanted to eliminate the requirement of homogeneity put in 
place for the prior "mass asset account" rules. See infra note 287 
accompanying text. 
2 2 6 .  See supra text accompanying notes 219-220. 
clear. 227 
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If Treasury is stuck with the proceeds tax rule, it may be 
able to take steps in the Regulations to mitigate its worst 
feature, the tendency to interfere with sales that have a 
legitimate business purpose.228 One way to accomplish this task 
would be to rely on an alternative interpretation of section 
16B ( i )  ( 4 ) . Because the language in the section is different from 
that in prior law, the requirement that the proceeds tax rule apply 
might be read to be limited to 11abnormal11 or "extraordinary" 
retirements. 229 Treasury could define 11normal11 or 11ordinary11 
retirements to include legitimate business transactions in addition 
to assets that simply wear out. 230 However, designing rules that 
2 2 7 .  For example, Treasury promulgated the entire Asset 
Depreciation Range system by Regulation in 197 1 .  The system 
generally gave taxpayers the opportunity for accelerated 
depreciation compared to prior law. Al though Treasury arguably had 
authority to promulgate the Regulations, Congress carefully 
reviewed them and made some changes before allowing them to go into 
effect. See Donald, 255-Jrd T . M . , Depreciation: ADR System for 
Post-1970 Property, at A-2 through A-3 (Bureau of National Affairs 
Portfolio, 1988 ) . 
It is also instructive that Congress removed the power granted 
to Treasury in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 to set useful lives 
before that power was ever exercised. See supra note 2 3 . This 
revocation may have been prompted by pressure from industries 
afraid that Treasury would mandate slower depreciation for their 
assets. See supra note 185 . 
2 2 8 .  See supra text accompanying notes 173-174 . 
2 2 9 .  see infra text accompanying note 3 0 0 .  
2 3 0 .  one letter t o  Treasury concerning the Regulations t o  be 
promulgated under section 16B ( i )  ( 4 )  suggests that the proceeds tax 
rule be applied only to � retirements . The letter writer 
proposes that the individual income method would apply to 
"substantial abnormal" retirements . This category would be defined 
to include retirements of more than 20% of the assets (by 
unadjusted basis) in a general asset account that occur "as a 
129 
distinguish between sales motivated by strategic loss-taking and 
those motivated by an independent business purpose may not be 
easy . 231 
It is clear that some of the constraints placed by Congress on 
the rules for general asset accounts make it difficult for Treasury 
to provide a coherent policy structure in the Regulations . It may 
be desirable for Treasury to seek a broader and more flexible 
mandate from Congress before completing those Regulations. 
direct result of a cessation, termination, curtailment , or 
disposition of a business, manufacturing, or other income producing 
process . "  See Letter from Daniel R. Mitchell of Amoco, Corp. to 
Rich Blumenreich of the Internal Revenue Service, 88 Tax Notes 
Today 160-36 (August 4 ,  1988 ) . The proposed category of 
"substantial abnormal" retirements would also include retirements 
due to factors other thari business exigencies. 
This approach has a similar goal to the approach in the text 
but uses the opposite technique . Instead of putting business 
transactions into the normal retirements category and exempting 
this category from the proceeds tax rule, the letter writer ' s  
approach puts these transactions into the abnormal retirements 
category and exempts this category from the proceeds tax rule. It 
is hard to see, however, how this approach would square with the 
language and legislative history of section 168 ( 1 )  ( 4 ) . That 
language and history suggests that i f  an exception were to apply, 
it would have to apply to normal dispositions. � infra note 300 
and accompanying text . 
231.  In addition, by combining assets appropriately in group 
accounts, a strategic loss-taking result can be achieved through 
simply retiring assets that wear out . � supra text accompanying 
notes 199-204 (example) . These are certainly "normal" retirements. 
See supra text accompanying note 190 . I f  the proceeds tax rule 
were not applied to them, some other disposition rule that is 
effective against strategic loss-taking would have to be applied. 
The only other candidate we have of that sort is the depreciation 
bond approach. But using that rule introduces the danger of 
churning transactions . See supra text accompanying notes 161-162. 
Since transactions motivated by legitimate business purposes would 
count as "normal" retirements, the rules would have to distinguish 
such transactions from transactions designed to churn depreciable 
assets. Designing such rules would not be easy. They would have 
to turn either on motivation tests or on mechanical rules that 
might well be overinclusive or underinclusive or both. 
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v. conclusions 
If the age-price profile for surviving units is known for a 
particular asset and the goal is to replicate economic 
depreciation, then the statutory depreciation schedule should be 
the age-price profile for surviving assets. Contrary to the 
leading academic approach devised by Hulten and Wykoff, this 
schedule should not be adjusted for retirement risk. The proper 
adjustment for that risk occurs automatically if the law allows a 
loss deduction when assets fail and are discarded. 
In contrast, when the future price path for surviving units is 
known and the objective is to accelerate depreciation in a manner 
that is neutral across assets, then depreciation schedules must 
take retirement risk into account. Assets with the same age-price 
profile for surviving units may require very different degrees of 
acceleration. The reason for this result is that the assets may be 
subj ect to very different survival patterns . If an asset has a 
higher survival rate, then the statutory depreciation schedule is 
more important because it is more likely to be applied to the 
assets. such assets do not need as much acceleration in the 
statutory schedule to receive the same degree of benefit as assets 
with lower survival rates. 
When the age-price profile for an asset is uncertain, 
approximating economic depreciation is more complex. strategic 
loss-taking becomes an important consideration. simple and clearly 
appropriate policies exist only for assets with very high trading 
costs or zero trading costs. These policies are basing the 
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depreciation schedule on the expected price path in the high 
trading cost case and allowing no depreciation deductions in the 
zero trading cost case. 
When trading costs are moderate , solutions that combine 
special disposition rules with ex ante schedule changes become 
attractive . None of these solutions is dominant . For example, one 
promising solution, the depreciation bond approach, eliminates 
strategic loss-taking but permits the churning of depreciable 
assets. The proceeds tax rule, another possible solution, 
eliminates both strategic loss-taking and churning but requires a 
difficult ex ante schedule adjustment and discourages dispositions 
of depreciable assets for legitimate business reasons. 
Finally, some types of group accounts raise special problems . 
Closed, homogeneous accounts are not in this category . Whatever 
set of rules turns out to be optimal under individual item 
accounting will be optimal for these accounts . However, strategic 
loss-taking is potentially a very severe problem for group accounts 
that are open or heterogeneous. For these accounts, it may be best 
to apply rules, such as the depreciation bond approach or the 
proceeds tax rule, that are particularly effective at curbing 
strategic loss-taking even if these rules are not used under 
individual item accounting . 
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Appendix A 
A Mathematical Description of the Productivity Method, the Treasury 
Department Approach, and the Text Examples 
This Appendix along with Appendices B and C provide 
mathematical derivations for the results in the text examples and 
figures. The derivation of the basic example in section II A of 
the text that is used throughout Part II is almost identical to the 
productivity method. This method is one of the two ways that the 
Treasury Department uses to arrive at age-price profiles for 
depreciable assets . 
section A of this Appendix provides a verbal description of 
the productivity method and then uses that method to construct the 
example in section II A of the text. Section B describes the 
mathematics of the Treasury Department approach . Section C 
connects the results in the Appendix with the various figures, 
tables and numerical examples in Part II of the text. 
A .  The Productivity Method and the Text Example from Part I I  
The productivity method i s  used by the Treasury Department to 
construct an age-price profile when market data does not suffice to 
estimate the profile directly. 232 The method begins with two 
empirical inputs : data on asset lives and data on net asset 
revenues during life. The data on asset lives leads to a useful 
life distribution for the type of asset under examination. This 
distribution specifies what proportion of new assets of this type 
2 3 2 .  See supra note 68.  
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last one year , two years, three years, and so on. The net revenue 
data allow net revenue per year to be expressed as a function of 
asset age. This "age-revenue profile" specifies how much profit 
surviving assets of any given age will earn annually. 
Given the useful life distribution and the age-revenue 
profile, it is possible to compute an expected net present value 
for a surviving asset of any given age. For each future year, the 
probability that the asset will survive to that year is multiplied 
by the net revenue that will be earned if the asset survives to 
that year . This product is discounted back to the present using an 
interest rate that reflects the time value of money.�3 
The sum of the discounted products from all future years is 
the net present value of the asset . 234  Calculating a net present 
value at each age yields a complete age-price profile.�5 
2 3 3 .  This interest rate should include a risk premium if the 
revenues are risky. 
234.  This value is sometimes called the "value-in-use" of the 
asset. See Treasury Rental Clothing Study, supra note 2 3 ,  at 2 0 .  
2 3 5 .  The productivity method outlined here does not adjust 
the values derived for taxes. Thus , neither revenues nor the 
discount rate are reduced to an after-tax amount. 
This approach is theoretically sound if the end product will 
be a system that replicates economic depreciation. If economic 
depreciation is the rule, then the after-tax present value of all 
assets will be independent of the tax rate. See Samuelson, � 
Deductibility of Economic Depreciation to Insure Invariant 
Valuations, 72 J. Pol. Econ. 604 (1964 ) . The reason that this 
result holds is that the reduction in revenues by taxes is exactly 
offset by a reduction in 'the discount rate. §li Strnad, supra note 
7 ,  at 1853-57 . The result implies that present value computed 
ignoring taxes will be equal to present value computed using any 
given tax rate . 
If the tax treatment does not replicate economic depreciation, 
then calculating present value by ignoring taxes is only sound if 
the marginal investor is not subject to tax. See R. Brealey & s .
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The text example in Part II is derived by applying the 
productivity method to an assumed pattern of asset lives and an 
assumed pattern of net asset revenues for surviving assets. In 
particular, the example assumes an exponential distribution of 
asset lives so that the probability of survival up to time t is 
S ( t) e-l.t. ( 1) 
With this distribution of l ives, the mean life is 1/1, and assets 
fail at a constant rate of 1 per year. 236  In the example, 1 = . 10 
so that the expected life of an asset is 10 years when it is first 
put into service. Revenues decline exponentially from an initial 
level at time o of R per year. Thus, the annual revenue rate at 
time t is 
R ( t) = Re -11t. (2)  
In the example, the parameter a is set at . 20 so that the revenue 
rate declines at a rate of 20% per year. 
In order to compute the value of the asset at any given time, 
Myers, supra note 6 7 ,  at 415-17 (discussing role of marginal 
investor in determining market value of assets ) . However, the 
qualitative results in this Article would still apply i f  the 
marginal investor is subject to a nonzero tax rate. The only 
difference would be that some of the tax effects would be 
capitalized into asset prices. For a good discussion of this 
phenomenon, see Auerbach, Should Interest Deductions Be Limited? , 
in Uneasy Compromise: Problems of a Hybrid Income-consumption Tax 
195 (1988 ) . 
2 3 6 .  The rate o f  failure per year i s  simply 
s' < t> = I. . 
S ( t) 
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a discount rate is necessary to reduce future revenues to present 
value. The example assumes a 4% annual rate, equivalent to an 
exponential rate of r = l n ( l . 04 )  = 0 . 0392 2 .  
Given the assumed asset life distribution, the assumed age­
revenue profile, and the assumed discount rate, it is possible to 
compute V(T) , the value of the asset at time T :  
V( T) = J R ( t) e-rlt-Tl e-1 Ct-Tl dt = e-uT 
T « +r+A · 
( 3 )  
Normalizing this value by dividing by value at time 0 yields 
V(T) = e-«T, V( O )  ( 4 )  
Note that the normalized value at time t does not depend on 
the expected life of the asset. This fact is a consequence of the 
assumption that assets fail at a constant rate. That assumption 
means that the expected life and the distribution of future lives 
remains constant for surviving assets. If an asset is T years old, 
it has the same prospects for survival to year T + t as it 
initially did for surviVal to year t. The only change is that 
revenues are lower in year T + t than in year t .  Thus, equation 
( 4 ) , the normalized value equation for surviving assets, depends 
only on the level of revenues. 
It is easy to compute the present value of depreciation for 
the age-price profile generated by this equation. we first 
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differentiate to obtain the instantaneous rate of change in value: 
[ V(T) ]' = V1 (T) = -ue-«t.V( O )  V( O )  (5) 
We now integrate the absolute value of this rate of decline 
discounted to present value to obtain the present value of 
depreciation:Z37 
ii V' ( T) le-''dT = �I V(O)' u cx:;r . (6) 
This present value of depreciation is only valid for assets 
that survive -indefinitely. under current law, the remaining 
adjusted basis is deducted at retirement . Including these loss 
deductions as a component of depreciation, as is theoretically 
proper, 2� the expected present value of depreciation is 
PV = ii v' ( T) le-"S ( T) dT + f0 V( T) [1 -S ( T)]1e-rTdT. {I V(O) , V( O )  ( 7 )  
We call this expected present value o f  depreciation, "the 
2 3 7 .  Note that we could have delayed normalizing until after 
completing this integral .  Normalization involves dividing by the 
initial value, S ( O ) . This initial value is a positive constant and 
is carried through as a multiplicative factor from equation 236 to 
the current equation containing the integral. 
2 3 8 . See supra text accompanying notes 42-4 4 .  
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retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation. "  The first 
integral is identical to the integral in equation (6)  except that 
the integrand is multiplied by the proportion of assets that will 
survive to each given time. This survival probability is precisely 
the probability that the asset will be moving down (and 
depreciating) along the age-price profile for surviving assets at 
that time. The second irltegral is the present value of retirement 
deductions. The term 1 - S (T) is the cumulative probability of 
failure up to time T ,  and the derivative of the term is the density 
function for asset failure. This derivative is multiplied by the 
normalized value of the asset at that time and the .product is
discounted back to time o by the discount factor e·rT . We have 
PV "' J a;e-aTe-1Te-rTdT + J e-11T).e-1Te-rTdT = 
' ' 
for the retirement-adjusted present value. 
« +l. 
u+r+l 
(8) 
We now turn to the Hulten & Wykoff approach. They adjust the 
age-price profile for surviving assets at each age by multiplying 
by the probability of survival to that age. Thus, we replace the 
normalized value in equation ( 4 )  by the new normalized value 
NV(T) S ( T) V(T)S(O)  V( O )  
S(T) V( T) 
V(O) 
The integral in equation ( 6 )  becomes 
"' e-(11+.l) T (9)  
f1,NV1 ( T) le-rTdT = f (a; +l) e- (a;+r+).) TdT = 
' ' 
« +). 
«+r+l 
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(10) 
This value is identical to the value obtained in equation (8) for 
the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation. Thus , the 
present value of depreciation under the Hulten and Wykoff approach 
is equal to the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation. 
It is important to note that we will obtain a different result 
for the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation if the 
statutory schedule is based on the Hulten and Wykoff age-price 
profile from equation (9 )  instead of on the age-price profile for 
surviving asse�s from equation ( 4 ) . When the statutory schedule is 
the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile, instead of equation (7)  we 
have 
PV = f!NV' < Tl le-«s ( T) dT + f NV( T) [l-S(T) J'e-rTdT
' ' 
which yields 
PV ,,, J (a;+l) e-(11+.llTe-.lTe-rTdT + J e-f«+1J T).e-1Te -rTdT ,,, ct+2l . 
o 0 «+r+2l 
(11) 
(12) 
The term 21 appears on the right hand side here instead of the term 
l in equation (8) . Thus , the retirement-adjusted present value of 
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depreciation based on the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile is 
equivalent to the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation 
for the age-price profile for surviving assets if we double the 
rate at which assets fail when computing that profile. 239 It is 
not surprising that using the Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile 
as the basis of the statutory depreciation schedule instead of the 
age-price profile for surviving assets results in dramatically 
shorter 1 i ves . 240 
B. The Treasury Department Approaches 
The Treasury Department approach requires two steps. First, 
the Department derives the retirement-adjusted present value of 
depreciation based on the age-price profile for surviving assets . 
Second, Treasury constructs a straight-line schedule that has the 
same present value adjusted for retirements . 
The Department has two different ways of computing the 
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation. In section A of 
this Appendix we have already encountered the first way, what the 
text calls the 11Hulten and Wykoff variant . "  For our example, the 
final result of this variant is the retirement-adjusted present 
value of depreciation computed in equation ( 12 ) . Section A of this 
Appendix shows that this result is equivalent to the present value 
2 3 9 .  This doubling is the mathematical basis for the less 
precise assertion in the text that using the Hulten and Wykoff age­
price profile instead of the age-price profile for surviving assets 
in effect provides an improper "double correction" for retirements. 
See supra note 5 6 .  
240.  Cf. supra text accompanying notes 56-57 (large reduction 
in class life caused by using Hulten and Wykoff age-price profile) . 
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of depreciation under the Hulten and Wykoff approach unadjusted for 
retirement deductions. It is this equivalence that justifies the 
name "Hulten and Wykoff variant . 11 The text argues that the 
retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation computed in this 
way is correct. 241 
The second way that Treasury uses to compute the retirement­
adjusted present value of depreciation is more complex, and 
involves four steps: 242 
( 1 )  compute an age-price profile for a n  asset with knQHn 
life for each life; 
( 2 )  normalize the prices for each profile derived i n  step 
(1)  by dividing by initial price; 
( 3 )  compute the present value o f  depreciation for each 
life; 
( 4 )  compute a n  overall present value o f  depreciation by 
weighting the present value for each life by the 
probability that the asset will survive that long. 
In our example, to replicate step ( 1 ) , we need to alter equation 
( 3 )  to reflect a fixed and known life, y :  
' 
V(T,y) = fR ( t) e-r< t-Tl dt 
T 
' 
RerT f e-(a+r) tdt 
T 
__.B_ [e-aT _ erTe-<or:+rly]. 
a+r 
2 4 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
2 4 2 .  See supra text accompanying notes 71-75. 
(13)  
Normalizing by dividing by the initial price, we obtain 
V(T,y) 
V(O, y) 
e-«T - erTe-(•+'l'l
1 - e-la+r)y 
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( U )  
Differentiating this expression with respect to T, taking the 
absolute value of the result and integrating that absolute value 
multiplied by the discount rate e-rT , yields an expression for the 
present value of depreci�tion as a function of the fixed and known 
life y :  
PV(y) 
_ '}! V1 ( T, y )  le-rTdT- ./J V( O , g) 
� a;e- C«+rl T + re-<••r)y dT"' J  1 e- <«+r>v 0 
• 
«+I 
• 
«+I 
+ rye-<o:+rly 1 - e-(a+r)y 
+ ry e fe1•r>r - 1 
(15) 
This result is identical to the outcome in equation (6) , the 
present value of depreciation for surviving assets , except for the 
second term which "corrects" for the fact that the asset has finite 
life y instead of an indefinite life. Note that243 
lim PV(y) 1 
n•O 
and 
PV1 (y) < 0 for y > 0 .  
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(16) 
Thus, normalization causes the present value of depreciation to 
decline with y ,  asset life. But it follows from equation ( 1 3 )
that 
5V(O,y) 
6y "" R
e-(a+r)y > 0 . (17) 
Thus, longer-lived assets will produce more revenues and have a 
� present value at the time of purchase. In effect, the 
Treasury ' s  second variant weights short-lived assets more heavily 
by value than long-lived assets. 
To compute the present value of depreciation under the second 
243 . The l imit result in equation (16) is obvious, but the 
derivative result requires some work. Note first that 
PV'( ) - 1 e l•+rly - 1 - ( a: +r) ye l•+r)y 
Y - I ( e <••rly _ 1 ) 2 
For y > o ,  the denominator is always positive. The numerator is 0 
when y = o and its sign as y increases from o depends on its 
derivative. In fact, the derivative of the numerator is 
- (u+r) 2ye <••.rl y  
which i s  less than zero for all y > o .  A s  a result, the derivative 
of PV(y) is less than zero for all y > o .
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variant, we integrate the expression for PV (y) in equation { 15) 
multiplied by ( 1  - S (T) ] ' ,  the probability density function for 
asset life. The resulting present value is 
,; 
PV = f PV(y) [1-S(y) ] 1dy
' 
= _a_ + f
• 
Arye-(•+r+.lly 
a;+r 1 - e-la+r>y dy .  ' 
It is difficult to evaluate the integral on the right hand side 
analytically. The present values in the text under the second 
variant were derived by computing the integral numerically for the 
parameters of the text example. 
Despite the fact that the integral cannot be easily evaluated, 
it is not hard to show that 
a 
a+r + J 
A.rye-l«+r+J.ly 
0 1 - e -(cc+r) dy 
> � .a+r+J.. 
(19)  
That is,  the present value of depreciation under the second variant 
is greater than the present value under the first, "Hulten and 
Wykoff11 variant that we derived in equation (8) . To see this 
point, consider that244 
1 - e-<a+r)y < (o: +r) y for y > o .
As a result, 
a 
a+r 
f, e -la+r+lly + AIY dy 1 _ e-Ca+rly 
> 
' 
a 
a+r + 
_!!_Je-<«+r+lly dya+r ' 
_«_ + rl. 
a+r 
«+I. 
ix+r+A. • 
(«+r) ( « +r+A) 
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(20) 
(21) 
In the numerical example in the text, the second variant resulted 
in a higher present value of depreciation (and thus a shorter class 
life) than the first variant. 245 Here we have demonstrated that 
this result is true in general and not j ust for the particular 
parameters used in the example. 
After computing the retirement adjusted present value of 
depreciation using either the first or second variant, the Treasury 
2 4 4 .  Both sides of equation (20) are zero when y = O ,  but the 
derivative of the right hand side is greater than the derivative of 
the right hand side for all values of y greater than O .  The result 
in the equation follows. 
245. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
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Department computes an equivalent class life. This equivalent 
class life is the recovery period for a straight-line schedule that 
generates present value of depreciation (after adjusting for 
retirements) that is equal to the retirement adjusted present value 
of depreciation for the asset. 
We now go through the steps required to compute class lives 
for our example. Straight-line depreciation per dollar of initial 
asset value over a recovery period of T years will be at a rate of 
l/T per year. Given that e·1t is the proportion of assets surviving 
to any time t ,  the depreciation during an instantaneous interval dt 
following time t will be 
.! e-rte-ltdt 
T (22) 
where we have weighted the depreciation by the probability of 
survival at time t and discounted the result back to time a by 
multiplying by e-rt. Retirements during that time interval dt 
following time t will contribute 
[ T ; t] [e-r9 [le-"dt] (23)  
where the first term i n  square brackets i s  the adjusted basis at 
the time of retirement, the second term discounts value back to 
time 0 and the third term is the probability of death during the 
time interval dt following time t. 
Integrating the sum of the terms in equations (22) and ( 2 3 ) , 
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we obtain. the following expression for the present value of 
depreciation per dollar of initial value under a straight-line 
schedule: 
x f :! + l. ( T - t) e-U. + rl tdt T ' 
1 + l.T ( 1  - e-U.+r) T) -T(l+r) 
x 
.!/lte-0. + rltdt .T , 
And integrating by parts yields 
x 
_ _! f te- Cl+r) tdt
, T o
x 
_,![-=E.... e- !l+r) t]T +.!f� e-(l+rl tdtT l+I 0 T 0 l.+r 
_!!__ e -Cl+r) T  - l [1 - e- (l+r> 71 .T(l.+r) T(l.+r)2 
(24) 
(25) 
Adding the result from equation (25) to the first term on the right 
hand side of equation ( 2 4 ) , we obtain the retirement-adjusted 
present value of straight-line depreciation over recovery period T :  
PV( T, l)  =-·- + I [1 - e-'1•r' 7] ,l+r T(l+r)2 (26)  
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To compute the appropriate class life, we equate PV ( T , 1 )  to "PV, 11 
the retirement-adjusted present value of depreciation in equation 
( 8 }  and solve for T. 246 
Note that if we had failed to adjust for retirements in 
computing the equivalent straight-line schedule, we would have 
obtained the same result as in equation ( 2 6 )  but with 1 = O :
PV(T) = ;T[l - e-''J. (27) 
This result is smaller than the result in equation ( 2 6 )  whenever 1 
> o . 247 As a result, a smaller value of T would have to be chosen 
to reach any particular level of present value. 
C .  The Known-Life, Fixed Revenue Example i n  Section I I  C 4 
Section II c 4 uses an example that differs from the one used 
in earlier parts of the text. In particular, this example assumes 
that asset life is fixed at T years and that revenues flow at a 
constant rate of R per year. 
2 4 6 .  No easy analytic solution for T was apparent to the 
author. The class lives in the text were derived by solving for T 
numerically using the MATHCAD engineering scratchpad program. 
2 4 7 .  This assertion can be verified by taking the derivative 
of PV ( T , l) in equation (26)  with respect to l and showing that this 
derivative is positive. But it is easier to simply observe that 
retirement deductions accelerate depreciation compared to 
depreciation under the schedule for surviving assets . PV(T) in 
equation (27)  represents exactly the present value of depreciation 
under this schedule while equation (26)  represents present value 
adjusted for the acceleration that results from retirement 
deductions. 
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Under. these assumptions, the value of the asset at time t will 
be 
T 
V( t) = J Re-r"ds = R z[l - e-r(T-tl] . (28) 
' 
Normalizing by the initial value and taking the derivative yields 
the instantaneous rate of economic depreciation at each time t :  
v'c t> 
V(O) 
-re-rlT-tl 
1 - e-rT (29) 
Taking the absolute value of this depreciation rate, multiplying by 
the discount factor e·rt, and integrating yields the present value 
of depreciation: 248 
T -rT -rT PV = f re dt = TI e T • o l - e-rT 1 - e-r (30) 
To compute an equivalent class life for this asset, one 
equates the present value of depreciation from equation (30) with 
PV(T) from equation (27)  and then solves for T .  This class life 
248 . Because we have assumed that the asset will last exactly 
T years, there is no need to take retirement loss deductions into 
account . The only retirement is the one that occurs with certainty 
at the end of T years. At that point the asset has been fully 
depreciated on the tax accounts. Adjusted basis and value (amount 
realized) are both zero so that there is no loss. 
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translates into an equivalent straight-line schedule, namely the 
straight-line schedule for a recovery period equal to that class 
life. 
Section II c 4 also considers the present value of 
depreciation along the equivalent straight-line curve for the first 
part of the asset ' s  life followed by depreciation along the age­
price profile for the rest of the asset ' s  life. The cross-over 
time is the time at which the two curves cross. 249 If this 
crossover time is C and the straight-line curve is based on a class 
life of L, then the present value of depreciation along this 
"mixed" curve is 
C T 
PV = J 1.. e-rtdt + J re-rT dto T c 1 - e-rT 
_.!_ (1 - e-rc) + ( T  - C) I e-rT
n 1 - e-
D .  Linking the Results in this Appendix to the Text 
(31) 
We now connect the results in this Appendix to the numerical 
results and figures in the text . The following table lists the 
text figures and numerical results in the left column and the 
corresponding equations in this Appendix in the right column : 
249. See Figure 9 IDm.I.:a. text accompanying note 100 . 
text .figure or result 
Figure 5 
Figure 6 
class lives in 
section II C 1 
Figure 7 
present values and 
class lives in 
section II C 2 
Figure 8 
present values in 
section II c 3 
Figure 9 
Figure in note 104 
present values in 
section II C 4 
Figure 10 
Table I in section II D 
equation 
equation ( 4 )  
equation ( 4 )  (upper curve) 
equation (9) (lower curve) 
equation (26)  (equivalent 
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straight-line schedules) 
equations ( 8 )  and (26)  
equation (10)  (curve) 
equations (10) and (27) (lower 
straight-line schedule) 
equations (10) and (26)  (upper 
straight-line schedule) 
equation ( 8 )  ( first variant) 
equation (18) ( second variant) 
equation (26) (to compute 
equivalent class lives) 
equation ( 4 )  (curve) 
equations (6) and (27) (for 
straight-line schedul·e) 
equation (4) (curve} 
equation ( 27) (straight line) 
equation (28) (curve) 
equations (30) and (27) (for 
straight-line schedule) 
equation ( 4 )  (curve) 
equations ( 4 )  and (26) (for 
straight-line schedule} 
equation ( 2 8 )  (curve and 
straight line) 
equation (31) ( "mixed curve") 
equation (4) (for both curves) 
equation (1) (with A =  9/10, 2/3) 
Table II in section II D 
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equation ( 8 )  (with a =  . 10 ,  . 20 ;  
). - 9/10, 2/3 ) 
Appendix B. 
Neutrality: Cost of Capital Approaches 
152 
This Appendix describes the mathematics of measuring the 
"neutrality" of accelerated depreciation, that is, the degree to 
which various accelerated depreciation schemes give the same 
investment incentive to diverse assets. As discussed in the text, 
there is more than one way to compare investment incentives for two 
different assets, and the two principal methods are the present 
value approach and the rate of return approach . z5o 
The present value approach is used in Table II of the 
text .Z51 In addition, the text uses an example of two assets with 
different survival probabilities. 252 One asset survives each year 
with 9/10 probability while the other survives only at a 2/3 rate. 
These two assets have the same age-price profile for surviving 
units and thus would have the same depreciation schedule if 
economic depreciation were the goal . The text points out that if 
the depreciation rate for the asset with the lower survival rate is 
doubled compared to economic depreciation, the neutral depreciation 
rate for the other asset will only be 1 .  29 as fast as economic 
depreciation under the present value approach. 253 
250.  See supra note 109. 
2 5 1 .  See supra text accompanying notes 108-109. 
252 . See supra text accompanying notes 107-114. 
253 . See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
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This Appendix describes the mathematics behind these numerical 
results. This mathematics is derived largely from a paper by 
Professor Alan Auerbach . 254 We begin with the following 
definitions: 
t 
r 
u 
z 
c ( t) 
q(t) 
D(t) 
a 
l 
time in years 
instantaneous after-tax interest rate 
the margirial tax rate 
the present value of depreciation deductions for the 
asset 
the cost of renting the asset on an annual basis at 
time t 
the per uriit value of the asset if placed into 
service new at time t 
the depreciation deduction per dollar of asset on an 
annual basis at time t 
the instantaneous rate of decline in revenues from 
the asset 
the instantaneous rate of failure for the asset 
Professor Auerbach shows that with these variables, the present 
value of gross returns per dollar of asset purchased is 
PV( l. ,  a) = J e-rtc( t) e- (111+11 t 0 q dt
while the internal rate of return for the asset is 
p (l , a ) .E. - (l+o:) . q 
(32) 
( 3 3 )  
To solve these equations , we must derive a n  expression for 
q(t) in terms of c (t) . We note that rents are deductible so that 
after-tax rents from the asset will be ( 1 - u) times the flow of 
254 . See Auerbach, supra note 109 . 
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rents. In addition, depreciation is deductible so that the after­
tax benefit to the owner of the asset will be u times the stream of 
deductions. The present value of the after-tax rents from one unit 
of the asset combined with the present value of the tax 
depreciation benefits from that one unit will be q(t) , the value of 
the unit. We write 
q(t) = f e-r!s-tl[ (l-u) c(s) e-1(s-tle-•<s-tl + uq( t)D(s) ]ds 
.t (34)  
where 
=f e-r(s-t>[ ( 1 -u) c (s) e-1(s-tl e-• <s-t!]ds + uq(t) z
' 
z = f e-r•v(s) ds .
0 
We now rewrite equation ( 3 4 )  as 
( 1-uz) q( t) = f e-<r•1+•) ls-t> ( 1-u) c( s) ds.
' 
(35)  
(36) 
since all of our parameters such as t ,  a and 1 are constant 
over time, q(t)  must be constant over time. We therefore take the 
derivative of q(t)  in equation (36) and set it equal to zero to 
obtain 
- (1 -u) c � s) + (r+l+a.) q(1-uz) = O 
so that we can solve for c in terms of q:
c = (r+A+a) q (1 -uz)(1-u) 
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(37)  
(38) 
Substituting this value of c into equations ( 3 2 )  and ( 3 3 ) , we 
obtain 
and 
p (l. .  • )
PV(l.,  o )  ( 1-uz) (1-u) 
(r+A+a) (l-uz) - (l+a; ) .(1 -u) 
( 3 9 )  
( 4 0 )  
for the present value and internal rate o f  return approaches 
respectively. 
Using equation (39)  we note that: 
6PV 
5Z -=!!..dz 1-u (41) 
so that increasing the present value of depreciation deductions by 
any particular amount lowers the gross present value of returns 
required by the proportion u/ (1-u) . In addition, under the 
internal rate of return approach we have 
&PV 
5Z --=!!.. (o: +r+l) dz 1 -u 
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(42)  
s o  that accelerating depreciation has 
internal rate of return case. The 
a similar impact in the 
only difference is the 
proportionality factor. 
Equations (39)  and ( 4 0 )  are the basis for computing the 1 . 29 
value in the text under the present value approach. From equation 
( 4 )  in Appendix A ,  the age-price profile for surviving assets is 
given by the normalized value equation: 
V(T) = e-«T. 
V(O) 
( 43)  
A curve with a = .20 represents depreciation at twice as fast a 
rate with a curve with a = . 10 .  I f ,  a s  in the text example, we 
assume that the depreciation rate is doubled ( from the base level 
of a curve based on a =  . 10) for the less durable ( l  = 2/3 )  asset, 
then we must solve the following equation for x in order to 
determine the degree of acceleration appropriate for the more 
durable (l = . 90) asset: 
PV( l = . 9 0 , o: =x) PV(l.= .67 , o = . 20 ) . ( 4 4 )  
From equation ( 3 9 )  it i s  clear that equality in equation ( 4 4 )  will 
occur when x is set such that 
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z ( A= . 9 0 , o: =x) z (l= . 67 , « = . 20) . (45) 
But equation ( 8 )  in Appendix A gives the value of z ,  the retirement 
adjusted present value of depreciation deductions, so that we need 
to find the value of a1 sUch that 
«1 +l.1 
«1+r+I1 
«2+12 
C¥2+r+l2 
where 
l., 
l., 
a, 
. 10 
. 6667 
. 2 0 . 
(46) 
This value is . 129 so that we must accelerate the curve for the 
more durable asset 1 . 29 times compared to our base level of a =  . 10 
in order to have neutrality when the curve for the less durable 
asset is accelerated 2 . 00 times compared to the same base level . 
Using a similar analysis under the internal rate of return approach 
would yield 1 . 56 instead of 1 . 29 .  
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Appendix c 
Asset Life Distributions and the Nature of Retirement Risk 
The examples in Part II of the text assume an "exponential" 
asset life distribution while the racehorse examples in Part III 
assume a 
Appendix 
"Weibull" 
explains 
distribution of a certain 
these distributions and 
type .Z55 
describes 
This 
the 
computations used to derive the figures and numerical results in 
Part III. The discussion has a value that goes beyond merely 
explaining the derivation of the text examples. In particular, the 
discussion serves as a brief introduction to modelling asset life 
distributions for studying the depreciation pattern of particular 
assets . 256 
As mentioned in one of the footnotes in the text, an 
exponential distribution is one instance of the more general class 
of Weibull distributions . 257 There is a theoretical reason for 
considering the class of Weibull distributions in connection with 
studying asset lives. If continuing functioning of an asset 
depends on many independent components, then asset failure will 
occur when the first component fails. For example, a racehorse ' s  
useful life will terminate i f  the horse breaks its leg, has a heart 
255. See supra note 120 and text preceding note 3 7 .  
256. There is a substantial l iterature on modelling asset 
life distributions . These distributions play a critical role in 
the engineering and design of mechanical and electronic systems. 
For a good and very accessible introduction to the field, see P.
Tobias & D. Trindale, supra note 3 7 .  
257. See supra note 3 7 .  
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attack or succumbs to a virus. Note that each 11component0 of the 
horse will have a life with a duration that is greater than or 
equal to zero years. We can think of the life of each component as 
a random variable. Since the failure of any component means the 
end of the asset 1 s useful life, the minimum of these random 
variables will be the useful life of the asset. 
we can now describe in statistical terminology the class of 
distributions that would be useful in modelling asset lives. We 
seek a "smallest extreme value distribution, "  the distribution of 
a minimum of a large number of similar random variables where the 
random variables are restricted to be positive . Mathematicians 
have shown that this class of distributions is precisely the class 
of all Weibull distributions. 258 
258. For a more elaborate discussion with citations to the 
mathematical literature , see P. Tobias & D. Trindale ,  supra note 
3 7 ,  at 63-71. 
There is another class of distributions that is used to model 
asset lives, the lognormal distributions. These distributions are 
theoretically better than the Weibull distribution when the asset 
consists of a homogeneous material that wears out from continued 
friction or similar stress. A good example would be the pylons 
that hold up a pier in the ocean. The amount of wear on a pylon 
each year depends on how rough the ocean was during that year. If 
the ocean is particular rough during a period of years, pylons 
installed during those years will have shorter lives. For a 
discussion of the lognormal distributions and their applicability, 
see id. , at 92-98. 
The Weibull distributions and lognormal distributions clearly 
differ in their theoretical suitability for modelling the failure 
rate for particular assets . Nonetheless, for studying the 
appropriate tax depreciation of most assets , it would not matter 
very much which class of distribution is used. This conclusion 
follows from the fact that both classes are very rich, that i s ,  
both classes admit many possible patterns for the frequency of 
asset lives. In a real life problem, we would limit ourselves to 
one of the two classes and pick the distribution in that class that 
most closely approximates the data on actual lives. Each class is 
so rich that the curves selected for the two classes would be very 
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Each individual Weibull distribution is characterized by two 
parameters. First, there is the "characteristic life" of the 
distribution. The characteristic life is the 63 . 2  percentile so 
that by the time the characteristic life is reached 6 3 . 2  percent of 
the assets have failed. Second, there is a shape parameter. This 
parameter determines whether assets tend to fail around one 
particular time or whether asset failures are spread out in time. 
If we denote the characteristic life as "c,  11 the shape parameter as 
11m, 11 and time as 11t, 11 then the probability density function for the 
Weibull distribution is: 
f ( t) = [�][�f e-<1:/cJ• . (47)  
To understand the shape parameter, consider the following 
figure which graphs the probability density function against time 
for three different Weibull distributions. 
similar in the range over which the data was observed . 
The major difference between the two classes occurs where the 
goal is to extrapolate from the range of the data to values that 
are smaller or larger than what has been observed. An example 
would be a component in the space shuttle booster. This component 
need function only for a very short period of time, perhaps only a 
minute or so. But data on failure rates may be available only for 
extended periods such as months or years. In this case it matters 
a great deal whether one assumes the distribution is from the 
Weibull class or from the lognormal class. Curves estimated from 
the two classes would be similar over the range of the data but 
would diverge sharply outside of that range. When the time period 
of concern is shorter than those observed in the data, lognormal 
extrapolations tend to be more optimistic (less failure) than 
Weibull extrapolations. � id . , at 97 . 
In studying depreciable assets , the need to extrapolate 
outside of the range of the data will be quite limited. Where data 
exists, it will tend to cover the time spans of interest. 
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Figure 1 4  
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All three distributions have a characteristic life of 10 years. 
The sharply peaked curve has a shape parameter of 10 , the gently 
peaked curve has a shape parameter of 2 ,  and the curve that is 
convex rather than peaked has a shape parameter of 1 .  
A Weibull distribution with a shape parameter o f  1 i s  an 
exponential distribution. This distribution is the one that we 
have used in the examples in Part II of the text. The distribution 
describes a situation where the rate of death is constant. Since 
the number of uni ts is higher in the beginning, the number of 
failures per unit time will start out high and decline gradually if 
the failure rate is constant . In other words, shorter lives will 
be more frequent than longer lives. The result is a probability 
density function that starts out high and gradually declines as 
shown in the figure. 
In contrast, consider the sharply peaked curve . This curve 
concentrates around the ten year characteristic life and drops Off 
to zero quite sharply around 13 years. This type of curve would 
characterize an asset that is fairly predictable in its durability. 
Most units will last around ten years and almost none will last 
longer than 13 or less than 5 years. The gently peaked curve 
represents a case in between the two other curves. 
As an illustration, consider the case of thoroughbred 
racehorses. Using a simple ordinary least squares approach based 
on Treasury Department data, 259 the three major categories of 
thoroughbreds have the following characteristics: 
type of horse 
geldings 
fillies/ma.res 
colts/stallions 
characteristic life 
6 . 555 
11.081 
7 . 784 
shape parameter 
2 . 12 5  
1 . 51 
1 . 292 
The corresponding probability density functions are plotted in 
Figure 15: 
259.  The data was derived from bar graphs in the Treasury 
Horse Study, supra note 2 3 .  For estimating Weibull distribution 
parameters, maximum likelihood methods generally are considered to 
be superior to ordinary least squares. See P. Tobias ' D .
Trindale ,  supra note 37,  at 74-81. However ,  ordinary least squares 
methods generally are quite accurate for l ives within the range of 
the data. See i,g. , at 80.  In any event, attaining the most 
precise possible estimates is not critical in this Article. 
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The curve that increases the most rapidly and peaks earliest is the 
curve for colts/stallions. These horses have a high early death 
rate. The most gradual curve is for fillies/mares and the sharply 
peaked curve is for geldings. It is striking that apparently 
similar assets (different sexes of racehorses) have very different 
asset life distributions. 
The example in Part III of the text is based on the asset life 
distribution for thoroughbred geldings corresponding to the sharply 
peaked curve above. The age-price profiles in Figures 11,  12 and 
13 in the text are derived under the assumption that revenues are 
constant at some level R so that the only question is how long the 
horse will live. The cumulative density function for the Weibull 
distribution with characteristic life c and shape parameter m is 
F( t) = 1 - e-<t/c)• (48) 
so that the probability of survival up to time t is 
S (  t) = e -(t/cJ•. (49) 
Now the value of the asset at time T will be: 
V( T) :: f Re -.l"(t-7') e-C1lt-T)]·de 
T 
where 1 = 1/c and r is the instantaneous discount rate. 260 
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(SO) 
To 
derive Figures 1 1 ,  12 and 1 3 ,  the integral in equation (50) was 
evaluated numerically for many different values of T and the 
results were graphed in the figures. 261 
260.  In equation (50) , the integrand is the revenue rate 
times the probability that the asset is still operating at a given 
time discounted to time T using the instantaneous interest rate r .  
2 6 1 .  Numerical simulation was necessary because equation (50) 
does not have an obvious analytic solution. In a few places, Part 
III states a present value of depreciation for various values of R. 
These present values were also computed numerically. The pattern 
of depreciation was approximated as the change in V(T) over short 
interval s .  These changes i n  value were discounted back t o  time O 
and added up to provide an estimate of the present value of 
depreciation. The short intervals were made shorter and shorter 
until the estimates converged. 
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Appendix D 
Systematic Versus Nonsystematic Risk 
Risk divides into two types: systematic risk and 
nonsystematic risk. 262 Systematic risks are aggregate risks in 
the economy . Not everyone can diversify away from systematic risk, 
so this type of risk is "priced , "  that is, investors will demand a 
premium to take on systematic risk. Nonsystematic risk is not an 
aggregate risk. If ca[>ital markets are functioning well ,  all 
individuals can diversify away from this kind of risk. 
Nonsystematic risk is not priced because no one is ultimately 
required to bear it. 
Professors Bulow and summers have argued that depreciable 
assets subject to systematic risk should be given special 
depreciation subs idles . 263 This argument is based on 
dist�nguishing between two types of risk: capital risk and income 
risk. Income risk is what we have called "revenue risk11 in the 
text. 264 Capital risk is the risk inherent in the fluctuation of 
262.  See R. Brealey ' s. Myers, supra note 67, at 131-34.
Systematic risk is sometimes called "market risk" and nonsystematic 
risk is sometimes called "unique risk . "  See, g.g. , id. at 1 3 2 .
263 . See Bulow & summers, The Taxation of Risky Assets, 92 J .
Polit. Econ. 20 (1984 ) .  see also Auerbach, Corporate Taxation in 
the United States, Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity 451, 503-05
(Appendix c) (1983) (explicating Bulow & summers' argument using 
Hall-Jorgenson cost of capital model ) .  
264 . See supra text accompanying note 2 .
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asset pric..es. 265 The government shares in income risk through the 
tax system. When income is high, taxes are high so that the 
government shares in the upside. Conversely, when income is low, 
taxes are low so that the government shares in the downside. 
The core of the Bulow and Summers• argument is that this risk-
sharing does not occur with respect to capital risk.ii!66 since 
assets are not traded each year and since tax depreciation 
schedules are fixed in advance and not adjusted annually for actual 
asset value outcomes, the taxpayer faces the entire brunt of 
. capital risk alone. This phenomenon distorts investment by putting 
assets subject to systematic risk at a disadvantage . ii!67 
The basic problem with the Bulow and Summers approach is that 
it does not take the whole lifespan of the asset into account . If 
the taxpayer sells or disposes of the asset in the future, then the 
government will share in the capital risk faced by the taxpayer. 
For example, suppose that operating an asset becomes unprofitable 
early in its life due to a sharp drop in revenues, and the asset is 
discarded. At the time of disposal of the asset, the taxpayer will 
deduct the remaining basis as a loss. This loss deduction early in 
265.  Capital risk does not coincide exclusively with revenue 
risk or retirement risk, the categories used in the text. Since 
the value of an asset depends both on its survivability and on its 
revenue stream if it does survive, capital risk includes elements 
of both revenue risk and retirement risk. 
266.  See Bulow & Summers, supra note 263,  at 2 5 .
2 6 7 .  The impact o f  the tax system on assets subject to 
nonsystematic risk is not a concern. This type of risk can be 
diversified away costlessly. Whether or not the government will 
share in nonsystematic risk will not affect investment incentives. 
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life means that the overall pattern of deducting the original cost 
of the asset will be accelerated relative to the statutory 
depreciation schedule. The loss taken at retirement of the asset 
normally would have been deducted over a period of years. The 
taxpayer receives accelerated deductions, and this treatment 
partially mitigates th� early loss at the expense of the 
government. Thus, the government does share in capital risk. 
It turns out that as long as the tax system takes losses and 
gains from asset dispositions into account , the effect claimed by 
Bulow and Summers will not occur. To fully document this result 
requires technical analysis that appears elsewhere . 268 Instead of 
repeating that analysis here, I present some qualitative arguments 
of the same nature as the ones in the text. 
Consider first the case where trading costs are zero. In this 
case, strategic trading allows the taxpayer to choose in each time 
period between depreciation at the statutory rate or depreciation 
at the actual rate of decline. 269 Suppose that the statutory 
268. See Strnad, The Taxation of Risky Investments : An Asset 
Pricing Approach 44-50 (California Institute of Technology Social 
Science Working Paper No. 546, 1984 ) : Strnad, The Taxation of Risky 
Investments : An Asset Pricing Approach 18-25 (unpublished working 
paper, 1988) . 
269. This point is established in Part I .  See supra text 
accompanying notes 10-14 . 
The basic reasoning that establishes the point is as follows . 
Suppose that at the beginning of a particular year an asset has an 
adjusted basis of $X and that for that the year $0 is allowable as 
a depreciation deduction under the statutory schedule. If the 
taxpayer takes this deduction, adjusted basis will be ($X - $0) = 
$Y at the end of the year. I f ,  however, the asset falls below $Y 
during the year, the taxpayer can costlessly sell the asset and 
repurchase a substitute at a price below $Y. In fact, with zero 
trading costs, the taxpayer can execute this transaction at the 
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depreciation rate for each tax accounting period is set at the 
average rate over all possible asset value outcomes during that 
period. Then, the taxpayer will choose the actual rate of decline 
if the actual rate is faster than the average rate, and the 
government will share in the downside portion of capital risk: To 
the extent that decline in asset value happens faster than average , 
the taxpayer receives a larger deduction and pays the government 
less in taxes. 
In contrast, suppose that the actual decline in value is at a 
slower rate than the statutory rate. Then, the taxpayer can choose 
the statutory rate by not trading the asset. In this case, an 
"upside" outcome occurs since the asset declined less than the 
average expected decline. But the government does not share in 
this upside outcome since the taxpayer does not have to decelerate 
the deductions allowed by the statutory schedule. 
It is apparent that in the zero trading cost case, the 
government shares in the downside of capital risk but not in the 
upside. This result is even better for the taxpayer than what 
Bulow and Summers find lacking, namely, a full sharing of risk, 
both upside and downside, by the government. There certainly is no 
need to allow more generous depreciation deductions for risky 
assets in this case. On the contrary, the ability of the taxpayer 
to share losses with the government but keep all gains suggests 
lowest value that the asset attains during the year. See � 
note 13.  Suppose that this lowest value is $ Z .  By engaging in 
"strategic trading , "  the taxpayer has obtained a deduction in the 
amount ($X - $Z) which is larger than the statutory depreciation 
deduction of $D � ($X - $Y) . 
less generous depreciation deductions for risky assets. 
approach is exactly what is advocated in the text. 270 
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This 
so far the focus has been on the zero trading cost case. 
Suppose, instead, that the opposite case applies: Trading costs 
are so high that strategic loss-taking is never profitable. Now 
the taxpayer knows at the time the asset is purchased that the 
asset will be held until it is discarded as worthless. As a 
result, the value of the asset during the time it is held will not 
affect the net worth of the taxpayer. In finance parley, the cost 
of the asset is a "sunk cost. 11 All that matters is the revenue 
stream that flows from the asset. This revenue stream is taxed. 
As a result, the government fully shares in the upside and the 
downside risk for the investment. In essence, capital risk is 
irrelevant when trading costs are very high. 
The 11 intermediate case" of moderate trading costs is much more 
complicated. The complications arise from the fact that it is 
difficult to model optimal taxpayer behavior. To see this 
difficulty, suppose that the asset 1 s actual value has fallen 
somewhat below its adju�ted basis under the statutory schedule. 
The taxpayer can sell to "accelerate" deductions relative to the 
statutory schedule, but this sale is costly. The taxpayer can also 
wait in the hope that the asset will continue to decline faster 
than the statutory schedule. Then the stream of deductions can be 
accelerated even more for the same trading cost. But the asset may 
go up in value instead of falling further. Choosing the optimal 
270. see supra text accompanying notes 131-142. 
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timing fo� sales is a difficult problem. 
Professor Williams has solved this problem and has embedded 
the resulting optimal behavior in a simple model with tax 
dePreciation. He finds that the tax system will favor riskier 
depreciable assets unless trading costs are so high that no trading 
will occur. 271 Furthermore, where trading costs are not 
prohibitive , the degree to which riskier assets are favored is 
higher when trading costs are lower.272 
These results verify the intuitive story presented above273 
concerning the zero trading cost case and the case of prohibitively 
high trading costs. In the zero trading cost case, riskier assets 
are favored. 
disappears . 
If trading costs are prohibitive , this effect 
Professor Williams • results add to this picture by 
indicating that the case of "moderate" trading costs lies in 
between the other two cases: Riskier assets will be favored . but 
not as much as in the case of zero trading costs . 
Despite these results, there may be an effect of the kind 
described by Professors Bulow and Summers when asset dispositions 
are free of tax . Some of the disposition rules studied in the text 
do involve an elimination or reduction of disposition taxes. 
consequently, the Bulow-summers effect must be kept in mind as a 
271. See Williams, supra note 124 ,  at 305. 
272. See id. at 304-05. 
273. See supra text accompanying notes 269-270. 
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potential problem when considering these rules. 274 
274 . See supra note 181 (discussing potential impact of 
Bulow-summers effect under various disposition rules) • 
Appendix E 
Group Accounting: A Brief History and synopsis of the Rules 
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Over the last twenty years, four systems of group accounting 
have been in use. These four systems each have a different name 
for group accounts. Only two of the four systems apply to assets 
placed into service currently, that is, in 1991.  Al though the 
other two apply only to property placed into service in the past, 
they either affect current law or play a role in the policy 
analysis in Parts III and IV. As a result, all four systems are 
described here.
Section A describes the four systems and the assets they 
covered or cover. Section B discusses the treatment of asset 
dispositions under the four systems, extending the discussion 
provided in Part III of the text. 275 Alternative aSset 
disposition treatments is the feature of group accounting that is 
of most interest for this paper. 276 
A. A Description of the Four Systems and their Scope 
From 1971-1980 a taxpayer could elect to depreciate assets 
under the Asset Depreciation Range ( 11ADR") system. This election 
required that, with a few minor exceptions, all of the taxpayer's 
property eligible for ADR treatment (in particular, most items of 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 172-180. 
276. Group accounting under any of the four systems is 
complicated and includes many special rules. Only a few features 
are presented here . Readers interested in more detail are 
encouraged to consult the sources cited in the description of the 
systems. 
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tangible personal and real property) had to be treated under that 
system.Zn The ADR required the use of 11vintage accounts , "  a type 
of group account. 278 
The taxpayer had some flexibility in placing assets in vintage 
accounts. Multiple vintage accounts could be established and the 
taxpayer could place as many or as few (including one) assets in 
each account as desired. 279 However, each account could only 
contain assets that were placed into service the same year, that 
were subject to the same recovery period and that were subject to 
the same depreciation method.280 
Electing ADR treatment meant that the taxpayer was allowed to 
select useful lives from a 11range11 from 20% shorter to 20% longer 
than the useful lives that otherwise would have applied. The 
principal motivation for electing ADR treatment was to obtain 
accelerated depreciation by choosing the shortest lives in the 
277 . See Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) -ll, paragraph (b) (5)  (ii) . 
The property eligible for ADR treatment included all tangible 
personal or real property that had been assigned a class life and 
was "section 1245 property11 or section 125.0 property . 11 See Reg. § 
l . 167 (a) -l1, paragraph (b) ( 2 ) ; I . R . C .  § 1245(a) ( 3 )  (1971) ; I . R . C .  
§ 1250(c) (1971) . 
278.  See Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) (11) , paragraph (b) ( 4 ) . 
279 . See Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) -11 , paragraph (b) ( 3 )  ( i ) . 
280. See Reg. § 1-167 (a) -11, paragraphs (c) ( 1 )  (iv) and 
(b) ( 4 ) (i) ; Donald, supra note 227 , at A-19 through A-20. Another 
restriction was that section 1250 property (primarily real 
property) could not be placed in the same vintage account with 
section 1245 property (primarily personal property) . see Reg. § 
l . 167 (a) -l1 , paragraph (b) ( 3 )  (ii) : I . R . C .  § 1245(a) ( 3 )  (1971) : 
I . R.C. § 1250(c) (1971) . 
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range. 281 .The administration ' s  main reason for proposing the ADR 
system was to stimulate investment by allowing taxpayers to obtain 
depreciation at an accelerated rate compared to previous law. 2BZ 
For property placed in service from 1981-1986, the Accelerated 
cost Recovery System was applied as a mandatory system for the 
items of tangible personal and real property to which the ADR 
applied. This system replaced both the elective ADR treatment and 
the treatment that applied when the taxpayer did not elect the ADR. 
ACRS allowed the taxpayer to use group accounts called "mass asset 
accounts" to depreciate certain types of property on an elective 
basis. Only a limited class of assets called "mass assets" was 
eligible for this elective treatment. These assets had to be 
numerous, individual identification had to be impractical, and the 
value of each asset had to be small compared to the value of the 
group of assets . 283  In addition, assets in a single account had 
281.  See M. Graetz, supra note 1 ,  at 3 9 5 .  
2 8 2 .  See, §.g. , Legislative History of the Revenue Act of 
1971, P . L. 92-178, U . S .  Code Congressional and Administrative News , 
92d Congress, 1st Session, 1971, at 1912-1914 (House Report , 
dissenting views of Rep. Sam M. Gibbons , summarizing and 
criticizing administration position) . 
The ADR was proposed and put in place by the Treasury 
Department in early 1971 and subsequently approved by Congress 
(except for a few minor details) in the Revenue Act of 1971. For 
a discussion of the history of the ADR, see Donald, supra note 227 , 
at A-2 through A-3 . 
2 8 3 . More precisely, the Proposed Regulations under ACRS 
define a "mass asset11 to be 
a mass or group of individual items of recovery property ( i )  
not necessarily homogeneous, ( i i )  each o f  which i s  minor in 
value relative to the total value of such mass or group , (iii) 
numerous in quantity, (iv) usually accounted for only on a 
total dollar or quantity basis, (v) with respect to which 
separate identification is impracticable, (vi) with the same 
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to have the same class life and had to be placed in service in the 
same year. 284 These limitations were motivated largely by a 
technical concern about recapture of the investment tax credit from 
assets sold from mass asset accounts . 285 Although asset coverage 
for mass asset accounting under ACRS was much more limited than 
under ADR, the Regulations under ACRS did not require the taxpayer 
to elect mass asset accounting for all mass assets . The taxpayer 
could pick and choose between group accounting and individual 
accounting for different mass assets . 286 
In the Tax Reform Act of 1986 the investment tax credit was 
repealed. In addition, MACRS replaced ACRS as the mandatory 
depreciation system for tangible personal and real property. 
Congress continued to allow an elective group accounting method, 
now named "general asset accounts, 11 and mandated that Treasury 
detail the rules covering these accounts in Regulations . Since the 
present class life, and (vii) placed in service in the same 
taxable year. 
Prop. Regs. § 1 . 168-2 (h) ( 2 ) . 
This definition seems to have been drawn largely from the 
existing Reg. § 1 . 47-l (e) ( 4 )  which is substantially similar but 
goes on to say: 
This term includes portable air and electric tools ,  j igs, 
dies, railroad ties, overhead conductors, hardware, textile 
spindles, and minor items of office, plant, and store 
furniture and fixtures; and returnable containers and other 
items which are considered subsidiary assets for purposes of 
computing the allowance for depreciation. 
284 . Prop. Regs. § 1 . 168-2(h) ( 2 )  (vi) and (vii) . 
285.  See Megaard and Megaard, 470-2nd T . M . , Depreciation 
Recapture - Sections 1245 and 1250, at A-116 (Bureau of National 
Affairs 1989) . 
2 8 6 .  See Prop . Reg. § 1 . 168-2 (h) ( 3 ) . 
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investment tax credit was repealed, Congress directed that the 
limitations on the assets subject to group accounting for "mass 
assets" under ACRS be removed so that general asset accounts may 
coritain "diverse assets. 11zs7 
Treasury has not yet issued Regulations covering general asset 
accounts so that the full implications of this directive are not 
yet clear. At a minimum, the directive probably means that the 
Regulations will allow assets subject to different recovery periods 
or different depreciation methods to be placed in the same account . 
It might also mean that the Regulations will permit general asset 
accounts to include assets placed in service in different years. 
In addition, given the Congressional goal was to � the ACRS 
restrictions, it is almost certain that the flexible aspects of the 
ACRS scheme will be retained , namely, unlimited taxpayer discretion 
to place some assets in group accounts and to leave others to 
individual item accounting. 
The fourth type of group accounting consists of "multiple 
asset accounts . 11 These accounts are currently available as an 
elective alternative to individual item accounting for assets put 
into service that are not covered the MACRS system. 288 The 
2 8 7 .  The Blue Book for the 1986 Act states that since the 
investment tax credit was repealed "the Act contemplates that the 
definition of assets eligible for inclusion in mass asset accounts 
will be expanded to include diverse assets . "  See Tax Reform Act of 
1986 Blue Book, supra note 1 8 ,  at 108 . This idea is also stated 
directly in the legislative history of the Act. See Tax Reform Act 
of 1986 Senate Report, supra note 18 at 104 . 
288 . For example, patents and copyrights are intangible 
assets and therefore are not covered by MACRS . 
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accounts were also available for property not covered by ACRS put 
into service in 1981-86 and for property put into service from 
1971-80 by taxpayers who did not elect ADR. 289 The taxpayer may 
set up as many multiple asset accounts as desired, may allocate 
assets to multiple asset accounts in any desired pattern (including 
combining assets subject to different recovery periods or 
depreciation methods) ,  and may choose to depreciate some assets 
under individual item accounting and others under multiple asset 
accounts . 29o In addition, in contrast to vintage accounts under 
ADR and mass asset accounts under MACRS , multiple asset accounts 
may be "open , "  that is, new assets may be continually added to the 
account, and accounts are not limited to assets placed in service 
in the same year. i!91 
B .  The Treatment o f  Dispositions under Group Accounting 
The text mentions three alternative tax treatments for 
the dispositions that have been used in group accounting: 
individual item method , the account adjustment method and the 
proceeds tax method. 292 This section presents the mechanics of 
289 . See Donald, supra note 2 2 7 ,  at A-6 (availability of 
multiple asset account election for taxpayer not electing ADR) ; 
Megaard and Megaard, supra note 2 8 5 ,  at A-111 (availability of 
multiple asset accounts for nonrecovery, that is, non-ACRS and non­
MACRS , property) ; Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) -7 ,  paragraph (a) (same) . 
290. See Reg. § l . 167 (a)-7,  paragraphs (a) and (c) . 
291. See Megaard and Megaard, supra note 2 8 5 ,  at A-112 . 
292 . See supra text accompanying notes 7-8 and 172-180. The 
text also mentions a fourth method as part of the "depreciation 
bond approach . "  .$.§§ supra text accompanying notes 159-171. This 
method, consisting of ignoring asset dispositions for tax purposes, 
is not discussed here because it is has never been used for group 
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these three treatments in a group accounting framework and then 
specifies the treatments used under the four group accounting 
regimes presented in section A .  
There i s  a special accounting terminology for group accounts, 
but for simplicity the exposition here employs the traditional 
basis/adjusted basis terminology used in individual asset 
accounting.293 Quotation marks are used for this terminology to 
indicate that it is technically inappropriate although 
substantively correct. 
Suppose a group of identical assets is placed into service in 
a particular year as a group account. The "basis" of the account 
will be the sum of the bases of the assets . In the first year the 
account will g_enerate a depreciation deduction and that deduction 
will be subtracted from the "basis" for the account to arrive at an 
"adjusted basis" for the account. For both multiple asset accoitnts 
and general asset accounts, the depreciation rates that apply are 
the same ones that would be used to depreciate the assets under 
individual item accounting . 294  
There are three general methods for treating dispositions 
under multiple asset accounts and general asset accounts: the 
individual item method, the account adjustment method, and the 
accounts . 
293 . For a rapid and clear introduction to the terminology 
usually employed for group accounting, see generally Megaard and 
Megaard, supra note 285. 
294 . See · �  note 1 8  and accompanying text (general asset 
accounts) :  supra note 198 (multiple asset accounts) . 
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proceeds tax method. 295 To clarify the operation of these 
methods, consider an example. Ten assets with an original cost of 
$1000 each are placed in a group account subj ect to straight-line 
depreciation over a 5 year recovery period. Thus, the "basis" of 
the group account starts at $10 , 000. Suppose that all of the 
assets remain in the accOunt for the first two years except that 
one asset is sold on the last day of the second year. Absent that 
sale event, the adjusted basis would be $6000 at the end of the two 
years. We will consider sale of the asset for $800, a "gain" of 
$200 compared to the "adjusted basis11 of $600, and sale for $400, 
a "loss" of $200 compared to the "adjusted basis" of $600. 
Under the individual item method, gain or loss is taxed at the 
time of disposition and the "adjusted basis" attributable to the 
asset is removed from the group account . The outcomes in the 
example are as follows: 
( 1 )  Gain case. At the end of two years, $600 in "adjusted 
basis" is attributable to the asset. This amount of adjusted 
basis is removed from the account, reducing the account 
"adjusted basis" to $5400. This $5400 is depreciated on a 
straight-line basis over the remaining three years. Since the 
sale price of $800 for the asset is $200 more than the $600 of 
"adjusted basis" attributable to it, a gain of $200 is 
included in taxable income for the second year. 
( 2 )  Loss case. In this case, the outcome is exactly the same 
except that taxable income is reduced by a $200 loss, the 
difference between a sale price of $400 and the $600 in 
"adjusted basis" attributable to the asset. 
The outcome under this method is exactly the same as under 
295. This terminology is the author ' s .  
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individual- item accounting . 296  Gain or loss is realized on the 
sale of a depreciable asset and the depreciation of other assets is 
unaffected. 297 
Under the account adjustment method no gain or loss is 
realized currently upon disposition of an asset. Instead, any loss 
is added to the "adjusted basis" of the account and any gain is 
subtracted. In addition, the "adjusted basis" attributable to the 
asset is subtracted from the "adjusted basis" of the account . The 
outcomes in the example are as follows: 
{ 1 )  Gain case. At the end of two years, $600 in ''adjusted 
basis•• is attributable to the asset. This amount of "adjusted 
basis" is removed from the "adjusted basis" of the account, 
reducing it from $6000 to $5400. Since the sale price of $800 
for the asset is $200 more than the $600 of "adjusted basis" 
attributable to it, a gain of $200 is subtracted from the 
"adjusted basis" of the account, reducing it to $5200 from 
$5400. The $5200 is deducted on a straight-line schedule over 
the remaining three years. 
( 2 )  Loss case . In this case , the outcome is exactly the same 
except that "adjusted basis" for the account is increased by 
the $200 loss ( instead of being decreased by aa $200 gain) . 
The result is $5600 in "adjusted basis" remaining in the 
account to be deducted on a straight-line schedule over the 
remaining three years. 
The effect of this method is to delay realization of the gain or 
loss from disposition of the asset. The gain (or loss) will be 
recovered as decreased {respectively, increased) depreciation 
deductions in future years. If a taxpayer faces a constant 
2 9 6 .  This identity i s  the reason for the name "individual 
item method. "  
297 . Thus, in the example, the $5400 of "adjusted basis" 
attributable to the other nine assets is deducted at exactly the 
same rate as it would have been if the tenth asset had not been 
sold. 
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marginal tax rate over time, this method treats gains more 
favorably and losses less favorably than the individual item 
method . 
Under the proceeds tax method .llQ changes are made in the group 
accounts due to disposition of an asset from the account, but the 
amount realized from that disposition is included in taxable income 
without reduction for tl'ie "adjusted basis" attributable to the 
asset. The outcomes in the example are as follows : 
( 1) Gain case. No adjustment is made to the group accounts. 
An "adjusted basis" of $6000 remains in those accounts to be 
deducted over the remaining three years using the straight-
1 ine method, just as it would have been if no sale had taken 
place. Since $800 was realized upon sale of the asset, this 
$800 is included in taxable income for the second year. 
( 2 )  Loss case. As in the gain case, no adjustment is made to 
the group accounts. The $400 realized from sale of the asset 
is included in taxable income for the second year. 
In effect, the proceeds tax rule includes not only gain or loss but 
also the "adjusted basis11 attributable to the asset in income in 
the year of disposal and then allows this 11adjusted basis" to be 
recovered as depreciation deductions from the group account in the 
future. For a taxpayer facing constant marginal rates, this rule 
is clearly less favorable_ in its treatment Of both gains and losses 
than either of the other two methods . Although the proceeds tax 
rule may seem punitive, Parts III and IV show that there may be 
some justifications for the rule.298 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174 , 214-224 . 
The proceeds tax rule also has obvious administrative 
advantages. There is no adjustment of a group account as a result 
of disposition of an asset in the account, and thus no need to 
determine what portion of the "adjusted basis" of the group account 
is attributable to the asset disposed of. In the case of accounts 
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The following table denotes the treatment of dispositions for 
each type of retirement and for each of the four regimes sketched 
in part A of this Appendix: 299 
Table IV 
account type 
vintage accounts 
(ADR system, 
1971-1980) 
mass asset accounts 
(ACRS , 
1981-1986) 
general asset accounts 
(MACRS , 
1987-present) 
multiple asset accounts 
(non-ADR, non-ACRS 
and non-MACRS property, 
1971-present) 
normal 
retirements 
AA 
PT 
PT unless 
Regulations specify 
otherwise 
AA 
abnormal 
retirements 
II 
PT 
PT 
II 
consisting of assets with different useful lives that have been 
added to the account at different times, this determination could 
be quite complicated. The only accounting required under the 
proceeds tax method is to include the amount realized in income . 
299.  For vintage accounts, instead of distinguishing between 
"normal" retirements and "abnormal" retirements, there is a 
distinction between "ordinary" retirements and 11extraordinary" 
retirements. This different terminology is accompanied by some 
substantive differences in the category, although there is a 
qualitative similarity in the categories. Compare supra text 
accompanying note 190 (distinction between normal and abnormal 
retirements) with Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) -11,  paragraph (d) ( 3 )  ( i i )  
(distinction between ordinary and extraordinary retirements from 
ADR vintage accounts) . 
The mass asset accounts rules under ACRS abandoned the 
distinction between normal and abnormal retirements . The table 
indicates this change by simply listing the same disposition 
treatment in both the normal retirement colwnn and the abnormal 
retirement column. 
The disposition rules listed in the table are detailed with 
citations in Megaard and Megaard, supra note 2 8 5 ,  except for the 
rule for abnormal retirements under ADR which can be found in the 
Regulations. See Reg. § 1 . 167 (a) -11, paragraph (d) ( 3 )  (iv) (a) . 
183 
As indicated in the table, there is some uncertainty 
concerning the treatment of dispositions for general asset 
accounts. For mass asset accounts , language in the Internal 
Revenue Code required PT treatment for dispositions. However, 
congress changed the language when general asset accounts replaced 
mass asset accounts, and this change can be construed to mean that 
normal retirements are hot intended to be subject to the PT 
rule. 300 The exact treatment for normal retirements from general 
asset accounts will not be known until Regulations are issued. If 
the Regulations do not require the PT rule to be used, it seems 
l ikely that the AA rule will be applied since this rule has been 
applied to normal retirements in the systems (vintage accounts and 
multiple asset accounts) that treat normal and abnormal retirements 
differently . 
300. For a dis'cussion with the relevant citations, see 
Megaard and Megaard, supra note 285, at A-115. 
